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INTRODUCTION
At common law, husbands were exempt from prosecution for raping
their wives. Over the past quarter century, this law has been modified
somewhat, but not entirely. A majority of states still retain some form of
the common law regime: They criminalize a narrower range of offenses if
committed within marriage,' subject the marital rape they do recognize to
less serious sanctions,2 and/or create special procedural hurdles for marital
rape prosecutions? The current state of the law represents a confusing mix
of victory and defeat for the exemption's contemporary feminist critics.
Virtually every state legislature has revisited the marital rape exemption
over the last twenty-five years, but most have chosen to preserve the ex-
emption in some substantial manifestation. With rare exception, moreo-
ver, courts have not invalidated state laws protecting marital rape.
Political protest and legislative action, rather than any clear judicial
1. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1406.01,
13-1407(D) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103, 5-14-105, 5-14-109 (Michie 1997); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 261, 262 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-65(2)-(3), 53a-70b(b) (1994);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1997); IOWA CODE § 709.4(1)-(2) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3517(a)
(1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (Banks-Baldwin 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43,
14:43.1, 14:43.3 (West 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (1996); MICH. CoMn,. LAws § 750.5201
(1991); MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (1994); NEV. REv. STAT. §
200.373 (1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2, 632-A:5 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2907.01(L), 2907.02 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-1(9),
11-37-2 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-
22-7.2, 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 ( Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§
18.2-61, 18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2, 18.2-67.2:1 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.010(3),
9A.44.050, 9A.44.060, 9A.44.100 (1988); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-307 (Michie 1997); infra notes 408-
409 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., A~iz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.0103) (West 1989) (giving judge discretion to
treat marital rape as a misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61(D), 18.2-67.1(D), 18.2-67.2(D),
18.2-67.2:1(C) (Michie 1999) (permitting court, if state prosecutor and victim agree, to place marital
rapist on probation pending completion of counseling or therapy; once counseling or therapy is
completed, court may discharge rapist and dismiss proceedings if it "finds such action will promote
maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the complaining witness").
3. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b) (West 1988) (one-year reporting requirement, unless
victim's allegation is corroborated by independent evidence that would be admissible at trial); 720 ILL.
Coap. STAT. 5/12-18(c) (West 1993) (thirty-day reporting requirement, unless court finds good cause
for delay); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (thirty-day reporting requirement).
4. See infra notes 470-471 and accompanying text.
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statement of constitutional norms, has driven the partial and uneven modi-
fication of the common law rule.
If the modem opponents and defenders of the marital rape exemption
agree on any question, it is that their dispute is a new one. The contempo-
rary debate over the exemption operates on the assumption that the law's
treatment of marital rape first became controversial in the late twentieth
century. Supporters of the exemption frequently assert that women never
saw the need to challenge a husband's conjugal rights until approximately
twenty-five years ago. The drafters of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, who offer the most sophisticated contemporary de-
fense of the exemption, explain that the rule-"so long an accepted fea-
ture of the law of rape"-has only "recently come under attack."5 Judges
similarly note that "until 1977 there was no serious challenge to the
spousal exemption,"' or observe that "[u]ntil the late 1970's there was no
real examination of' the subject whatsoever? Prominent modern femi-
nists, in turn, identify themselves as part of the first organized political
opposition to marital rape, "a reality about which little systematic was
known before 1970."' To the extent that participants on either side of the
debate consider historical questions at all, they generally content them-
selves with a brief citation to Sir Matthew Hale, who wrote the most in-
fluential treatise defending the marital rape exemption at common law.9
5. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 343 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
6. People v. De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983) (noting "the
extensive research done by this Court").
7. Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221,223 (Ga. 1985).
8. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 242 (1989)
[hereinafter MAcKINNON, TOwARD]; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5
(1987) ("Since 1970, feminists have uncovered a vast amount of sexual abuse of women by men. Rape,
battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, prostitution, and pornography, seen for thefirst
time in their true scope and interconnectedness, form a distinctive pattern: the power of men over
women in society.") (emphasis added); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTiCE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 129
(1989) ("[I]n the 1970s and 1980s, partly as a result of the feminist and children's rights movements
that originated in the 1960s, wife abuse has been 'discovered' .... Family violence is now much less
sanctioned or ignored than in the past; it is becoming recognized as a serious problem that society must
act on.").
9. See Warren, 336 S.E.2d at 223 ("Perhaps the most often used basis for the marital rape
exemption is the view set out by Lord Hale in 1 Hale P.C. 629. It is known as Lord Hale's contractual
theory."); De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11 ("Formal recognition of a spousal exemption or
immunity from rape.., is attributed to Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676) .... [F]rom Hale until 1977
there was no serious challenge to the spousal exemption."); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,
supra note 5, at § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 342 ("The traditional explanation for legal incapacity to rape one's
own wife is that the marriage constitutes a blanket consent to sexual intimacy which the woman may
revoke only by dissolving the marital relationship." (citing Hale)); Robin West, Equality Theory,
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 64-65 (1990)
("Marital rape exemptions are strikingly easy to trace to misogynist roots, from Hale's infamous
argument that a married woman is presumed to consent to all marital sex and, therefore, cannot be
raped, to the common law's assumption that marriage results in the unification of husband and
wife ....").
1376
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This consensual account of the history of marital rape is founded on
a massive historical erasure. As Parts I through IV of this Article reveal, a
husband's conjugal rights became the focus of public controversy almost
immediately after the first organized woman's rights movement coalesced
in 1848. " Over the course of the next half century, feminists waged a vig-
orous, public, and extraordinarily frank campaign against a man's right to
forced sex in marriage. This nineteenth-century debate over marital rape
constitutes a powerful historical record that deserves to be examined in its
own right. It also provides a useful framework from which to assess and
understand the course of the modem debate over the exemption.
Public discussion and legal decision making about marital rape have
proceeded without knowledge of this historical struggle. To some extent,
this is because existing historical scholarship has not assimilated into the
popular or legal consciousness. But the work that historians of the nine-
teenth century have done on the feminist call for sexual self-possession in
marriage also remains very incomplete. The leading historical accounts do
not analyze the feminist effort as a legal protest and a legal demand, made
in an attempt to unseat a deeply rooted common law prerogative and de-
nied. Instead, they discuss the feminist argument for a woman's control
over her husband's sexual access as a chapter in the history of birth con-
trol" or a moral campaign to rationalize sexual desire. 2 This Article also
10. The "woman's rights movement" is the term that organized feminism used to describe itself
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the name that I will employ in this Article. That
designation appeared as early as the announcement for the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, which
marked the movement's start. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 67 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al.
eds., Ayer Co. 1985) (1881) ("WoMAN's RIGHTS CONVENTION.-A Convention to discuss the social,
civil, and religious condition and rights of woman, will be held in the Wesleyan Chapel, at Seneca
Falls, N.Y., on Wednesday and Thursday, the 19th and 20th of July, current; commencing at 10 o'clock
A.M.").
11. Linda Gordon's groundbreaking work, which focuses on the 1870s, dominates this aspect of
the history of birth control. See LINDA GORDON, VOMAN's BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: BIRTH CONTROL
IN AMERICA 95-115 (rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter GORDON, WOMAN's BODY, WOMAN's RIGHT]. As she
observes, "[a] woman's right to refuse is clearly the fundamental condition of birth control." Id. at 103.
An important feature of Gordon's work is to explain why the feminist commitment in the 1870s to
"birth control" did not also take the form of advocating the use of contraceptive devices. See id. at 97-
101; Linda Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support "Birth Control" and
Twentieth-Century Feminists Do: Feminism, Reproduction, and the Family, in RETHINKING THE
FAILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 140, 144-47 (Barrie Thorne ed., rev. ed. 1992) [hereinafter
Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support "Birth Control"]; infra text
accompanying notes 222-224.
Reva Siegel's legal history of the nineteenth-century struggle over abortion also discusses sexual
self-possession in marriage. Siegel explains that "[miost frequently, [nineteenth-century feminists]
attributed the incidence of abortion to marital rape," although "they also attributed abortion to the
onerous work of motherhood, some even tracing it to the expropriation of women's domestic labor in
marriage." Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 306 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning
fron the Body]; see also infra text accompanying notes 222-225.
In addition, Siegel's reading of early woman's rights advocacy about household labor and wife
beating describes how nineteenth-century feminists put forth an institutional critique of marriage that
2000] 1377
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reveals nineteenth-century feminism's garrulousness about the supposedly
unspeakable. Scholars have frequently assumed that marital rape was a
private concern that nineteenth-century feminists feared discussing in any
public or systematic way.13 But the historical record makes clear that these
advocates not only publicly demanded the right to sexual self-possession
attempted to give gender-specific meaning to the liberal vision of self-ownership. In the process of this
discussion of marital labor and marital violence, she observes that feminists would occasionally offer a
simultaneous critique of marital rape in the same terms. Siegel, however, does not disentangle the
marital rape claim from claims about household labor and wife beating, explore its full dimensions, or
trace its course. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1102-06 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Home
as Work]; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
LJ. 2117,2148-49 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, "The Rule of Love"].
12. See WILLIAM LEACH, TRUE LOVE AND PERFECT UNION: THE FEMINIST REFORM OF SEX AND
SOCIETY 90 (2d ed. 1989) ("If women were to control their own fertility, moral education was required
to raise both sexes to an equal level of purity, to rationalize or render 'natural' and harmless male
sexual desire, and to prevent disease."); id. at 92-93 ("In effect, feminists fixed the limits of sexual
expression, organized and channeled it, thereby reducing occasions for sexual intercourse."); Blanche
Glassman Hersh, "A Partnership of Equals": Feminist Marriages in 19th-Century America, in THE
AMERICAN MAN 183, 204 (Elizabeth H. Pleck & Joseph H. Pleck eds., 1980) (arguing that nineteenth-
century woman's rights movement advocated "late marriage and 'moral [rather than legal] restraint'
within marriage. These were the only means of birth control they could accept.").
Jane Larson's work on the history of rape reform also appears to operate on the premise that
nineteenth-century feminists did not systematically challenge the law's treatment of marital rape. She
characterizes feminist efforts between 1885 and 1900 to raise the age-of-consent in statutory rape laws
as "the first American women's rape reform initiative." Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at
Last": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4 (1997).
13. For instance, Karen Sinchez-Eppler observes that in the writings of feminist-abolitionists like
Angelina and Sarah Grimkd and Elizabeth Cady Stanton:
Concern over the slave woman's sexual victimization displaces the free woman's fear of
confronting the sexual elements of her own bodily experience, either as a positive force or as
a mechanism of oppression. The prevalence of such fear is illustrated by the caution with
which even the most radical feminist thinkers avoid public discussion of "woman's rights in
marriage"; only in their private correspondence do the leaders of the woman's rights
movement allude to sexual rights.
KAREN SANCHEZ-EPPLER, TOUCHING LIBERTY: ABOLITION, FEMINISM, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
BODY 22 (1993); see also BLANCHE GLASSMAN HERSH, THE SLAVERY OF SEX: FEMINIST-
ABOLITIONISTS IN AMERICA 65 (1978) ("There was little argument about the grievance [sexual abuse in
marriage], but timidity and prudishness made it difficult to discuss even privately, and feminists
expressed widespread anxiety that it would frighten away potential supporters who could accept less
controversial but much-needed reforms."); Hersh, supra note 12, at 203 ("The efforts of the feminist
women and men to elevate spiritual intercourse in marriage over physical union were consistent with
their demand for woman's sexual autonomy. This was played down in public rhetoric, [however,]
especially in the conservative postwar period when efforts at marriage reform virtually ended.").
Ellen DuBois takes a somewhat different tack. DuBois has done a tremendous amount of work
uncovering the demands of the early woman's rights movement, and she briefly discusses some
instances of public feminist advocacy for a woman's right to control her husband's sexual access. Yet,
ultimately, DuBois subsumes the sexual self-ownership claim within her argument that nineteenth-
century feminists understood suffrage to be their most radical and important goal, and were willing to
bypass questions of marital status in order to secure women's right to participate in the public sphere
on gender-neutral terms. See Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal
Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, 74 J. AM. HIST. 836, 843,
856-57 (1987); infra text accompanying notes 22-25, 135-139.
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in marriage, they pressed the issue constantly, at length, and in plain lan-
guage.
Excavating the nineteenth-century contest over the law's treatment of
marital rape restores a significant chapter in the history of the first
woman's rights movement in the United States, offering a new perspec-
tive on the commitments and effectiveness of that movement. Historians
have often characterized the first woman's rights movement as narrowly
intent on securing gender-neutral rights of access to the public sphere,14
with suffrage defined as the movement's overriding and most radical
goal.'5 Yet leading nineteenth-century feminists argued-in public, vocif-
erously, and systematically-that economic and political equality, in-
cluding even the vote, would prove hollow, if women did not win the right
to set the terms of marital intercourse. Indeed, feminists explained a
woman's lack of control over her person as the key foundation of her sub-
ordination. This claim was acutely gender-specific, grounded in the argu-
ment that women needed to control the terms of marital intercourse in
order to regulate the portion of their lives they would have to devote to
raising children. Convinced that women's subordination was ultimately
rooted in the structure of marital relations, feminists demanded both the
right to refuse and viable socioeconomic alternatives to submission.
This agenda, admittedly radical, was neither dismissed nor ignored in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, although it never fully trans-
formed customary norms. The popular prescriptive (advice and instruc-
tional) literature on marriage contains strong evidence that the feminist
critique of marital rape resonated with evolving societal understandings of
desirable marital conduct. Very soon after nineteenth-century feminists
began speaking about a wife's right to her own person, mainstream pre-
scriptive authors began to offer extended analyses of the harm that marital
rape inflicted. This prescriptive literature, however, did not challenge a
husband's legal right to control marital intercourse. It marshaled, instead,
an array of moral, physiological, and strategic arguments designed to con-
vince husbands to voluntarily cede discretion over sex to their wives,
promising that the concession would serve the interests of husbands as
well as wives. In the hands of the popular prescriptive literature, the femi-
nist demand for enforceable rights to protect women from subordination
to their husbands was recast into a series of suggested strategies for mari-
tal mutuality, to be pursued in a husband's interest as he saw fit.
Ultimately, the law of marital rape changed only incrementally in the
nineteenth century, and only in the context of divorce. As an episode of
law reform, the course of the nineteenth-century feminist campaign
against marital rape illuminates a deep cultural resistance to altering this
14. See infra text accompanying notes 134-140.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 18-27.
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aspect of the law, at a time when other aspects of married women's legal
status were beginning to evolve. States willing to augment the property
rights of married women in the middle of the nineteenth century,16 or to
ratify woman suffrage in the early twentieth century, 7 were emphatically
unwilling to subject husbands to prosecution for marital rape. At least in
this arena where sexual and reproductive relations were so directly impli-
cated, authoritative legal sources proved staunchly opposed to the notion
of incorporating into the law a vision of marriage as a potentially dishar-
monious, abusive, even dangerous site of human interaction, in which
wives might need and deserve legal rights against their husbands.
The progress of this nineteenth-century debate on marital rape sheds
new light on the modem contest over the exemption and helps explain its
trajectory. As Part V discusses, one of the most striking aspects of the
modem defense of the marital rape exemption-not generally remarked
on as such by modem commentators but clear in the light of history-is
that it assumes the aligned interests of husband and wife. The exemption's
contemporary defenders argue that the rule's continued existence protects
marital privacy and promotes marital harmony and reconciliation, leaving
both husband and wife better off. In fact, they go farther than that. In the
vision of the modem defense of the marital rape exemption, the assump-
tion of aligned interests between husband and wife is so strong that pro-
ponents do not acknowledge that a marital rape exemption might cause
wives harm. The argument assumes that a wife's interests, like her hus-
band's, are fully and consistently served in a marital relationship shielded
from the possibility of criminal prosecution for rape.
This line of reasoning has proven extremely successful, despite con-
temporary feminist efforts to analyze the exemption as an instrument of
women's legal subordination. To be sure, the marital rape exemption has
undergone more adjustment in the late twentieth century than in the
nineteenth. The only change in the law's treatment of marital rape that
nineteenth-century feminists lived to see consisted of marginal alterations
in the terms on which divorce was available. Over the past quarter cen-
tury, in contrast, a minority of states have eliminated the exemption and
the rest have reduced its scope. But the marital rape exemption still sur-
vives in considerable measure in most states, at a time when the repudia-
tion of women's legal subordination that was just beginning in the middle
of the nineteenth century has been virtually completed as at least a formal
matter. Twentieth-century feminists, like the nineteenth-century woman's
rights movement, have had an impact on the law of marital rape, but one
that falls far short of their aspirations or their level of success in other
legal contexts.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
17. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
1380 [Vol. 88:1373
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In part, the dominant consensual vision of the history of marital rape
helps explain why this modem argument from aligned interests has been
so powerful. When one starts with the assumption that women have long
accepted the marital rape exemption without protest, the proposition that
the exemption continues to operate to the mutual benefit of husbands and
wives is more likely to seem plausible and even intuitively convincing.
That position might be more difficult to sustain in light of a history of
feminist argument and advocacy describing a husband's conjugal rights as
a crucial constitutive element of women's oppression.
Yet it would be farfetched to suppose that the current legislative
commitment to maintaining the marital rape exemption in substantial
form, and the judicial decision not to intervene through equal protection
doctrine, would suddenly dissipate if the record of struggle over marital
rape were widely known. If the history of the nineteenth-century cam-
paign against marital rape suggests anything, it is that the societal reluc-
tance to acknowledge the possibility of antagonistic interests and hurtful
behavior in marriage through the granting of legal rights to women is
long-established, deeply embedded, and highly resistant to feminist chal-
lenge, particularly where questions of marital intercourse are at stake. On
this view, it is hardly surprising that modem defenders of the exemption
have been so inclined to assume and assert that the historical survival of a
husband's conjugal privileges was uncontested; we have a tremendous
cultural need to understand marital relations as consensual and harmoni-
ous, notwithstanding the contrary evidence we confront about the nature
of some unions. The modem defense of the marital rape exemption is one
of the most obvious, if odd, manifestations of that phenomenon. Never do
we hear more about the joys of marital love, trust, and intimacy in a con-
temporary legal context than when courts, lawmakers, and commentators
justify the preservation of a husband's legal right to rape his wife.
There is a highly relevant difference between the environment in
which the first organized woman's rights movement campaigned against
marital rape and present social and legal conditions, however, which sug-
gests that the future course of the modem campaign against marital rape
need not run parallel to that of its nineteenth-century predecessor. In the
nineteenth century, the harm that a husband's right to marital rape in-
flicted upon wives was freely and explicitly acknowledged as a social
matter. In an era still committed to a wide variety of legal structures sub-
ordinating women to men, that acknowledgment was not enough to con-
vince mainstream writers or authoritative legal sources that the creation of
legal rights protecting women against their husbands was an appropriate
remedy. The modem defense of the marital rape exemption, in contrast,
obscures and denies the harm that the rule inflicts upon women. This has
been a crucial tactic because the injury that marital rape causes is far
2000]
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harder to defend, and the absence of legal remediation far harder to jus-
tify, in a nation now explicitly committed to women's legal equality. The
historical record of struggle over marital rape helps reveal this harm,
making concrete what the marital rape exemption's contemporary cham-
pions have concealed. In the process, this history provides a foundation
upon which the modem feminist campaign against marital rape can build.
I
THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION AS IT WAS ARTICULATED, UNDERSTOOD,
AND DEFENDED IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
A. Women's Legal Status in the Nineteenth Century
1. The Consensual Account of Nineteenth-Century Women's History
The notion that a husband's conjugal rights were not contested until
the late twentieth century accords with a common mode of thinking about
women's legal status. This consensual account of the history of marital
rape does not draw on any factual record, and it would find no comfort
there. As this Article demonstrates, a husband's conjugal rights generated
profound controversy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, virtually
from the moment that the first feminist movement was organized. The ac-
count operates, instead, on a presumption: that longstanding aspects of
women's legal status must have survived to the modem age because they
embody a set of shared norms, long agreed to by women and men alike.
The premise that women's legal status is the product of consensual
agreement is prominent even in many historical examinations of the first
woman's rights movement. This line of scholarship acknowledges, of
course, that nineteenth-century feminists campaigned to overturn laws
subordinating women to men. But it depicts the feminist protest as limited
in scope, and ultimately successful in convincing legislatures to reform
the law wherever feminists pushed forcefully for change. These narratives
of the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement stress the passage of
the married women's property acts in a number of state legislatures,
starting in the 1840s. At common law, married women had little, or no,
right to contract, own property, or sue. 8 Some of the first married
women's property acts modified this common law regime by codifying
court decisions that permitted married women to hold their own property
in equitable trusts and by protecting a wife's real property from her
18. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17, 51-55 (1982); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1985); ELIZABETH BOWLES
WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861, at 7-21 (1987); Richard
H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850,71 GEo. L. 1359, 1365-68 (1983).
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husband's debts. 9 Later statutes, enacted from the 1850s onwards, granted
wives the right to keep their own earnings.2' All of this legislation, how-
ever, focused on questions of property distribution between husbands and
wives that were of immediate practical concern to relatively few
women: Only a small subset of wives in the nineteenth century either
owned real property or worked outside the home.' A number of historians
nonetheless describe the married women's property acts as satisfying
feminists' demands for the reform of marital status law.22 In this vision,
the passage of the married women's property acts left suffrage as the most
important, controversial, and far-reaching claim of the woman's rights
19. See JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 16-21
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1870); BASCM, supra note 18, at 156-59 (on New York statutes enacted
in 1848 and 1849); WARBASSE, supra note 18, at 137-247; Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century
Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts
and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 3 (1985); Chused, supra note 18, at 1398-1412; Siegel,
Home as Work, supra note 11, at 1082-83.
20. See BASCH, supra note 18, at 164-65; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 175,
199-217 (1998); Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 11, at 1083, 1142-43, 1180-87; Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO.
LJ. 2127,2141-46 (1994).
21. See Siegel, Home as Work supra note 11, at 1084 ("In 1860, the national census reported
that only 15% of all free women were engaged in paid labor, and most were single or widowed.
Historians estimate that 5% of married white women worked outside the home during the nineteenth
century; the 1890 census counted only 3.3% of married women working for wages."). Free black
married women participated in the labor force in significantly greater numbers. See, e.g., PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA 48 (1984) ("By 1847 a census revealed that close to half the female Black population of
Philadelphia consisted of washerwomen and domestic servants.... While the White female labor force
was made up primarily of single women, Black women, both married and single, were forced to
work .... ); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 123 (1982) ("In 1880, 73.3 percent of black single women and 35.4 percent of black
married women in seven southern cities reported paid jobs. Among white women only 23.8 percent of
the single and 7.3 percent of the married reported paid employment.").
22. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 11, at 1085, 1076 (noting historians' claims that "the
earnings statutes satisfied feminist economic demands," while disputing assertion with thorough
account of feminist advocacy for "'joint property' laws" that would entitle wives "to joint rights in
marital property by reason of the [household] labor they contributed to the family economy"); ELLEN
CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 42 (1978) (arguing that New York Married Women's Property
Act of 1860 "granted New York women all the economic rights they demanded, but still refused
women the right to vote'); BASCH, supra note 18, at 165 ("Every provision of the 1860 [New York]
statute, it should be noted, was a specific goal of the women's movement. The New York Earnings Act,
in other words, was the significant legislative realization of demands by women for women."). Zillah
Eisenstein similarly writes that:
Stanton in the end focuses on the legal component of woman's oppression within marriage.
She argues that because women give up their legal existence in marriage, they become
nameless, purseless, and childless. The husband and wife become one person legally-the
husband. The man has custody of his wife's person. He is guardian of their children, owner
of her property, and has rights to her industry. Hence, the married woman has no legal status,
and propertied single women are taxed without representation. If this is the problem, the
solution in Stanton's mind was passage of the Married Woman's Property Act (1836-48).
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 159 (1981).
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movement. Suffrage became, these historians report, "the capstone of
women's emancipation."' "Nineteenth-century feminists and
anti-feminists alike perceived the demand for the vote as the most radical
element in women's protest against their oppression;"24 feminists were
willing to "bypass[] women's oppression within the family."' This
account explains the history of women's legal status in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as a story of steady liberalization and, ultimately,
of consensualism. It suggests that the demands of the first feminist
movement were all accommodated in turn, with the movement's agenda
completed by the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.6 On
this view, feminists never seriously challenged what remained un-
changed-every aspect of the law of marriage that the married women's
property acts did not reach.27
23. DuBois, supra note 22, at 40. Aileen Kraditor similarly explains:
Why did most feminists focus their campaign for equality so sharply on the vote
between the Civil War and the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution in
1920? An obvious reason... was that most of the other rights they had agitated for either had
been won or were clearly on the way to being won.
Aileen S. Kraditor, Introduction to UP FROM THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FEMINISM 3, 19 (Aileen S. Kraditor ed., 1968). Eleanor Flexner also presents suffrage as the
key claim of the nineteenth-century feminist movement, the demand to which all its advocacy
inexorably led. See, e.g., ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (rev. ed. 1975) (noting that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan
B. Anthony understood the vote to be the issue "of primary importance" to the woman's rights
movement).
24. Ellen DuBois, The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage Movement: Notes Toward the
Reconstruction of Nineteenth-Century Feminism, 3 FEMINIST STUD. 63, 63 (1975).
25. Id.; see also STANLEY, supra note 20, at 203 ("By the postbellum era, only suffrage assumed
higher priority for feminists than earnings legislation; this was a reform of marriage law on which they
could agree.").
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
Reva Siegel has argued that subsequent interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment has itself been
dominated by this same consensual vision of women's history. Advocates on both sides of the debate
over woman suffrage understood the Nineteenth Amendment to have profound feminist implications
for relations between the sexes, particularly in marriage. SeeReva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and
the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About "the Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex
Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131, 142-52 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1999). Modem courts and commentators, however, have read the Nineteenth Amendment simply
as a rule barring sex-based restrictions on the franchise, rather than as a source of broader constitutional
norms about women's status and rights. See id. at 132-33. Siegel argues that this interpretation of the
Nineteenth Amendment reflects and "in turn sustains the prevailing understanding of gender
arrangements as the product of evolving social consensus rather than legal coercion and political
conflict." Id. at 133.
27. Steven Buechler has a somewhat different account of the progress of the woman's rights
movement, based primarily on his study of the movement in Illinois. See STEVEN M. BUECHLER, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, 1850-1920, at xi-
xiii (1986). Buechler does note that the movement began by criticizing many aspects of women's status
beyond the scope of the married women's property acts, see id. at 26-27, 38-41, 88-90, but he explicitly
rejects the notion that the movement ultimately turned to a narrow focus on suffrage because of the
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The history of the struggle over marital rape complicates this pic-
ture.2 It reveals that the legal demands of the nineteenth-century feminist
movement were not limited to suffrage and the marginal property reforms
at stake in the married women's property acts. The first organized
woman's rights movement offered a much more systematic critique of
women's legal status in marriage. Indeed, feminists repeatedly identified a
woman's right to control the terms of marital intercourse as the predicate
condition for women's equality, without which full property rights and
even suffrage would be meaningless. Nevertheless, the law's treatment of
marital rape hardly changed over the course of the nineteenth century, and
the modest reform that did occur was limited to divorce law. The history
of women's legal status in the nineteenth century did not follow just one
path, of gradual progress and consistent success. Lawmakers willing to
enact the married women's property acts or to ratify the Nineteenth
Amendment apparently thought there was too much at stake in changing
the marital rape exemption. The exemption's survival into the modem era
is not evidence that the rule was never contested. The rule was maintained
despite decades of feminist objection, because the exemption's defenders
were far more powerful than its critics.
2. The Law of Marriage in the Nineteenth Century
To appreciate what the defenders of the marital rape exemption un-
derstood to be at issue requires a brief introduction to the law of marriage
in the nineteenth century. The frequent identification of the married
women's property acts as the culmination of the feminist campaign for the
legal reform of marriage might suggest-wrongly-that the law of mar-
riage was somehow equalized in the middle of the nineteenth century.
That was hardly the case. The marital rape exemption was explained and
strength of the opposition it encountered in seeking fundamental changes in the law of marriage, see id.
at 211. Instead, Buechler argues, the middle-class women who led the woman's rights movement
voluntarily dropped their challenge to marital status law as they became increasingly class-conscious
and more anxious about radically disrupting the status quo. See id. at 45-47, 51-52, 95-96, 102.
28. As such, this Article fits into an emerging body of work that is returning to the primary
sources to rethink the emphasis that historians of the woman's rights movement have traditionally put
on suffrage specifically, and gender-neutral rights to participate in the public sphere more generally.
See Elizabeth B. Clark, Religion and Rights Consciousness in the Antebellum Woman's Rights
Movement, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 188, 188-89 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet
Thomadsen eds., 1991) ("Historians have overstated both the secular identity of antebellum feminism
and the centrality of suffrage to that movement.... [R]ights consciousness was originally rooted in
domestic concerns for many women, who saw them as a means of achieving protection for themselves
and their families while pursuing the ends of social justice."); Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 11, at
1078 ("[Mlost accounts of nineteenth-century feminism have focused on the movement's quest for the
vote.... But the movement's demand for joint property was no timid sister of suffrage
advocacy.... [It constituted] an explosive critique of the family form-exposing the state's role in
defining 'private sphere' life and demonstrating that women's economic dependence on men was a
condition imposed and enforced by law.").
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defended amidst an elaborate legal regime that continued to explicitly
subordinate wives to husbands.
In the nineteenth century, authoritative legal sources agreed that the
rights and obligations of husbands and wives were most appropriately un-
derstood, explained, and regulated through the organizing rubric of a
status/contract distinction. This distinction classified legal rules into two
oppositional categories: status rules (like the marital rape exemption),
which fixed marital rights and obligations in the law and made them un-
alterable by private agreement, and contract rules, which permitted hus-
bands and wives, or couples contemplating marriage, to structure their
own legal relationship if they preferred not to rely on the default rules set
by the state. The marital relation was governed by both types of rules,
mainly at alternate parts of its life cycle.
By the first half of the nineteenth century, individuals had a large
measure of control over decisions about whether, when, how, and whom
to marry. Nineteenth-century treatises stressed, for instance, that parental
consent was not a legal prerequisite to marriage in the United States!9
Most states also held that valid marriage ceremonies did not need to take
any particular form.3" Indeed, over the course of the nineteenth century, a
majority of American jurisdictions recognized the legal validity of com-
mon law marriages, where the couple had not necessarily participated in a
ceremony of any sort.3
Status rules were much more consequential and prominent in con-
trolling ongoing marital relationships. A couple could choose whether to
marry, but could rarely modify the legal nature of their union. The legal
terms regulating married couples in the nineteenth century differed from
contracts in multiple respects. First, and by definition, the status rules
governing marriage provided that it was legally impossible for a husband
and wife to circumvent their requirements by mutual decision.32 These
29. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 99 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873); EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND
DUTIES OF WOMEN 242-43 (Salem, John P. Jewett & Co. 1845); SCHOULER, Supra note 19, at 46.
30. See IRVING BROWNE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND OF EMPLOYER
AND EMPLOYED 9-12 (Boston, Boston Book Co. 2d ed. 1890); KENT, supra note 29, at 100;
MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 243-44; TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 312 n.1
(Albany, William Gould 3d ed. 1862); JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 54 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 3d ed. 1882).
31. See Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 494-95 (1884); Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79
(1878); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 11
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1864); KENT, supra note 29, at 102-03; REEVE, supra note 30, at
308 n.1; W.C. RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 58-63 (Chicago, T.H.
Flood & Co. 1899); Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in
the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1890-95 (1998).
32. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) ("[W]hen the contract to marry is executed by
the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts may
be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with
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rules did not depend on securing actual consent from any particular cou-
ple; rather, they conclusively inferred consent, as a matter of law, from the
couple's initial agreement to marry.33 Legal writers like Joel Bishop,
author of one of the most influential family law treatises of the nineteenth
century, explained that the marital relation, as the foundational unit of so-
ciety, was too important to be left to the vagaries of individual will.
"[T]he idea, that any government could, consistently with the general
weal, permit this institution to become merely [a] matter of bargain
between men and women, and not regulate it by its own power, is," he
scoffed, "too absurd to require a word of refutation."'
The marital relation in nineteenth-century law also diverged from a
bilateral contract in its tremendous restrictions on the possibility of exit. A
husband and wife could not simply agree to end their relationship.
Marriages terminated at the death of one party or at divorce, which was
only available for fault (most notably, cruelty, desertion, or adultery), and
difficult to obtain even then." If a husband or wife became incapable-
marriage."); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480,483 (1863) ("[Marriage is] a new relation, the rights, duties
and obligations of which rest, not upon [the couple's] agreement, but upon the general law of the State,
statutory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. They are of
law, not of contract."); 5 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 746 (John Houston
Merrill ed., Northport, Edward Thompson 1888) ("The relation of two married persons to each other is
not a mere personal relation depending on their will, but a status,-a legal condition established by
laws,--which the State has full power to create, change, and abrogate."); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 31 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1852)
("[Ilt is not in the power of the [married] parties, though of common consent, to alter any substantial, as
to make the marriage for a time, or take the power over the wife from the husband, and place it in her
or any other .. ") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 1 WILLIAM T. NELSON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF DIVORCE 5 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1895) ("The [marital] relation differs from a
contract in the following essentials: 1. The parties are not free to fix the terms of the agreement.").
33. See SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 22 ("[Marriage] is a contract .... to a certain extent, since
the law always presumes two parties of competent understanding who enter into a mutual
agreement .... But this agreement differs essentially from all others. This contract of the parties is
simply to enter into a certain status or relation.").
34. BISHOP, supra note 31, at 10; see also Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 ("Marriage, as creating the
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than
any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature."); Adams, 51 Me. at 485
("[Marital obligations] arise not from the consent of concurring minds-but are the creation of the law
itself; a relation the most important as affecting the happiness of individuals, the first step from
barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life, and the true basis of human progress.").
35. See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
SEPARATION 16 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1891) ("Evils numberless, extending to the demoralization
of society itself, would follow the abandonment of marriage as a permanent status, and permitting it to
be the subject of experimental and temporary arrangements .... [Nevertheless,] [n]o married partner
should desert the other, commit adultery, beat or otherwise abuse the other .... ); KENT, supra note
29, at 113 ("When a marriage is duly made, it becomes of perpetual obligation, and cannot be
renounced at the pleasure of either or both of the parties. It continues, until dissolved by the death of
one of the parties, or by divorce."); NELSON, supra note 32, at 18 ("In the divorce suit the interest of the
state is paramount to the rights of the parties .... The state has an interest in marriage as a public
institution; and public policy requires that the marriage be preserved in all cases where the purposes of
the marriage are not defeated."); RODGERS, supra note 31, at 3 ("[A] contract of marriage... is
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after marrying-of performing an obligation of the marital relationship
(through impotence or insanity, for example), this incapacity did not free
the other spouse from marital obligations and did not constitute ground for
marital dissolution. 6 The availability of remedies other than exit was ex-
tremely limited as well. If one spouse willfully refused to perform marital
obligations, the common law did not permit the other to sue for enforce-
ment or damages.37 Suits between husband and wife for torts like assault
and false imprisonment were also prohibited.38
This structural account of status in the nineteenth-century marital re-
lation only provides a partial picture, however. The rights and obligations
of husband and wife also depended enormously, of course, on the
indissoluble in its binding force, even with the consent of the parties or either of them .... ");
SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 22-23 ("Mutual consent... brings them together .... [But] [d]cath alone
dissolves the tie,-unless the legislature [permits] divorce; and this it should only do when the grossly
immoral conduct of one contracting party brings unmerited shame upon the other.., and inflicts a
wound upon the community.").
For a more extensive discussion of the law of divorce in the nineteenth century, see infra Part IV.
36. See Ferris v. Ferris, 8 Conn. 166, 167-68 (1830) ("Corporal imbecility may arise after the
marriage, which will not then vacate the marriage, because there was no fraud in the original
contract.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); BISHOP, supra note 32, at 28 ("[Marriage]
subsists in full force, even although one of the parties should be forever rendered incapable, as in the
case of incurable insanity, or the like, from performing his part of the mutual contract.") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); SCHOULER, supra note 30, at 34 (noting that a marriage is not
voidable for impotency where the "physical incapacity aris[es] from some cause subsequent to
marriage").
Incapacity that existed at the time of the marriage ceremony was ground for marital dissolution.
See Bascomb v. Bascomb, 25 N.H. 267, 272 (1852) (denying divorce on ground that alleged impotency
"arose not only after the marriage, but as a consequence of it [specifically, injuries sustained during
childbirth].... It would seem to be the result not of the neglect, but of the performance of duty. It is no
fault of the libellee, that she has fallen into her present condition .... "); BROWNE, supra note 30, at 5
("Where impotence exists there can be no valid marriage.... The impotency must have existed at the
time of the marriage."); AMos DEAN, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE: DESIGNED FOR THE
PROFESSIONS OF LAW AND MEDICINE 3-4 (New York, Banks & Bros. 1866) ("[By statute, New York]
provides that a marriage contract may be declared void for physical incompetency in either of the
parties, which existed at the time of the marriage."); REEVE, supra note 30, at 322 n.1 ("Impotence, in
order to constitute a ground of divorce, must exist at the time of the marriage, and must be incurable.");
RODGERS, supra note 31, at 12 ("The law never sanctions the annulment of a marriage on account of
the disability of physical incapacity, unless the same existed at the time of the marriage.").
37. See BISHOP, supra note 32, at 32 ("No suit at law or in equity, sounding in contract, and
going to the status itself, can be maintained between husband and wife .... And we may well conclude
that where there is no remedy known to the law.., there is no right."); NELSON, supra note 32, at 5
("The [marital] relation differs from a contract in [that] .... [n]o damages can be recovered for a
violation of marital duty."); SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 56-57 ("[T]he peace of society forbids that
[husband and wife] should sue one another for damages for breach of the marital obligations. Here
again is marriage sui generis, and not like other contracts.").
38. See TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 93 n.1 (Albany, William Gould, Jr.,
& Co. 4th ed. 1888) ("It is now settled in New York that a married woman cannot recover damages in a
civil action against her husband for assault, notwithstanding the [1860 New York statute] allowing her
to... '[sue] for damages .... the same as if she were sole."'); SCHOULER, supra note 30, at 77-78
("This disability of the spouses to sue one another... is founded on the principle that husband and wife
are one.... Mhe wife has no cause of action in damages against her husband for a pure tort committed
upon her person during the marriage relation, such as assault or false imprisonment.").
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substance of these status rules. In the nineteenth century, many of these
rules operated along common law principles of coverture, which explicitly
subordinated wives to husbands. William Blackstone, whose treatise on
the laws of England was extremely influential throughout the United
States, offered the classic definition. "By marriage," he wrote,
the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage,
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
every thing .... Upon this principle, of an union of person in
husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and
disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.39
Coverture united husband and wife by subsuming a married woman's
civil identity and according husbands wide-ranging control over their
wives. Legal scholars explained the principle in the language of hierarchi-
cal authority and obedience. As James Schouler's family law treatise
elaborated, "the laws of nature and divine revelation" jointly designated
the husband as "the head of the family. 4 "It [was] for the wife to love,
honor, and obey; it [was] for the husband to love, cherish, and protect."'"
The implications of this understanding of the legal relationship be-
tween husband and wife can be found throughout nineteenth-century
jurisprudence. Most notably for present purposes, a husband enjoyed sub-
stantial rights to his wife's person!' The common law gave husbands the
authority to chastise, or correct, their wives, as long as the corporal pun-
ishment did not cause permanent injury.43 Courts and commentators had
39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
40. SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 53.
41. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873)
(Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life."); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED
WOMEN 27 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1871) (noting that coverture principles reflect "the law of
nature, which gave strength to the man and feebleness and dependence to the woman").
42. See SCHOtJLER, supra note 19, at 53 ("As to the more strictly personal consequences of the
marriage union, [the husband's] rights and duties have suffered no violent change at our modem law.");
see also id. at 16-17 (describing a shared consensus "[tihat as to rights of the person, or what are
sometimes contrasted with civil as moral rights, no essential changes are wanted; the property rights of
married women coming alone within the scope of a sweeping reform").
43. See 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPXDIA OF LAw, supra note 32, at 815 ("[The
old writers say that a husband may chastise his wife with a rod no thicker than this thumb ....");
BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *432 ("The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate
correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him
with this power ... in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants or
children ...."); BROWNE, supra note 30, at 14 ("The common-law idea of marriage is that the husband
and wife become one person, and that person is principally husband .... He has the custody and
control of her person. He may moderately chastise her."); I EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE
CRtMINAL LAW 207 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1897) ("It seems generally to be supposed that by the
earlier common law the husband might lawfully inflict physical chastisement on his wife in exercising
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formally renounced this right by the latter half of the nineteenth century.
But legal authorities continued, nonetheless, to treat wife beating more fa-
vorably than other instances of assault and battery and remained ex-
tremely reluctant to enforce criminal or civil penalties for marital
violence.45 A husband could also, with only modest limitations, legally re-
strict his wife's movements in the nineteenth century-could conclusively
determine where the couple would live,46 could physically restrain his wife
over her a reasonable control ... unless some permanent injury should be inflicted, or there should be
an excess of violence ...."); TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 65 (New Haven,
Oliver Steele 1816) ("[At common law,] the husband seems to have had the same right over the person
of his wife, that he had over the person of his apprentice; to chastise her moderately or confine her; a
right still claimed and enforced in [England], among the lower ranks of society."); Siegel, "The Rule of
Love, " supra note 11, at 2121-29.
44. See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) ("[T]he privilege, ancient though it be, to
beat [the wife] with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to
inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law."); 9 THE AMERICAN AND
ENGLISH ENCYCLOPDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 815 ("Though the old writers say that a husband
may chastise his wife with a rod no thicker than his thumb, modem law recognizes no such right, and a
husband is not justified in beating his wife, even though she be drunk, or insolent."); 1 JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 535 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 7th ed. 1882)
("[A] former supposed right of chastisement is entirely abandoned .... ); BROWNE, supra note 30, at
17 ("At ancient common law the husband had the right moderately to chastise his wife .... But under
modem common law, the husband has no right to strike his wife even if she is drunk or insolent.");
MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 207 ("But this authority on the part of the husband [to 'lawfully inflict
physical chastisement on his wife'] has been expressly repudiated in all the recent cases on the
subject .. "); REEVE, supra note 30, at 142 n.1 ("A husband has no right to inflict corporal
punishment on his wife .... ); SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 59 ("[S]ince the time of Charles II. the
wife has been regarded more as the companion of her husband; and this right of chastisement may be
regarded as exceedingly questionable at the present day. The rule of love has superseded the rule of
force."); Siegel, "The Rule of Love," supra note 11, at 2129 ("By the 1870s, there was no judge or
treatise writer in the United States who recognized a husband's prerogative to chastise his wife.").
45. As Reva Siegel's study of this transition reveals, nineteenth-century judges and legal scholars
explained the refusal to intervene in cases of wife beating as a method of protecting marital privacy and
promoting marital harmony. See Siegel, "The Rule of Love," supra note 11, at 2142-70. For judicial
explanations along these lines, see State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874) ("If no permanent injury
has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to
draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive."); State v.
Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 459 (1868) ("[It] is not, that the husband has the right to whip his
wife... ; but that we will not interfere with family government in trifling cases.... We will not inflict
upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of
trifling violence.").
46. See 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPrEDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 812 ("The
husband is the head of the family. He decides where the family residence shall be, and may change it as
often as his pleasure, business or health dictates; and his wife must live where he directs ....");
BROWNE, supra note 30, at 15 ("The husband is entitled to select the mutual domicile, where the wife
is bound to reside, and whither she is bound to follow him."); KENT, supra note 29, at 218 ("The
husband is the best judge of the wants of the family, and the means of supplying them; and if he shifts
his domicile, the wife is bound to follow him wherever he chooses to go."); RODGERS, supra note 31, at
126 ("[T]he husband, being the head of the family in law, has the right to the unmolested possession
and control of the person of his wife to the exclusion of all the world. His home is her home; his
domicile her domicile."); SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 54 ("As there must be a home, so there is also a
matrimonial domicile of the parties recognized by universal law. And the husband, as the dignior
persona, has the right to fix it where he pleases.... [W]herever he goes she is bound to go
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to prevent her from leaving that household,47 and could retrieve her if she
did stray, particularly if she had left to go to another man.48 In recognition
of the legal control that husbands exercised over their wives, common law
courts in the nineteenth century presumed that married women acted un-
der the coercion of their husbands and accordingly excused them from li-
ability for a wide range of crimes if committed in their husbands'
likewise .... ). Joel Bishop literally naturalized a husband's right to decide where he and his wife
would live, explaining that "nature, as well as law, points to the husband as the proper party" to
determine marital domicile. "The concurring testimony of the world," he observed, "represents the
husband to be the forest oak, and the wife the forest vine, clinging to its bark, and graceful and lovely
only while it clings." BISHOP, supra note 31, at 654.
Nineteenth-century courts were increasingly willing to consider modifications to this common law
right, but only incremental ones. In 1882, for instance, James Schouler observed that "[a] husband
would not be permitted to remove his wife to some remote and undesirable place for the sake of
punishing or tormenting her, or so as to compel her to stay alone where he did not mean to reside
himself." This, he explained, "would not be fixing the matrimonial domicile with honest intent."
SCHOULER, supra note 30, at 65.
47. See 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 814 ("The
husband as head of the family has a right of gentle restraint over his wife's movements. He may, by
reasonable measures, enforce cohabitation and a common residence; he may lock her up to prevent her
from eloping, or going into lewd company and squandering her money...."); BLACKSTONE, supra
note 39, at *433 ("[Trhe courts of law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in
case of any gross misbehaviour."); KENT, supra note 29, at 218 ("[A]s the husband is the guardian of
the wife, and bound to protect and maintain her, the law has given him a reasonable superiority and
control over her person, and he may even put gentle restraints upon her liberty, if her conduct be such
as to require it .. "); MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 270 ("[Ilf [a wife] attempt[s] to leave [her
husband], or is guilty of improper conduct, he has a right to control and constrain her liberty; provided
always this is done gently and with no violation of the criminal law."); REEVE, supra note 43, at 66
("[t is said, that [a husband] may imprison [his wife] to prevent her going off with an adulterer, and
also to prevent her from destroying and squandering his property."); SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 53
("Marriage necessarily supposes a home and mutual cohabitation. Each party has therefore a right to
the society of the other. They married to secure such society. And the obligation rests upon both to live
together-or as the expression sometimes goes to adhere").
48. See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 739 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1858) ("[P]erhaps, under some circumstances, [a husband] may simply restrain
[his wife's] locomotion. And the North Carolina court has very properly held, that he may lawfully take
her by force from the possession of an adulterer."); BROWNE, supra note 30, at 17 ("There is no doubt
that the husband may forcibly prevent the wife from eloping... "'); MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 270
("[I]f a wife leave her husband, he has a right to reclaim and bring her back."); REEVE, supra note 43,
at 66 ("This seems to be settled, that if a wife elope and go away from her husband without cause, that
the husband may seize upon her person and bring her home .... ); SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 60
("Strong instances for the exercise of this right [of 'gentle restraint'] occur where the wife has eloped
with a libertine and the husband wishes to bring her home, or where she purposes an elopement and he
seeks to prevent it.").
Common law courts had placed some restraints on the exercise of this authority by the nineteenth
century. Tapping Reeve's family law treatise, the first published in the United States, explained as early
as 1816 that "the court will never take away a wife from a friend to whom she has fled to escape the
effects of his brutality, and order her to be delivered to her husband." REEVE, supra note 43, at 66; see
also KENT, supra note 29, at 217-18 ("[F]or any unreasonable and improper confinement by [her
husband], [a married woman] may be entitled to relief upon habeas corpus."); SCHOULER, supra note
19, at 60-61 ('"Mr. Justice Coleridge, in an English case, observes, that the husband's right must not be
exercised unnecessarily or with undue severity; and that the moment the wife, by her return to conjugal
duties, makes the restraint of her person unnecessary, such restraint becomes unlawful.").
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1391 2000
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1373
presence. This presumption excluded only the most serious offenses, like
treason, murder, and robbery, and crimes understood to be the particular
province of women, like keeping a brothel.49
The marital rape exemption had deep roots in this legal regime. It
was understood, explained, and defended in the context of a wide array of
marital status rules that conclusively inferred consent from a person's ini-
tial agreement to marry and coverture principles that organized marital
status so that husbands exercised control over their wives.
B. The Marital Rape Exemption in Nineteenth-Century Criminal Law
There was not the slightest suggestion in nineteenth-century case law
and treatises that a husband could be prosecuted for raping his wife. Rape
laws stated what a "'male person"' could not do to "'any woman, other
than his wife."'' s Legal writers took pains to emphasize that "[a] man
cannot be guilty of a rape upon his own wife,"'" that "a husband does not
become guilty of rape by forcing his wife to his own embraces,"52 that rape
"may be committed by any male of the age of fourteen or over, not the
husband of the female."53This clear prohibition on prosecution had its in-
tended effect. I have been able to locate no nineteenth-century attempts to
49. See 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 826-28; 1
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 243-49 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1856); BROWNE, supra note 30, at 14-15, 26-27; WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
77-78 (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1894); MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 285; RODGERS, supra note
31, at 230-31; 1 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE *6-7 (New York, Banks, Gould & Co. 6th ed. 1853); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 19-23 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. & Brother 1846).
Common law courts paired this exemption from liability for wives with a rule holding husbands
criminally liable for the offenses their wives had committed in their presence. As Joel Bishop
explained, a husband was required, on pain of criminal sanctions, "to put forth his marital power to
restrain [his wife] from violating the laws." BISHOP, supra note 44, at 536.
50. 2 WATERMAN, supra note 49, at *304-1 n.1 (quoting Ohio statute); see also id. at *305-1 n.1
(quoting Oregon law defining rape as an act committed by "'any male person' against "'any woman
other than his wife').
51. OLIVER L. BAROUR, THE MAGISTRATE'S CRIMINAL LAW 66 (Albany, Win. & A. Gould &
Co. 1841).
52. 2 BISHOP, supra note 48, at 623-24.
53. MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 429; see also id. at 207-08 ("The consent of the wife to sexual
connection with the husband having been given by the act of marrying, he is not guilty of an assault in
having such connection."); 3 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *811
(Springfield, G. & C. Merriam 4th Am. ed. 1841) ("A man cannot, indeed, be himself guilty of a rape
on his own wife .. "); CLARK, supra note 49, at 190 ("It is lawful for a husband to have carnal
knowledge of his wife, and the fact that he uses force does not make him guilty of rape."); 1 WM. L.
CLARK & WM. L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 645 (1900) ("[A] man cannot be
guilty of this offense [rape] by having carnal knowledge of his wife, and it can make no difference that
he does so by force and against her will."); IRA M. MOORE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
LAW, AND PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND IN COURTS OF
RECORD IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 306 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1876) ("The Husband Cannot be
Guilty of Rape upon his own Wife .... ); WHARTON, supra note 49, at 293 ("[A] husband cannot be
convicted of the offence [of rape] ....").
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try a husband for personally raping his wife,5 and only one prosecution,
Frazier v. State55 from early in the twentieth century 6 The Texas court
that heard Mr. Frazier's appeal in 1905 reversed his conviction for assault
with attempt to rape, which is not surprising.TThe unexplained-and
unique-puzzle of the Frazier case is how it reached a trial court and a
jury in the first place.
The history of marital rape necessarily contains large silences be-
cause of this absence of prosecution. Cases left uninvestigated and un-
brought are much harder to reconstruct than the concrete proceedings of
trials and appeals. As a consequence, the record of the marital rape ex-
emption has, on occasion, bizarre locations. This section examines laws,
legal treatises, and cases, but none of these sources were responding to,
commenting on, or deciding actual marital rape suits; they addressed the
exemption in some other, less direct way. A large proportion of the
nineteenth-century judicial opinions that discussed the marital rape ex-
emption, for instance, revolved around the question of whether a rape in-
dictment, in a case with no evidence of a marital relationship between
victim and defendant, still had to state that the victim and defendant were
not married to each other. Some nineteenth-century courts actually
54. Husbands were successfully prosecuted for rapes committed on their wives, when they were
not the direct perpetrators of the rape but had helped or forced another man to commit it. See infra text
accompanying notes 78-97.
In addition, at least one husband in England was prosecuted in the nineteenth century for forcibly
sodomizing his wife. See Regina v. Jellyman, 173 Eng. Rep. 637, 637 (1838) ("The prisoner was
indicted for having committed an unnatural offence with his own wife .... It was stated by the wife of
the prisoner, that he committed the offence while in bed with her, and that she resisted as much as she
could .... "). The court instructed the jurors to acquit if they found that the wife had actually consented
to the sodomy. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. See id. (recording jury instruction that: "T]he
wife, if she consented, would be an accomplice [to sodomy], she would require confirmation .... If
you either disbelieve the evidence, or believe the prosecutrix did not resist, you ought to acquit; it was
her duty to have resisted such an attempt to the utmost."); see also MOORE, supra note 53, at 307 & n.3
(citing Jellynian); 1 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 185 (New York, Banks & Bros. 7th ed. 1860) (discussing Jellyman).
55. 86 S.W. 754 ('rex. Crim. App. 1905).
56. At trial, Mason Frazier was found guilty of assault with attempt to rape. The evidence
indicated that Emma Frazier, his wife, had informed her husband that she no longer wanted to have
marital intercourse with him, had moved into a separate bedroom, and had unsuccessfully sought a
divorce. See id. at 754-55. Mr. Frazier was convicted based on evidence that:
On the occasion of the alleged assault [he] entered [his wife's] room, and rather vigorously
insisted upon what he believed to be his rights as a husband. She resisted, and fled into the
room where the boys were sleeping. Appellant followed her in there, and again renewed his
efforts. She finally escaped, however, and the matter ended.
Id. at 755.
57. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied on a long line of precedent in finding that Mr.
Frazier's conduct did not constitute "a violation of the law." Id. at 755. As it noted, "in all the cases it is
said, so far as we are aware, wherever the question has been adjudicated, that the husband cannot be
himself guilty of actual rape upon his wife." Id.; see also id. ("So far as we are aware, all the authorities
hold that a man cannot himself be guilty of actual rape upon his wife .... ); id. ("[XV]e are aware of no
case holding that the husband can be guilty of the offense where he himself is the actual party to the
intercourse.").
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reversed rape convictions because the indictment had failed to explicitly
indicate that the victim was not the defendant's wife.5
58. These cases often relied on United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872), which held
that an explicit statement of non-applicability was required in an indictment where the statutory
exemption at issue constituted an element of the crime, rather than simply a defense to it, see id. at
173-74. The courts that considered this question in the context of the marital rape exemption were
divided.
Some held that the marital rape exemption was a constitutive element of the crime of rape, so that
an indictment could not give sufficient notice to the accused of the offense charged without specifically
indicating that the exemption did not apply. See Parker v. Territory, 59 P. 9, 10 (Okla. 1899) ("[A]s the
allegation that the prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused was a material and necessary part of the
definition of the offense .... we think there is no doubt that the failure to charge this fact in the
indictment was fatal to the indictment .... (citing Cook)); Young v. Territory, 58 P. 724, 725 (Okla.
1899) ("[Oklahoma's rape statute] cannot be read, and eliminate the clause 'not the wife of the
perpetrator.' This [clause] is not a matter of excuse for the defendant.... but is a necessary and
essential element of the crime itself, which must be established by the prosecution .... (citing Cook));
Dudley v. State, 40 S.W. 269, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897) ("[Il]n cases of assault with intent to rape the
indictment must negative the fact that the girl was the wife of the accused."); Edwards v. State, 39 S.W.
368, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897) ("[P]art of the definition [of raping a girl under 15], is the fact that the
parties were not man and wife.... [A]II of the constituent elements that go to make up rape, except
penetration, must be alleged and proved in an assault with intent to rape...."); Rice v. State, 38 S.W.
801, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897) ("IT]he words 'other than the wife of the person' occur in the body of
the enacting clause.... [It] is a part of the act itself, and, under the rule heretofore laid down, the
indictment should negative the fact that the alleged injured female was the wife of the defendant.").
Other courts refused to overturn rape convictions where the indictment failed to specifically
indicate that the victim was not the defendant's wife. See People v. Estrada, 53 Cal. 600, 600 (1879);
State v. Terry, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 240, 242 (1838); MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 434 ("It is
not necessary to allege in the [rape] indictment that the woman is not the wife of the defendant .... );
see also State v. Halbert, 44 P. 538, 538 (Wash. 1896) (holding that an indictment for sexually abusing
a female child, whose last name was the same as the defendant's, did not need to state that the child
was not the defendant's wife). These decisions were generally careful to stress that the indictments at
issue indicated, albeit indirectly, that the victim was, in fact, not the wife of the accused. See State v.
White, 25 P. 33, 35 (Kan. 1890) ("[I]f Lottie Linden had been the wife of the defendant Charles W.
White, her name would have been White, and the intercourse charged would not have been a 'crime' or
'rape' nor committed 'unlawfully and feloniously,' as charged .... "); Commonwealth v. Scannel, 65
Mass. (11 Cush.) 547, 548 (1853) ("The indictment, charging as it does, that the defendant did ravish
one Mary Moran, a person of different name and without further description, corresponds to the usual
precedents in this respect, and is well enough."). Some of these courts also specifically characterized
the marital exemption as a defense to rape, rather than an element of the crime, which placed the
burden on the defendant to bring forth evidence that he was married to the victim. See Commonwealth
v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 491 (1857) ("[A] party indicted [could always] show, in defence of
a charge of rape alleged to be actually committed by himself, that the woman on whom it was charged
to have been committed was his wife. But it is not necessary to negative the fact in the indictment.");
State v. Williams, 23 P. 335, 337 (Mont. 1890) ("The essential element of the offense is the outrage to
the person and feelings of the female .... The offense would exist in an act of sexual intercourse
committed with any female, under any of the [statutory] circumstances .... with the exception, not of a
class of females, but of a single individual, viz., the wife of the perpetrator."); State v. Williamson, 62
P. 1022, 1023 (Utah 1900) ("[it is not necessary, under our statute, to show in the information that the
person ravished was not the wife of the defendant. The statute contains no provision or exception
requiring it.... The party indicted, however, may show in his defense that the alleged act was
committed with his wife."); FRANCIS J. LIppr, CRIMINAL LAW AS ADMINISTERED IN MASSACHUSETTS
261 (Boston, Houghton, Osgood & Co. 1879) ("The [rape] Indictment need not allege ... that the
female was not his wife.... This can be shown in defence.").
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The notable contrast between wives' categorical exemption from
rape statutes and the protection against rape (nominally) accorded to other
highly vulnerable classes of women also helps illustrate the exemption's
deep roots in nineteenth-century law. It was a well-established proposition
in nineteenth-century treatises that prostitutes and concubines fell within
the purview of rape statutes, even if actual conviction was unlikely since
the defendant could present evidence of the victim's occupation to the
jury.59 Legal writers explained that the concern of rape laws centered, not
on the status of the victim, but on the fact that the act in question was
"against the will of the female on whom it is committed." On this theory,
prostitutes and concubines were fully covered by rape laws; 6 a man ac-
cused of raping a prostitute or concubine could offer reputational evidence
against his alleged victim only because such evidence was understood to
speak to the likelihood that the woman had in fact consented.62 Yet
59. The common law rule that a man could be prosecuted for raping a prostitute actually dates as
far back as 1631, when the King's Bench in England noted in Lord Audley's Case that a rape
conviction would stand, notwithstanding proof "that the party ravished [was] of evil fame, and of an
unchaste life." The Trial of Mervin Lord Audley, Earl of Castlehaven, for a Rape and Sodomy (1631),
reprinted in 3 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 401, 414 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C.
Hansard 1816) [hereinafter Lord Audley's Case]. As the opinion explained, "[tihe Judges resolve it to
be a Rape, though committed on the body of a common strumpet; for it is the enforcing against the will
which makes the Rape; and a common whore may be ravished against her will, and it is Felony to do
it." Id.
60. BARBOUR, supra note 51, at 65.
61. See id. ("[N]or will it be any excuse [in a rape case that the victim] ... was a common
strumpet, or the concubine of the ravisher; for she is still under the protection of the law, and may not
be forced."); CHITTY, supra note 53, at *811 ("Formerly it was said to be no rape for a man to have
forcible knowledge of his own concubine, but the law now presumes the possibility of her return to
virtue.") (citations omitted); CLAMR supra note 49, at 190 ("The fact that the woman is a common
prostitute, or the man's mistress, does not make the act any the less rape, if force, actual or implied, is
used; for the carnal knowledge is unlawful, and forcible unlawful carnal knowledge of any woman is
rape."); CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 53, at 646 ("Subject to this qualification [for wives], any
female may be the subject of rape. It is not necessary .... that she shall have been
chaste.... [Unchastity] does not, as a matter of law, prevent the intercourse from being rape, if it was
in fact accomplished by force and without her consent."); DEAN, supra note 36, at 25 ("The crime of
rape may be committed upon a virgin, a single or married woman, or even upon a prostitute. The latter
being also under the protection of the law."); MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 442 ("[The want of chastity
of the female is no defense, for the crime of rape may be committed upon a prostitute or upon the
mistress of the assailant .. "); MOORE, supra note 53, at 304 ("It is, however, no excuse for the party
committing the offense of rape that the woman was a strumpet or the concubine of the ravisher, for she
is still under the protection of the law and may not be forced."); 2 WATERMAN, supra note 49, at *306-
1 n.1 ("[A] common strumpet... is still under the protection of the law, and may not be forced.
Neither is it even any justification, that [the victim] was a concubine to the ravisher himself; for a
woman may forsake her unlawful course of life .. "); WHARTON, supra note 49, at 296 (similar).
62. See BARBouR, supra note 51, at 67 ('If the prosecutrix be of good fame ... these and the like
circumstances give greater probability to her evidence; but on the contrary, if she be of evil
fame.., these and the like circumstances carry a strong but not a conclusive presumption that her story
is fictitious."); CHITrY, supra note 53, at *812 (similar); 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CRIMINAL LAW 619 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 6th ed. 1877) ('This offence may be committed
as well on a woman unchaste, or a common prostitute, as on any other female. In matter of evidence,
however, want of chastity may, within recognized limits, be shown as rendering it more probable that
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nineteenth-century case law and treatises never indicated that analogous
reasoning might suggest that husbands should be criminally liable for
raping their wives. To the contrary, leading treatises reviewed the con-
trasting rights of prostitutes and wives side-by-side without any apparent
qualms, noting, for example, that rape "may be committed as well on a
common prostitute, as on any other female. But a husband does not
become guilty of rape by forcing his wife to his own embraces. ' '6 3
The reasons cited to explain and justify the exemption in nineteenth-
century authoritative legal sources originated in the work of Sir Matthew
Hale, a former Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in England.
Hale's seminal treatise, the History of the Pleas of the Crown,'I was first
published in England in 1736 and became extraordinarily influential in
American legal circles almost immediately thereafter.65 Even more than a
century after Hale's work appeared, American treatises and case law had
not supplemented Hale's arguments for the marital rape exemption with
alternate theories of their own.
As an initial matter, this reliance on Hale suggests how secure
nineteenth-century legal authorities took the criminal exemption to be. In-
deed, one of the most striking aspects of the nineteenth-century "debate"
over marital rape is how little debate there actually was in terms of direct
exchange between the exemption's legal champions and its critics. Al-
though, as we will see, some late nineteenth-century courts did modify the
she consented."); CLARK, supra note 49, at 190 ("The fact, however, that the woman was a prostitute,
or of unchaste character, may always be considered in determining whether she consented or not, as a
prostitute would be more apt to consent than a chaste woman."); CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 53,
at 646 ("The fact that she was not chaste may aid, as a matter of evidence, in showing that she
consented .... ); DEAN, supra note 36, at 24 ("[lIt may.. . be shown that she ['the prosecutrix'] is a
common prostitute, this fact, if true, tending to repel the allegation of force, and laying a foundation for
inferring assent on her part."); MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 442 ("While the want of chastity of the
female is no defense .... the bad character of the prosecutrix as to chastity is material as tending to
show that the evidence of want of consent is not sufficient."); MOORE, supra note 53, at 302-03 ("For
the purpose of raising the presumption that the woman consented, it may be shown that she bore a
notoriously bad character for want of chastity and common decency; that she was in fact a common
prostitute; or... the concubine of the ravisher; or had voluntarily had connection with him."); 2
WATERMAN, supra note 49, at *307 to 307-1 ("Nor is it any defence that she is a common
strumpet .... But... though in itself no defence, it is most material for the defendant, and it is
permitted to him to show the fact, to throw a doubt upon her statement that the connexion was had
against her will."); WHARTON, supra note 49, at 296 ("All these latter circumstances [being 'a common
strumpet' or 'a concubine to the ravisher'], however, are material to be left to the jury in favour of the
party accused, more especially in doubtful cases, and where the woman's testimony is not corroborated
by other evidence.").
63. 2 BISHOP, supra note 48, at 623-24.
64. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Philadelphia, Robert H.
Small 1st Am. ed. 1847) (1736).
65. See CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY
IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789, at 246-47 (1995); Sharon Block, Coerced Sex in British North America,
1700-1820, at 179-80, 189, 195 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file
with author).
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law's treatment of marital rape as it affected the terms on which divorce
was available, lawyers and judges saw no need to respond to opposing
arguments in the criminal arena-the core of the exemption, rather than
its peripheries. In these sources, the criminal exemption remained a given.
Treatise writers and judges saw no threat meriting a rethinking of the
claims on which they had relied for over a hundred years.
Another explanation for this reliance on Hale, though, one equally
important to understand, is that these sources depended on Hale so heavily
because his arguments, grounded in principles of marital status law and
common law coverture, still seemed so convincing to them. In the
nineteenth century, American judges and lawyers who confronted the
marital rape exemption routinely cited Hale's argument from irretractible
consent. Hale's explication read, in full, as follows: "But the husband
cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for
by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."'67 The
statement included no supporting citations, and this appears not to have
been an oversight. Even scholars who believe that ample common law
authority already sanctioned the marital rape exemption when Hale
wrote,6" posit that the theory of irretractible consent originated with him.69
66. See infra Part IV.
67. HALE, supra note 64, at 629.
68. The earliest roots of the marital rape exemption are murky. The rule may be linked to the
concept of "conjugal debt" in medieval moral theology and the law of the church. This concept, derived
from Biblical statements on marriage, held that "both husband and wife had a duty to perform sexually
at the request of their mate." Elizabeth M. Makowski, The Conjugal Debt and Medieval Canon Law, 3
J. MEDIEVAL IsT. 99, 99 (1977); see also 1 Cor. 7:4 ("A wife has no authority over her body, but her
husband; likewise the husband has no authority over his body, but his wife. You must not refuse each
other .... ). A husband or wife could not unilaterally terminate this conjugal debt, even by joining a
religious order that prohibited sexual intercourse. See Makowski, supra, at 109. A spouse lost his right
of sexual access only if he committed a sin like adultery. See id. Some historians of the middle ages
have presented the doctrine of conjugal debt as evidence "of female equality in marital sexual
relations," arguing that "[m]edieval canonists' opinions about the sexual equality of married men and
women formed an integral part of the process that slowly led to a grudging recognition that equity
requires that men and women be treated equally in other spheres of life as well." JAMEs A. BRUNDAGE,
Sexual Equality in Medieval Cannon Law, in SEx, LAW AND MARRIAGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 66, 70,
72 (1993); see also Makowski, supra, at 99 (describing conjugal debt as an "equal opportunity
concept"). The history of the marital rape exemption in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries suggests
that these scholars may have read too much into the fact that the conjugal debt concept formally bound
a husband as much as his wife. Tellingly, almost every marital rape statute has been made formally
gender-neutral in the last twenty-five years, but the change has had essentially no impact on the gender-
specificity of the law's operation. See infra text accompanying notes 444-447, 463-476.
69. See David Lanham, Hale-Misogyny and Rape, 7 CRiM. L.J. 148, 155 (1983) ("While it
seems clear that there was ample authority for the fact of marital immunity in rape, the theoretical basis
of the immunity does seem to be Hale's own creation."). Lanham is very sympathetic to Hale, despite
the impression that the title of his article might convey. He argues, for instance, that Hale invented his
own explanation for the marital rape exemption because "Hale's attitude towards marital immunity was
more favourable to women than any authority which he could have cited. Instead of giving a reference
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Yet treatises and cases would repeat Hale's words, virtually verbatim,
throughout the nineteenth century, often as the only explanation they of-
fered for the exemption: "A man cannot be guilty of a rape upon his own
wife; for the matrimonial consent cannot be retracted," they noted.70
"[T]he husband of a woman cannot himself be guilty of an actual rape
upon his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which she has
given, and which she cannot retract."'" Several aspects of Hale's theory
suggest why it proved so compelling.
Hale's understanding of presumed legal consent made enormous
sense in the framework of nineteenth-century marital status law. As we
have seen, all of these status rules operated automatically, subjecting
every husband and every wife to predetermined constraints without per-
mitting individual negotiation or waiting for individual consent. These
status rules, moreover, remained in place as long as the marital relation
itself: Opting-out was impossible while one's marriage lasted (and the
prospects for securing a divorce were very limited). Whether a husband or
wife actually supported these rules, or would have liked to contract
around them, was irrelevant as a matter of law. The only occasion for ac-
tual agreement was a person's decision to marry in the first place. Hale's
theory applied this same understanding of legal consent to one of the
many status rules that organized the marital relation at common law,
namely, the rape exemption. His work explained that, in this context as
or series of references which would have given a misleading impression of his view of the law, he
inserted his statement of marital immunity." Id. at 153-54.
Cornelia Hughes Dayton's study of court records in colonial Connecticut also suggests that Hale's
writing on rape did not simply record the law as it was then understood, but instead was deeply
influenced by Hale's own view of how rape law should be organized and explained. See DAYTON,
supra note 65. Dayton studied, not the marital rape exemption, but another famous statement from Sir
Hale on rape, his warning that:
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be
punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.
HALE, supra note 64, at 635. Her research indicates that Hale's suspicion about the veracity of women
who brought rape charges did not correspond to the law in colonial America, at least, at the time that he
wrote. To the contrary, Dayton reports that courts in seventeenth-century Connecticut operated on the
presumption that women's charges of rape were to be believed. See DAYTON, supra note 65, at 31-32,
234-40. The presumption eventually changed, by the middle of the eighteenth century, because judges
and lawyers who had been influenced by reading Hale changed their local law to reflect his warning.
See id. at 60-61, 232, 234, 246-47. This history suggests that contemporaries did not understand Hale's
writing on rape simply as a positive account of the law, but rather took it, at least in some respects, as a
normative argument.
70. BARBOUR, supra note 51, at 66; see also CrTTY, supra note 53, at *811 ("A man cannot,
indeed, be himself guilty of a rape on his own wife, for the matrimonial consent cannot be
retracted...."); MOORE, supra note 53, at 306 ("The Husband Cannot be Guilty of Rape upon his own
Wife for the matrimonial consent cannot be retracted .... ").
71. State v. Haines, 25 So. 372, 372 (La. 1899); see also 2 WATERMAN, supra note 49, at *306-1
n.1 (same statement).
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elsewhere, a married person's original agreement to marry justified a legal
presumption of permanent and irretractible consent to marital status law.
It was, accordingly, important that Hale's consent theory, and the
marital rape exemption, did not cover forced marriages, where the wife
had been unlawfully compelled to wed. Hale himself explicitly carved out
an exception for these women, noting that their putative husbands could
be prosecuted for raping them.72 Nineteenth-century treatises, in turn,
adopted the point. As Thomas Waterman explained in 1853, the agree-
ment to marry was "in reality nothing more, nor less, than a contract
between two parties." Because "a contract implie[d] mutual consent, there
[could], of course, be no contract, when either party with[held] consent,
or when consent [was] extorted by duress." The victim of a forced mar-
riage had never freely agreed to marry, hence she was not legally married,
hence her consent to the operation of marital status law could not be pre-
sumed.7"
I want to stress, however, that Hale's theory generally did not con-
cern itself with a wife's actual state of mind. To be sure, his explanation
depended on the proposition that a woman had actually agreed to her mar-
riage, under circumstances free from legally cognizable force, duress, or
fraud. But after a woman had made that decision, Hale's theory no longer
turned on what a woman actually wanted or would agree to if asked. Con-
sider Hale's last clause: "But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."'74 This clause suggested
that there might be situations in which a married woman would want to
retract her consent to marital intercourse. Hale's statement, in other
words, acknowledged the potential divergence between a wife's actual
state of mind at any particular moment during a marriage, and the legal
rule conclusively inferring consent from her initial agreement to marry.
More precisely, it acknowledged this divergence and enforced the legal
presumption of consent. In doing so, it reconciled the theory behind the
72. See HALE, supra note 64, at 629-30. Hale also argued that victims of forced marriages who
retroactively gave their consent to the abduction could shield their husbands from rape prosecution. See
id. at 629, 633.
73. 2 WATEMAN, supra note 49, at *306-1 n.1; see also BARBOUR, supra note 51, at 72;
CHITTY, supra note 53, at *8 11.
Blackstone made a similar argument to explain why a wife could properly testify against her
husband in cases of forced marriage:
in this case she can with no propriety be reckoned his wife; because a main ingredient, her
consent, was wanting to the contract: and also there is another maxim of law, that no man
shall take advantage of his own wrong; which the ravisher here would do, if by forcibly
marrying a woman, he could prevent her from being a witness, who is perhaps the only
witness, to that very fact.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *431.
74. HALE, supra note 64, at 629 (emphasis added).
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marital rape exemption with that explaining the legitimacy of marital
status law generally.
Hale's argument for the marital rape exemption also resonated
deeply with the coverture principles that shaped the content of most
marital status rules in the nineteenth century. His explanation started by
noting the "mutual matrimonial consent and contract" of husband and
wife, evidenced by their shared agreement to marry.75 But it proceeded to
outline only the obligation that a wife owed her husband: "for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
this kind unto her husband." In other words, Hale presented a couple's
mutual decision to marry as grounds for subjecting wives and husbands to
very different obligations and rights. Both a wife and her husband agreed
to marry, but where this agreement gave the husband a right of sexual ac-
cess to his wife, it bestowed an obligation on the wife to submit. One
might think, as a purely theoretical matter, that this explicit sex-based dif-
ferentiation required justification. But in historical context, of course,
such an explanation could easily be understood as superfluous. Hale's
theory accorded with coverture principles that generally subjected wives
to a wide array of limitations and obligations that husbands did not bear.
This is not to say that the relationship between husband and wife was not
a reciprocal one at common law. It was; a wife had the right to support
and protection from her husband. 7 But while the marital relationship was
reciprocal, it was also explicitly hierarchical. Wives were vastly more
constrained; they surrendered many more legal rights by marrying. The
marital rape exemption, with its unequal demands on husband and wife,
was just one more example of coverture principles at work. And the wide-
spread commitment to the operative tenets of coverture was another rea-
son that Hale's irretractible consent theory struck authoritative legal
sources in the nineteenth century as so satisfactory.
When nineteenth-century cases and treatises considered the marital
rape exemption, they did not limit themselves to citing Hale's consent
theory, however. They often spent just as much time, or more, articulating
what I call a "third-party caveat" to the marital rape exemption, also de-
rived from Hale and also meant to legitimate a wife's subordination to her
husband. This caveat stated that the marital rape exemption was a per-
sonal privilege. It only covered acts that a husband personally committed
on his wife; it did not reach cases in which a husband had allowed, or
forced, another man to rape his wife. Why were so many pages devoted to
75. Id (emphasis added).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 815-16, 829-
32; PEREGRINE BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 187-88 (Exeter, George Lamson 1st
Am. ed. 1824); BISHOP, supra note 32, at 31-32; BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *430; KENT, supra
note 29, at 176-79; MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 284-305; SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 76-77.
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stating this limit on the marital rape exemption? The effort indicates, first,
what was and was not understood to be contestable. Cases and treatises
touching upon the marital rape exemption in the nineteenth century would
often cite Hale's irretractible consent theory, but would generally do little
else to confirm the existence and soundness of the ban on prosecuting a
husband for raping his wife. The lack of standard forms of support, like
case citations, in discussions of the marital rape exemption indicated its
status as an understood baseline. In contrast, judges and lawyers clearly
felt that they had to do more to explain and justify the third-party caveat,
perhaps because the caveat functioned to limit a husband's control over
his wife's person. Even though every case and treatise that considered the
issue endorsed the caveat," the rule had to be defended rather than just
stated.
More fundamentally, though, the emphasis on the third-party caveat
reinforced the point that the marital rape exemption drew the line between
legal and illegal intercourse so that it depended solely on whether a
woman was married to her sexual partner, and not on her consent. In
nineteenth-century jurisprudence, all sex outside of marriage, whether
consensual or not, was illicit by definition and formally criminalized in
fornication and adultery statutes.!9 The marital rape exemption reflected
and extended this dichotomy by making marital intercourse legal by defi-
nition!' The third-party caveat helped to further underscore this demarca-
tion by stressing that the marital rape exemption did not cover any sex
outside of marriage, even if accomplished at a husband's command.
Structuring the legality of sex so that it turned exclusively on
whether a woman was married to her sexual partner was crucially impor-
tant because it obscured how the marital rape exemption made a wife's
position resemble that of a prostitute. The comparison, which nineteenth-
century feminists would press aggressively,81 appears to have made the
exemption's defenders anxious as far back as Hale. Prostitutes were gen-
erally thought to be socially degraded in ways that wives were not. But no
overwhelming logic presented itself in this context to explain the
78. See sources cited infra notes 79-97.
79. See CLARK, supra note 49, at 312-19; CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 53, at 164-65;
CONSTABLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH, ABSTRACT OF CRIMINAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 80-81
(Boston, Wright & Potter rev. ed. 1869); EUGENE L. GROSS, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF
ILLINOIS 53 (Springfield, Illinois Journal Co. 1868); LIPPITT, supra note 58, at 130-34; EDWARD
LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 87-88 (Washington,
Gales & Seaton 1828); 2 MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 248-60, 286-88; MOORE, supra note 53, at 443-
45; M. WARREN, OHIO CRIMINAL LAW AND FORMS 329-30, 336-38 (Cincinnati, Wrightson & Co.
1856); WHARTON, supra note 49, at 556-59.
80. In fact, this dichotomy was never as complete as discussion of the marital rape exemption in
the nineteenth century suggested. Many states prohibited sodomy between husband and wife. See, e.g.,
MOORE, supra note 53, at 306-07; WATERMAN, supra note 54, at 184-86. However, lawyers and judges
never acknowledged this point in explaining the exemption's treatment of licit and illicit sex.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 184-209, 261-264.
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difference in the work performed. After all, a husband had a duty to sup-
port his wife at common law, 2 and the exemption gave him a legal right to
take sex in return. If a wife had extramarital relations (against her hus-
band's wishes), the common law permitted the husband to collect civil
damages from the other man, financially compensating him for "the
invasion of his exclusive right to marital intercourse with his wife." 3
Rather than attempt to substantively distinguish the terms on which
wives and prostitutes provided sexual services, authoritative legal sources,
with the help of the third-party caveat, separated the two sets of women
by reference to whether or not they were married to the men who had sex
with them. Consider Hale's explanation of the caveat:
A. the husband of B. intends to prostitute her to a rape by C. against
her will, and C. accordingly doth ravish her, A. being present, and
assisting to this rape... [T]his was a rape in C. notwithstanding
the husband assisted in it, for tho in marriage she hath given up her
body to her husband, she is not to be by him prostituted to
another.... [T]he husband being present, aiding and assisting, is
also guilty as a principal in rape, and therefore, altho the wife
cannot have an appeal of rape against her husband, yet he is
indictable for it at the king's suit as a principal.'M
In Hale's account, the difference between a wife and a prostitute is ex-
plained solely as a matter of jurisdiction. Intercourse with one's husband
was the obligation of wives; it was part of what being a wife signified. In
contrast, adultery (forced or not) fell within the purview of prostitutes.
When a woman agreed to marry, she agreed to be a wife and, accordingly,
not a prostitute. All this meant in practical terms, though, was that sex
with one's husband (consensual or not) was licit and socially sanctioned,
and sex with a man other than one's husband (consensual or not) was
illicit and socially stigmatized. 5
82. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83. Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, 125 (1883); see also Bedan v. Turney, 34 P. 442, 443
(Cal. 1893) ("Her sexual intercourse with another is an invasion of his rights .... As the right belongs
to the husband, it is no defense to his action for redress that its violation was by the consent or
procurement of the wife, for she is not competent to give such consent .... ); Browning v. Jones, 52
Ill. App. 597, 604 (1893) ("[U]nder and by virtue of [the marriage contract] the husband had acquired a
right and interest in, what is termed in law, consortship.... which is the converse of a dishonored bed,
the destruction of domestic comfort, of suspicion cast upon the legitimacy of offspring .. "); Wales v.
Miner, 89 Ind. 118, 125 (1883) ("As against the rights of the husband, the wife is incapable of
consenting to her seduction."); 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note
32, at 834 ("Inasmuch as the husband has the exclusive right of sexual intercourse with his wife,
necessarily he has a right of action against anyone who commits adultery with her."); REEVE, supra
note 43, at 63-64; SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 109.
84. HALE, supra note 64, at 629 (emphasis added).
85. Although Hale seems to have devised the argument from prostitution to explain the third-
party caveat, the caveat itself appeared in the common law a century before his treatise was published.
In Lord Audley's Case, tried at the King's Bench in England in 1631, the defendant, Mervin Lord
Audley, Earl of Castlehaven, was found guilty of committing "a Rape upon his own wife; for holding
1402 [Vol. 88:1373
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Nineteenth-century treatises and case law took care to note the third-
party caveat to the marital rape exemption, often citing Hale's reasoning
as an explanation. A husband could be found guilty of rape "as a principal
in the second degree," treatise writers observed, "by assisting another per-
son to commit a rape upon his wife; for though, in marriage, the wife has
given up her body to her husband, yet he cannot compel her to prostitute
herself to another." 6 Indeed, this caveat actually led to trial judgments
where husbands were found guilty of aiding in the rape of their wives by
other men. Consider two of the cases that reached a state supreme court.8 7
While there is no evidence to suggest that these cases were representative
of prosecutions under the third-party caveat, they are instances in which a
nineteenth-century court had serious occasion to discuss, and explain, why
a husband could be convicted as an accomplice to a rape committed on his
wife.
People v. Chapman,"8 the earlier of the two cases, was decided by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in 1886. Under a statute rendering all persons
who had aided, assisted, or abetted in the commission of a crime liable to
punishment as principals, Jeremiah Chapman had been tried and con-
victed in the rape of his wife, Maggie Chapman. The testimony of Mrs.
Chapman and of the actual perpetrator of the offense, James Reagan, indi-
cated that Mr. Chapman had entered into an arrangement with Reagan,
whereby Mr. Chapman promised to pay Reagan twenty-five dollars in
her by force, while one of his minions forcibly, against her will, had carnal knowledge of her." Lord
Audley's Case, supra note 59, at 401. Under English law, an accomplice or accessory to a felony was
considereda principal and subject to the same penalty as the person who actually committed the crime,
here a capital penalty for rape. See id. at 401, 416. The judges who decided Lord Audley's Case did not
offer any explanation for their decision, beyond the fact that they found that the defendant had indeed
committed the acts charged. See id. at 416; see also id. at 411 (wife's testimony); id. at 413 (servant's
confession that he raped Lord Audley's wife at Lord's insistence). Indeed, the decision did not even
mention the marital rape exemption as a background condition to be kept in mind.
86. 2 WATERMAN, supra note 49, at *306-1 n.1 (emphasis added; original emphasis omitted). For
other endorsements of the third-party caveat, see Commonwealth v. Murphy, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 163,
164-65 (1861); Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 491 (1857); Strang v. People, 24
Mich. 1, 13 (1871); Parker v. Territory, 59 P. 9, 10 (Okla. 1899); Young v. Territory, 58 P. 724, 725
(Okla. 1899); 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 807;
BARBOUR, supra note 51, at 66; 2 BISHOP, supra note 48, at 624; CHITTY, supra note 53, at *811;
CLARK, supra note 49, at 190-91; CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 53, at 645-46; DEAN, supra note
36, at 24; LiPPiTT, supra note 58, at 261; MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 430; MOORE, supra note 53, at
306; WHARTON, supra note 49, at 293.
87. At least one other husband in the nineteenth century appealed his conviction as an
accomplice in the rape of his wife to a state supreme court. State v. Haines, 25 So. 372 (La. 1899),
endorsed the third-party caveat to the marital rape exemption as a general matter, see id. at 372, but
limited the caveat's scope to exclude cases, like Haines itself, in which: (1) there was no evidence that
the man who had actually engaged in the sexual intercourse had been forced to do so, against his will,
by the husband; and (2) this actual perpetrator had nonetheless been acquitted of rape by the time the
state's case against the husband went to trial, see id. at 373. The court reasoned that "[o]ne cannot be
guilty of aiding and abetting the perpetrator of a crime without its first being shown that the crime has
been actually committed by another." IL
88. 28 N.W. 896 (Mich. 1886).
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return for Reagan's agreement to seduce Mrs. Chapman so that her hus-
band could catch the couple in bed and use that evidence to obtain a di-
vorce for adultery. Mrs. Chapman, however, resisted Reagan's advances,
and he proceeded to rape her. As Reagan knew, Mr. Chapman was in an
adjoining room at the time, watching and listening to all of this through a
hole he had bored through the intervening wall. But Mr. Chapman did
nothing to stop the rape. Only after it was over, did he burst into the room,
declaring "'Now I have caught you." 9 Three days later, Mr. Chapman
filed a bill for divorce, alleging that his wife had committed adultery with
Reagan.9° On appeal, Mr. Chapman argued that his actions were too tan-
gential to make him an accomplice: that he had simply remained passive
throughout the crime, that his agreement with Reagan had called for se-
duction, not rape. 91 The court decisively rejected this claim, applying stan-
dard principles from the law of accomplice liability. 2 It also described
what it understood to be the source of Mr. Chapman's "moral guilt."93 In
doing so, the court did not simply explain that Maggie Chapman had been
subjected to unwanted and forced sex. That would hardly have been a suf-
ficient foundation for the case. Mrs. Chapman, remember, would have
suffered no legally cognizable injury if the man in bed with her had been
her husband. Rather, the opinion stressed that Mrs. Chapman, a married
woman, had been subjected to extramarital intercourse, sex the judges
took to be illicit and demeaning by definition. Jeremiah Chapman had
then compounded his crime by falsely accusing his wife of adultery, sub-
jecting her to the stigma of extramarital intercourse once more. In the
court's words:
A husband who could barter with another for the despoiling of his
wife's virtue, and stand by to witness it .... and remain passive
and silent while such object was obtained by violence, and then use
such permitted and encouraged rape to divorce her from him, and
by this, and perjury added, publish her to the world as an
89. Id. at 896.
90. See id. at 897.
91. See id. at 896-97.
92. As the court reasoned:
The husband was not a mere passive looker-on in the proceedings. Reagan knew he was in
the next room, in sight of his work; and when the wife screamed, and respondent did not
interfere, he knew that the husband was willing he should succeed in the accomplishment of
the intercourse by force, if necessary,-an intercourse which had been bargained for by the
husband. And the presence of the husband in the next room, waiting to catch the parties
together, known to Reagan, both as to the presence, and the purpose of such presence,
imparted to him a confidence in his undertaking. And the husband intentionally gave reason
for such confidence. By the lifting of his finger or the opening of his mouth he could have
prevented the injury to his wife, but he did not do so.
Id. at 897.
93. Id. at 898.
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adulteress, is morally guilty of as foul a crime as can be named in
the calendar.94
State v. Dowell,95 decided four years later in the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, also enforced the third-party caveat. In this case, "[t]he
white husband of a white wife, under menace of death to both parties in
case of refusal, and supporting his threat by a loaded gun held over the
parties, [had] constrain[ed] a colored man to undertake, and his wife to
submit to, an attempted sexual connection."96 Without doubt, the racial
composition of this crime had overwhelmingly increased the likelihood of
prosecution, conviction, and affirmation on appeal; witness how the North
Carolina court stated the facts. But in reasoning about the third-party
caveat to the marital rape exemption, the court here, like the court in
Chapman, explained the rule as illustrating and reinforcing the divide
between licit and illicit intercourse so that it turned on whether the woman
was married to her sexual partner, rather than on the woman's consent.
The fact that Dowell had attempted to force a black man to rape his wife
certainly underscored the illicit nature of the intercourse at issue, but did
not change the basic framework in which the court understood the
problem:
The defendant strangely insists that he is not guilty because he is
the husband of the prosecutrix; and he relies as a defense upon the
marital relation, the duties and obligations of which he has, by all
the laws of God and man, so brutally violated. In our opinion, in
respect to this offense, he stands upon the same footing as a
stranger, and his guilt is to be determined in that light alone .... It
is true that [a husband] may enforce sexual connection; and, in the
exercise of this marital right, it is held that he cannot be guilty of
the offense of rape. But it is too plain for argument that this
privilege is a personal one, only. Hence if... the husband aids and
abets another to ravish his wife, he may be convicted as if he were
a stranger. The principle is thus tersely expressed by Sir MATTHEW
94. Id. (emphasis added). The dissent in Chapman condemned Jeremiah Chapman's conduct in
even harsher terms. See id. at 901 (Sherwood, J., dissenting) ("It is hard to conceive of an act more
cruel, or conduct more flagrant and injurious, to the young wife, whose person, pride, and chastity were
violated and mangled, and whose hope, happiness, and life have been essentially destroyed, than was
perpetrated by the villainous defendant .. ") (emphasis added).
It is important to note that the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately set aside Chapman's conviction
based on procedural inadequacies in his preliminary examination. See id. at 900-01. This outcome
might be taken to mean that the court actually harbored some uneasiness about jailing a husband for a
rape committed on his wife. But there was certainly no statement to that effect in the Chapman opinion.
Perhaps, as the dissent argued, see id. at 904 (Sherwood, J., dissenting), the procedural irregularity in
Chapman-the fact that none of the depositions taken at the preliminary examination were signed, see
id. at 900-was too minor to justify setting aside the conviction. But the holding in Chapman did
nothing to create particular obstacles to future third-party rape prosecutions against husbands. The
procedural issue that was dispositive in Chapman applied to all criminal cases equally.
95. 11 S.E. 525 (N.C. 1890).
96. Id. at 525.
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HALE: "For, though in marriage she hath given up her body to her
husband, she is not to be by him prostituted to another."'
Authoritative legal sources in the nineteenth century agreed that a
husband could not, and should not, be prosecuted for raping his wife.
Their explanations, grounded in principles and presumptions evident
throughout nineteenth-century regulation of the marital relation and sexu-
ality, explicitly assumed and supported the legal subordination of wives to
husbands. Judges, lawyers, and legislators may have been willing to over-
see some modification of other aspects of women's legal status at com-
mon law in the latter haft of the nineteenth century, but they remained
emphatically unwilling to tamper with a husband's marital rape exemp-
tion.
C. The Marital Rape Exemption's Effect on the Lived Experience of
Marriage in the Nineteenth Century
It is far simpler to discern how the marital rape exemption was ex-
plained and defended in judicial opinions and legal treatises than to dis-
cover how a husband's conjugal rights affected the lived experience of
marriage in the nineteenth century. But the debate over marital rape
turned on more than the arguments for the exemption put forth by judges
and lawyers. The feminist campaign against marital rape did not simply
treat a husband's right to control the terms of marital intercourse as an apt
symbol of women's legal subjugation. The women challenging that right
understood it to have important practical consequences for the shape of
women's married lives. Moreover, the popular prescriptive literature that
began to delineate the harm of marital rape in the second half of the
nineteenth century focused exclusively on actual practice. These marriage
manuals and health guides did not seek to change the legal rule granting
husbands conjugal rights, but sought to ameliorate the functional effect of
the exemption by convincing husbands to voluntarily cede control of
marital intercourse to their wives.
By definition, the marital rape exemption meant that women subject
to forced sex in marriage did not have the option of seeking criminal
prosecution. It is not surprising that I was able to locate no nineteenth-
century prosecutions of a husband for raping his wife.9" The existence of
the exemption made such attempts patently futile. The other practical con-
sequences of the exemption are more hidden from view. Feminists and
prescriptive writers engaged in a frank and voluminous dialogue about
marital intercourse and marital rape in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, but the social scientists of their era shied away from the subject.
The studies of women's sexual experiences in marriage that do exist,
97. Id. (quoting HALF, supra note 64, at 629) (emphasis added).
98. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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however, suggest a widespread desire among women to control the terms
of marital intercourse, a widespread recognition that they did not have the
right to exercise this control, and a widespread experience of harm caused
by unwanted sex in marriage.
Katharine Bement Davis's Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two
Hundred Women (1929)" is the most systematic and rigorous examination
of women's experience of sex in marriage during this approximate pe-
riod."° Davis, a social scientist and penologist, l0' sent ten thousand letters
to selected wives, asking them if they would be willing to answer and
anonymously return a questionnaire about their sexual experiences.102 Her
questionnaire was very thorough,1 3 and she ultimately received completed
answers from 1073 married women."° Davis's study is not ideal for a
99. KATHARINE BEMENT DAVIS, FACTORS IN THE SEX LIFE OF TwENTY-Two HUNDRED WOMEN
(1929).
100. At least two other studies of the sexual lives of married women were published in the United
States in the early twentieth century. Dr. G.V. Hamilton published A Research in Marriage in 1929.
This study, which was begun in 1924, reported the results of Hamilton's interviews with one hundred
married women and one hundred married men, all volunteers solicited casually through personal
contacts. See id. at xi, 1-2. Hamilton, a psychiatrist, asked his subjects a number of questions that might
cast light on how the terms of intercourse were negotiated in actual marriages. But he presented the
findings of his research in such a condensed form that they are difficult to interpret.
For instance, Hamilton asked his subjects: "'Is sex intercourse between you and your (spouse)
alvays a matter of mutual desire, or does your (spouse) at times merely submit to it because you desire
it?"' Id at 159 tbl.102. His report of their answers focused solely on the frequency of submission,
without offering any qualitative information. Hamilton's chart reveals that wives often submitted when
they did not desire intercourse. Seventy-three of the hundred wives reported having submitted at some
point in their marriages, where only three reported that their husbands had ever submitted to them. See
id. Sixty-four of the hundred husbands reported that their wives had submitted to them, where only
seven reported that they had ever submitted. See id. Hamilton's study does not indicate, however, the
terms of this "submission." We do not learn, for example, whether (and why) any of these wives felt an
obligation to submit, or feared physical violence if they refused.
Robert Latou Dickinson and Lura Beam published A Thousand Marriages: A Medical Study of
Sex Adjustment in 1932. This study was based on the records that a single obstetrician/gynecologist had
kept in the course of forty-seven years of practice. See id. at xvi, 3. It focused on the relationship
between a woman's gynecological health and her sexual "passion" or "frigidity" in marriage. See id. at
3. The work did not consider the amount of control, or lack thereof, that wives were able to exercise
over the terms of marital intercourse.
101. For brief accounts of Davis's career, see ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, THEIR SISTERS'
KEEPERS: WOMEN'S PRISON REFORM IN AMERICA, 1830-1930, at 116-18 (1981); NICOLE HAHN
RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 60, 65-66, 69-72, 79, 153 (2d ed.
1990).
102. See DAvis, supra note 99, at xi. "From these 10,000 women," Davis reports that she
"received requests for the questionnaires from about one third, and about one third of those receiving
them filled them out and returned them." Il
103. Among other topics, Davis's questionnaires covered: childhood influences, sex education,
sexual intercourse before marriage, expectations about marital intercourse, marital happiness, birth
control practices, abortion, the frequency of intercourse, female sexual pleasure and orgasm, the
relationship between sexual desire and the menstrual cycle, masturbation, and homosexuality. See id. at
1-78, 151-86, 218-37, 297-328.
104. See id. at xi. "For the most part, however," Davis "used only the first 1,000 received, as the
additional 73 cases had no important effect on the results." Id. at xi-xii. Davis also sent a different
questionnaire about sex to 1200 unmarried women. See id. at xiii.
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number of reasons, including its concentration on women somewhat
younger than the contemporaries of the first woman's rights movement
and its narrow focus on the middle class and the elite. 5 But notwith-
standing its shortcomings, the study offers valuable information about the
nature of actual sexual practices in the approximate era in which the first
organized woman's rights movement challenged a husband's conjugal
rights. Her report presents a fascinating window into women's lives.
The women Davis surveyed repeatedly made clear that they had en-
tered into marriage with the expectation that their husbands had the right
to control the terms of marital intercourse, although they were hardly en-
thusiastic about that husbandly prerogative. When asked whether they had
been "'adequately prepared by instruction for the sex side of marriage,"' 06
a number of women reported that their mothers had explicitly conveyed
this information about the nature of marriage to them. As one wife in this
cohort explained, "'My mother taught me what to expect. The necessity of
yielding to her husband's demands had been a great cross in her own
life.""'  Davis's questioning about whether the women had been
"'attracted or repelled by the way in which married sex relations came
into [their] experience' generated even more revealing responses. Nearly
a quarter (223) of the first thousand women to respond "replied
'neither."'108
Of these, 173 said that they "took it as a matter of fact"-
something that every married woman had to go through with,
regardless of her feelings. The other 50 qualified the "neither" with
the following adjectives: Amused, 1; astonished, 8; bewildered, 3;
105. The Davis study has at least two major limitations. First, Davis published Factors in 1929
and conducted all of her research within the previous decade, several decades after a husband's
conjugal rights were hotly contested by an organized feminist movement. This limitation is partially
overcome, however, by the fact that many of the women included in Davis's survey came to maturity
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. At the time of their reply, Davis's married women
respondents ranged in age from twenty-one to eighty-three. See id. at 1. Second, Davis focused on the
middle class and the elite. Davis deliberately did not want to survey a purely representative sample of
married women. Half of her ten thousand letters went to the members of an unnamed "large national
organization," with the organization's leadership instructed to choose five thousand "normal married
women-that is, women of good standing in the community, with no known physical, mental, or moral
handicap, of sufficient intelligence and education to understand and answer in writing a rather
exhaustive set of questions as to sex experience." Twenty-five hundred other women "were selected
from published lists of membership in various clubs belonging to the General Federation of Women's
Clubs. The choice of names was purely arbitrary except that it was made from the great varieties of
types and interests represented in this organization, and with a nationwide distribution." The last "2,500
names were taken from the alumna registers of women's colleges and coeducational universities, the
choice of names being made on a basis of age and geographical distribution." Id. at xi.
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id. at 67. Another respondent noted that "[her] mother had taught [her] that men were
chiefly animals."' Id. A third woman, who apparently felt that her mother's warnings had been
overstated, reported a similar course of instruction: "'I think mother gave me an abnormal idea of men
by her own sex attitude.... I thought most men must be beasts."' Id.
108. Id. at 69, 68 tbl.V.
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disappointed, 7; frightened, 8; indifferent, 8; indignant, 1;
interested, 5; relieved (that it was no worse), 1; resigned, 3;
shocked, 1; sorry, 1; stunned, 1; submissive, 2."°
Davis's work also suggests that women's marital happiness in this
period importantly turned on how a husband chose to wield his authority
over marital intercourse-whether a husband actually exercised his ad-
mitted rights or restrained himself voluntarily. Women "attracted" by their
first experiences of marital intercourse were significantly more likely to
report that their subsequent married life had been happy as well. IIn ex-
plaining what in their early sexual experiences had appealed to them,
these women stressed "[o]ver and over again.., the unselfishness,
consideration, and self-control of the husband." ' In contrast, women who
had been "repelled" by their introduction to marital intercourse-a group
that included almost one quarter (237) of the first thousand women in the
study-emphasized "[j]ust the opposite qualities .... The wife ignorant,
unprepared, shocked at the strength of her husband's passion; the husband
unable to realize this, inconsiderate, uncontrolled; a long period of
adjustment-and if this fails, unhappiness for both."" 2
Dr. Clelia Duel Mosher's earlier, if significantly smaller and less
systematic, survey of married women's sexual lives accords with Davis's
findings." 3 The Mosher study was notably less rigorous than Davis's
work. It consists of unprocessed data about just forty-five married
women."' Dr. Mosher, a physician and professor at Stanford University,
did not attempt to analyze her findings or to publish her study." 5 That said,
109. Id. at 69.
110. Davis reports that 116 women responded that they were unhappy with their married life. She
compared this group with 116 "happy" women from her survey, chosen to match the unhappy cohort in
age and education. See id. at 67. Of the unhappy group, 28 (24.1%) had been attracted "'by the manner
in which married sex relations came into [their] experience' and 42 (36.2%) had been repelled. In
contrast, 54 (46.6%) women in the happy group reported having been attracted by their initial
experiences of marital intercourse and 27 (23.3%) repelled. To phrase these findings another
way: Eighty-two women in this sample of 232 reported having been attracted by their initial
experiences of marital intercourse. Of these 82 women, 54 (65.9%) reported being happy in their
married life. Sixty-nine women in this sample reported having been repelled by their introduction to
marital intercourse. Of these 69 women, 42 (60.9%) women were unhappy in their married life. See id.
at 68 & tbl.V.
111. Id. at69.
112. Id. at 68 tbl.V, 69, 71.
113. CLELIA DUEL MOSHER, THE MOSHER SURVEY: SEXUAL ATTITUDES OF 45 VICTORIAN
WOMEN (James MaHood & Kristine Wenburg eds., 1980).
114. See James MaHood, Preface to MOSHER, supra note 113, at v, vii ( "[O]ur best estimate is
that significant information for a total of only 45 different women has come down to us and appears
here."); id. ("The blanks [questionnaires] are consecutively numbered, and the last is No. 51. But
Blanks No. 7, 37, 39, and 48 are missing in the original, and practically no information appears on
Blanks 16A and 49.... Stanford Historian Carl Degler identified Blanks 30 and 33 as from the same
woman.").
115. See id. at v-vii; MOSHER, supra note 113, at 3 (noting that her study "has given the
investigator a priceless knowledge for a practicing physician and teacher," but "[s]ome thought of
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Mosher's work provides useful information about an era somewhat earlier
than the period that Davis analyzed. Indeed, Mosher's study, conducted
between 1892 and 1920, is the earliest known survey of women's sexual
practices in the United States."6 Seventy percent of the women that
Mosher questioned were born before 1870. Seventeen of the forty-five
women were born before the Civil War.'17
Mosher's subjects repeatedly explained that they wished to limit
marital intercourse to those occasions when it was agreed to by wife and
husband alike. When asked what they thought "would be an ideal habit"
of sex in marriage, these women stressed mutuality again and again.
"[E]verything to be absolutely mutual," they typically responded."'
"When desired by both."'' 9 "No habit at all, but the most sensitive regard
of each member of the couple for the personal feeling and desires and
health of the other."'20 "The marital relation when mutual," they explained,
"begets a certain bond of love and sympathy that is certainly peculiar only
to those happily mated."'
At the same time, these women-like Davis's subjects-were well
aware that the actual conduct of their sexual lives was ultimately under
their husbands' control. Some women happily reported that their husbands
had agreed to mutuality. One wife, who had intercourse when it was "as
much desired by me as by him," explained that her husband was "an
unusually considerate man."'2  Another woman with a "[c]onsiderate
husband" noted that he had delayed consummating their marriage for two
weeks after the wedding."2 Many other women in Mosher's study,
arranging this work for publication ... was prevented by pressure of other routine work"); Carl N.
Degler, Introduction to MOSHER, supra note 113, at xi, xii-xiv, xvii.
Mosher also never indicated her method for selecting subjects. She appears to have relied on
volunteers that she knew personally or professionally, women drawn almost exclusively from the upper
middle class. See id. at xii ("No clues are provided as to how the respondents were selected.
Presumably they were self-selected .... Many of the Mosher women seem to be [Stanford] faculty
wives."); id. at xiii ("Thirty-four of the 45 women attended college or normal school; the education of
three is unknown. Since very few women or men attended college in the nineteenth century, these
women were clearly not typical of the general population."). Moreover, Mosher varied her
methodology over time, altering the questions she asked, sometimes relying on a written questionnaire
and sometimes asking her questions orally and recording the answers herself. See MaHood, supra note
114, at vi-vii; Degler, supra note 115, at xii. Even at their most complete, Mosher's questionnaires
never approximated the scope of Davis's inquiry.
116. See MaHood, supra note 114, at v-vi; Degler, supra note 115, at xi.
117. See Degler, supra note 115, at xi.
118. MOsHER, supra note 113, at 114 (Blank No. 10).
119. Id. at 435 (Blank No. 44).
120. Id. at 139 (Blank No. 12).
121. Id. at 276-77 (Blank No. 24); see also id. at 210 (Blank No. 18) ("[Tihe ideal must be a
compromise between two and must be the best for both."); id. at 317 (Blank No. 28) ("Special occasion
each time. Man should court wife each time.").
122. Id. at 25 (Blank No. 2(a)).
123. Id. at 426 (Blank No. 43); see also id. at 162-63 (Blank No. 14) (reporting that her "ideal
habit" was "[s]uch as I have-Where intercourse is only held when mutually desired").
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however, indicated that they were routinely obliged to submit to unwanted
sex. These women, like their peers, would have chosen to limit marital
intercourse to those times "[w]hen both had desire" 24 or "[w]hen
acceptable to both.""5 But they simultaneously reported their husbands'
systematic deviation from this ideal and the harm they had experienced as
a result. One of these respondents described "having intercourse on an
average of once a week," although sexual relations were "[v]ery painful"
for her because of injuries sustained in pregnancy and childbirth. 126 An-
other explained that she had engaged in marital intercourse when she
"often felt averse to it" and indicated that her husband controlled deci-
sions about reproduction, the conception of her first child having taken
place at "a time chosen by [her] husband as one that would probably result
in pregnancy though [she] did not know his thought at the time."27 Some
reported deep disappointment and dissatisfaction in marriage. One woman
had repeatedly been subject to much more frequent intercourse than she
desired.'"Although she felt "[m]ore alive mentally & physically" after
sexual climax, she concluded nonetheless that her sexual experience in
marriage had been "[n]ot agreeable" and that "men ha[d] not been
properly trained."'29 A second woman in the same position wrote, more
emphatically, of the "[s]hock and destruction of all ideals: When a pure
woman is treated by her husband as he has treated the prostitute he has
been to before marriage, it becomes loathsome."'30
Although tantalizingly incomplete, Davis's study and Mosher's work
provide some insight into how women negotiated marriage in the law's
shadow. The responses to these surveys reflect a definite understanding
that men had the authority to determine the conditions of marital inter-
course and women the obligation to submit to whatever sexual demands
their husbands chose to make. This understanding surely reflected social
norms about acceptable marital behavior. But it would be a mistake to
conclude that the popular expectations that Davis and Mosher reported
were not linked to the law's embrace of the marital rape exemption. The
married women who responded to the questionnaires that Davis and
Mosher distributed made clear that unwanted sex in marriage had caused
them real harm and that they would have greatly preferred it if their hus-
bands had respected their desires about sexual intercourse. Yet they knew
124. Id. at 423 (Blank No. 42).
125. Id. at 409 (Blank No. 40).
126. Id at 44 (Blank No. 3).
127. Id at 252 (Blank No. 22).
128. See id. at 407 (Blank No. 40).
129. Id. at 408 (Blank No. 40); see also id. at 9-11 (Blank No. 1) (reporting more frequent marital
intercourse than desired, although she "[clonsidered that [marital intercourse] sh'd be regulated largely
by the woman").
130. Id. at 421-23 (Blank No. 42).
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that their husbands had a right to act differently, to diverge from what
these women took to be the most desirable standard of marital conduct.
This understanding about a husband's right to marital intercourse may
have had nonlegal sources. But it was certainly given enormous strength
and realism by the fact that the criminal law categorically refused to en-
tertain claims based on forced sex in marriage, especially when combined
with the legal and socioeconomic obstacles to securing a divorce based on
marital rape (which will be discussed below).' As a practical matter, the
marital rape exemption limited a woman's options if she sought to avoid
marital rape. As a normative matter, the exemption added the law's sanc-
tion to husbandly claims of marital authority. The marital rape exemption
was not just a theoretical question for the law books and the legal trea-
tises. It affected how women lived their married lives.
Yet this is hardly the full story of the marital rape exemption in the
nineteenth century. Authoritative legal sources unambiguously endorsed
the exemption, and the popular understanding of a man's marital rights
seems to have tracked the legal rule. This does not mean, however, that a
husband's conjugal prerogatives went uncontested in the nineteenth cen-
tury. As Part II recounts, the nineteenth-century woman's rights move-
ment fought against a husband's right to control marital intercourse in a
campaign that was remarkably developed, prolific, and insistent, given
nineteenth-century taboos against the public mention of sex or sexuality.
Leading feminists identified a husband's conjugal rights as the crucial
constitutive element of women's subordination. They called for both an
enforceable right to refuse a husband's sexual demands and realistic
socioeconomic alternatives to submission. The record of this struggle
dramatically expands our understanding of the history of marital rape, and
also provides important new insights into the goals, progress, and efficacy
of the first organized woman's rights movement, which historians now
frequently describe as overwhelmingly dominated by the battle for
suffrage.
At the level of prescriptive norms about marital behavior, discussed
in Part III, the organized feminist critique had genuine resonance, but ul-
timately not transformative power. The advocates of "free love," who op-
erated on the leftward fringe of organized feminism in the nineteenth
century, articulated the arguments of the woman's rights movement in a
more radical voice. More surprisingly, popular tracts on marriage, repro-
duction, and health agreed that the exemption's consequences should be
curbed in actual practice. Very soon after the organized woman's rights
movement mobilized against a husband's conjugal rights, these main-
stream authors began to describe and denounce the harm that marital rape
inflicted on wives. This prescriptive literature, though, did not contest a
131. See infra Parts II.B, II.A, IV.
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husband's legal right to determine the terms of marital intercourse. In-
stead, it called on husbands to voluntarily refrain from exercising their le-
gal prerogatives, on the ground that such restraint would benefit them as
much as their wives. Where feminists demanded a structure of rights to
free women from subordination in marriage, the prescriptive literature
turned the concern over marital rape into a call for voluntary strategies to
enhance marital happiness and harmony, to be pursued to the extent that
they served a husband's interests.
In the end, as Part IV explains, the nineteenth-century feminists lived
to see no legal reform of a husband's conjugal prerogatives beyond mar-
ginal adjustments in the terms on which divorce was available. The mari-
tal rape exemption outlasted the rise of the first organized woman's rights
movement in the United States, the enactment of the first married
women's property acts, and the ratification of woman suffrage, but not
because the issue was uncontroversial or unspeakable. In this realm where
sex and reproduction were so clearly at issue, authoritative legal sources,
like mainstream prescriptive authors, were unwilling to translate the
growing social recognition that marital rape inflicted severe harm on
wives into a legal acknowledgment of the dangers potentially posed by the
marital relation, through the granting of legal rights that women might en-
force against their husbands.
1I
THE FIRST ORGANIZED FEMINIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST A HUSBAND'S
CONJUGAL RIGHTS
Almost immediately after the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848
sparked the formation of the first organized woman's rights movement in
the United States, 32 feminists began to argue that full political and eco-
nomic rights, including even the vote, would not be nearly sufficient to
establish women's equality with men. Although the woman's rights
movement was committed to each of these reforms, feminists simultane-
ously contended that all of them would ultimately prove hollow unless a
married woman also had the right to regulate her husband's sexual ac-
cess-the right to her own person, in the language of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Nineteenth-century Americans were reluctant to speak openly about
132. For a full account of the Seneca Falls Convention, see HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra
note 10, at 67-73. This convention adopted a "Declaration of Sentiments" that demanded the reform of
coverture laws. See Declaration of Sentiments (1848), reprinted in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
supra note 10, at 70, 70 ("[Man] has made [woman], if married, in the eye of the law, civilly
dead.... [A married woman] is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all
intents and purposes, her master-the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to
administer chastisement."). A woman's right to her person, however, was not mentioned. See id. at 70-
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sex, 33 and the leaders of organized feminism were well aware of the social
sanctions for sexual frankness. But their commitment to establishing a
woman's right of self-possession as the foundation of her equality led
feminists to offer a systematic and thorough critique of marital rape in
language wholly understandable to contemporary audiences.
The consensual account of the history of marital rape now accepted
by the exemption's supporters and critics alike is simply wrong as a fac-
tual matter. The nineteenth-century woman's rights movement contested a
husband's right to determine the terms of marital intercourse vociferously
and profoundly. Indeed, this campaign constitutes an important chapter in
the history of organized feminism in the nineteenth century, one that
sheds new light on the nature and dimensions of that movement.
Many historians have described the leadership of the nineteenth-
century woman's rights movement as classically liberal, meaning intent
on securing a gender-neutral distribution of political and economic rights
and uninterested in transforming the structure of familial relations.' On
this account, the first organized feminist movement sought to apply the
principles of the Declaration of Independence to women, without chal-
lenging any of the document's other premises. Specifically, these histori-
ans contend that feminists grounded their appeal for gender-neutral rights
of access to the public sphere in a natural rights argument that stressed
"that women were essentially human and only incidentally female"'35 and
regarded any mention of women's particular position, especially in the
family, "as suspect."'36 All men and women were created equal, and the
133. As late as 1899, the frank discussion of sexual intercourse could be controversial at official
gatherings of medical professionals. That year, Dr. Denslow Lewis presented a paper on the
"Gynecologic Consideration of the Sexual Act" at a meeting of the American Medical Association
(AMA). DENSLow LEwis, THE GYNECOLOGIC CONSIDERATION OF THE SEXUAL ACT 23, 5-19 (M & S
Press 1970) (1900). One of his colleagues objected to the presentation, on the ground that the
discussion of sex was "attended with more or less filth and we besmirch ourselves by discussing it in
public." Id. at 20. The AMA declined to publish Lewis's work. See id. at 23-49. The AMA was a
socially conservative organization, but its members' concerns were hardly unusual in this respect. Even
progressive figures committed to the cause of sex education frequently expressed deep discomfort
about breaching social proprieties. "Which shall we prefer," one such troubled writer asked in 1866,
an eruption of all the secrets of the physician into print and wood-cuts, every counter strewn
with them, and boys and girls invited to premature fancies-or the old ignorance of sacred
laws of the sexual relation, the old subjection of woman to the slavery of superfluous child-
bearing, with all the disgust, alienation, hidden chagrin, foundered health and spirits, which
that brings?
J.W., Book Notice, RADICAL (Boston), Aug. 1866, at 492, 492 (reviewing R.T. TRALL, SEXUAL
PHYSIOLOGY (1866)). John Weiss recommended "telling the truth with greater economy of details." Id.
134. By employing the term "classically liberal," I mean only to denote the set of ideas stated
above. My use of the designation is not intended to endorse any broader claims about the nature of
classical liberalism, a much disputed subject.
135. DuBois, supra note 22, at 36.
136. DuBois, supra note 13, at 846. Aileen Kraditor similarly explains the position of the
organized woman's rights movement:
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appropriate way to recognize their equality was by distributing political
liberty, namely the right to vote for democratically elected representa-
tives.137 This historical interpretation of the woman's rights movement is
grounded in a reading of women's demands for suffrage. But historians
have extrapolated from the debate over suffrage to conclude that the
nineteenth-century feminist movement was neither alert to sources of
inequality within the family that affected women's power and resources as
a class nor committed to gender-specific structural reform.'38 Even where
these historians briefly allude to the feminist claim for self-ownership in
marriage, they do not indicate that this discussion might challenge their
understanding of the movement. 139 Nineteenth-century feminists certainly
did rely on arguments grounded in classic liberalism, which was the
dominant philosophical tradition of the era and well suited to the suffrage
demand. Indeed, the Declaration of Sentiments adopted at Seneca Falls
If all men were created equal and had the inalienable right to consent to the laws by which
they were governed, women were created equal to men and had the same inalienable right to
political liberty. In asserting that natural right applied also to women, the suffragists stressed
the ways in which men and women were identical. Their common humanity was the core of
the suffragist argument.
AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 44 (1965); see
also KEITH E. MELDER, BEGINNINGS OF SISTERHOOD: THE AMERICAN WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1800-1850, at 154 (1977) ("All humans are equal in the sight of God and nature, was the assumption
[of the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement], equal not necessarily in talents or endowments,
but in basic rights and responsibilities. Aileen Kraditor has identified this approach as the argument for
justice, eternal and undifferentiated, not dependent on gender.").
137. As Anne Firor Scott and Andrew MacKay Scott have observed:
Though the demand that women should be permitted to vote was radical in its
implications, the argument was familiar. People who could not vote were being governed
without their consent. The Declaration of Sentiments asked only that the Declaration of
Independence be followed to its logical conclusion. If rights were given by the Creator was it
likely that he discriminated on grounds of sex? Women were one-half the population. If they
had no right to vote, the idea of consent of the governed was hollow.
ANNE FIROR SCOTT & ANDREW MACKAY SCOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHT FOR WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 9-10 (Univ. of Illinois Press 1982) (1975); see also DuBois, supra note 13, at 841 ("The
demand for political equality could inspire a women's rights movement among women from 1848 on
because political democracy was simultaneously a widely held belief and a radical assertion when
applied to women. Political equality for women rested on the popular republican tradition that insisted
on equal rights for all, with the franchise the crowning jewel of individual freedom.").
138. See DuBois, supra note 22, at 37 (arguing that organized feminist movement, focused on
establishing "that men and women were morally identical," "ignored the reality of women's domestic
confinement, which made them different from and dependent on men"); Elizabeth B. Clark,
Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 25, 49
(1990) [hereinafter Clark, Matrimonial Bonds] ("Stanton's preoccupation with individual freedom
prevented her from developing a coherent class-based theory that invoked systematic legal or
institutional remedies to women's position in marriage."); Elizabeth B. Clark, Self-Ownership and the
Political Theory of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 21 CONN. L. REV. 905, 934 (1989) ("Elizabeth Cady
Stanton's extreme individualist orientation made it very difficult for her at any stage in her career to
develop a substantive theory of the state, or a theory of class action within the state.").
139. See DuBois, supra note 13, at 843, 856-57.
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was explicitly modeled on the Declaration of Independence.'4 Yet, as the
feminist argument for a wife's right to control her own person makes
clear, the notion that the woman's rights movement limited itself to ap-
plying established liberal principles to women vastly understates the scope
of the movement's theoretical commitments. These feminists began with
liberalism's dedication to freedom and autonomy, but took it in radically
new directions.
In defining what the right to one's own person meant, articulate
feminists did not focus on gender-neutral rights to the public sphere or
freedom from coercion by the state. They were concerned about married
women who submitted to their husbands' sexual demands as the result of
force, or threats, or because they lacked palatable alternatives. The
woman's rights movement sought to establish a wife's right of refusal and
to remake women's social and economic possibilities to create realistic
alternatives to marriage. In making these claims, feminists recognized that
some of the most important barriers to female self-possession were lo-
cated within the structure of marriage, as well as the behavior of
individual husbands. Feminists criticized both a husband's legal right of
sexual access and the coverture rules that stripped married women of
control over their family's resources. They also objected to the tenuous
circumstances under which many never-married, separated, and divorced
women lived, subject to both explicit employment discrimination that left
women with few ways to support themselves outside of marriage and the
social stigma associated with living outside a husband's household.' In-
deed, feminists called unwanted marital intercourse, where the wife had
acquiesced because of her economic and social dependence on her hus-
band, legalized prostitution.42 By that, they meant that the wife who was
structurally compelled to have sex when she did not desire the act or its
reproductive consequences was different only in name from the woman
without any available option but to sell her body to strange men on the
140. See HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 68 ("After much delay, one of the
[women gathered to write the Declaration of Sentiments] took up the Declaration of 1776, and read it
aloud with much spirit and emphasis, and it was at once decided to adopt the historic document, with
some slight changes such as substituting 'all men' for 'King George."'); Declaration of Sentiments,
supra note 132, at 70 ("We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created
equal....").
141. As the Declaration of Sentiments adopted at the Seneca Falls Convention elaborated:
[Man] has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is
permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration. He closes against her all the
avenues to wealth and distinction which he considers most honorable to himself. As a teacher
of theology, medicine, or law, she is not known.
He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thorough education, all colleges being
closed against her.
Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 132, at 71.
142. This casts doubt on Elizabeth Clark's argument that the organized woman's rights movement
felt "compelled to downgrade the importance of financial 'security' in marriage, in order to establish it
as an affective relationship between equals." Clark, Matrimonial Bonds, supra note 138, at 49.
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street. In this vision, women's economic, legal, and bodily vulnerabilities
in marriage were all intricately connected. In demanding a woman's right
to her own person, feminists fought all of these inequalities simultane-
ously.
This claim, moreover, was intensely gender-specific. Feminists cam-
paigning against marital rape focused solely on a woman's right to control
marital intercourse, and they did not articulate their demand as a call for
women to receive the same protections that men enjoyed. Their argument
for self-ownership was not based on a theory of bodily inviolateness that
would apply to man and woman like. Rather, it looked to women's exclu-
sive responsibility for raising children. Nineteenth-century feminists did
not celebrate the norm assigning women all of the work of childcare.
Nonetheless, they took it to be such a profound social expectation that
they reasoned within it, contending that women needed to have control
over marital intercourse so that they could regulate the amount of their
lives they devoted to motherhood. In demanding a woman's right to her
own person, the nineteenth-century feminist movement was asserting an
equal right, and challenging gender-based subordination, in a completely
gender-specific way. This is not to suggest that the woman's rights
movement would have countenanced sexual violence against men. But
organized feminism explained the right to self-ownership in an idiom
radically different from that employed by the nation's founders, one that
was grounded in a gender-specific understanding of the comparative so-
cial position of women and men.
A. A Wife's Right to Her Person as the Predicate for Women's Equality
The feminist critique of women's legal subordination quickly fo-
cused on a married woman's lack of control over her own person. This
concern, moreover, was evident throughout the woman's rights move-
ment; feminists' substantive views on the issue differed far less than their
strategic appraisals about how it could best be pursued. The most useful
starting point for understanding what organized feminism took to be at
stake in demanding a wife's right to her person lies in the work of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the most prominent and brilliant theorist of the
movement.
As early as 1852, Stanton argued that marital intercourse was inap-
propriate under certain conditions. Addressing a temperance convention,
she warned of the dire eugenic consequences of having children with an
alcoholic husband and informed the wives of such men that they should
cease sexual relations at once. "[L]ive with him as a friend," Stanton ad-
vised, "watch over and pray for him as a mother would for an erring son,
soothe him in his wretchedness, comfort and support him, as best [you]
may-but for woman's sake, for humanity's sake, be not his wife-bring
2000] 1417
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no children to that blighted, dreary, desolate hearth.' ' 43 This exhortation,
of course, left the key question ambiguous: How exactly was a wife to
carry out her responsibility when her husband insisted on sexual access?
Did Stanton expect a wife to rely solely on moral suasion? If so, what if
persuasion did not work?1" Indeed, one might read this statement as plac-
ing married women in a double bind, wherein they would be held morally
responsible for reproduction that they did not, in fact or in law, have the
ability to control. Stanton's early ambiguity was deliberate. As she ex-
plained in a letter to Susan B. Anthony, her closest ally, Stanton had grave
doubts about "whether the world [was] quite willing or ready to discuss
the question of marriage."' 45 But Stanton's commitment to securing a mar-
ried woman's right to her own person was clear. Indeed, in the same let-
ter, she identified the issue as the pivotal site of women's subordination:
It is in vain to look for the elevation of woman so long as she is
degraded in marriage.... Man in his lust has regulated long
enough this whole question of sexual intercourse. Now let the
mother of mankind, whose prerogative it is to set bounds to his
indulgence, rouse up and give this whole matter a thorough,
fearless examination.... I feel, as never before, that this whole
question of woman's rights turns on the pivot of the marriage
relation, and, mark my word, sooner or later it will be the topic for
discussion. I would not hurry it on, nor would I avoid it.'46
In 1855, Stanton found the appropriate occasion for public frank-
ness. 47 That year, her cousin, Gerrit Smith, a leading antislavery reformer
who was sympathetic to feminism, wrote her a public letter about the
143. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mrs. Stanton's Address, LILY (Seneca Falls, N.Y.), May 1852, at 39,
41 (speaking at the second Women's Temperance Convention of the State of New York, April 20,
1852).
144. Antoinette Brown Blackwell made a similarly ambiguous statement at the Tenth National
Woman's Rights Convention, held in New York on May 10 and 11, 1860. See Tenth National
Woman's Rights Convention, in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 688, 727 (." [Is a
woman bound, because] legally married to one who is debased to the level of the brute, to be the
mother of his children?' ... 'No! ... you are bound never to make one whom you do not honor and
respect, as well as love, the father of any child of yours."') (statement of Antoinette Brown Blackwell).
145. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (Mar. 1, 1853), in 2 ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON: As REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY AND REMINISCENCES 48, 48 (Theodore
Stanton & Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., 1922).
146. Id. at 48-49.
147. Stanton had already briefly alluded to the issue in an address prepared for the New York
Legislature that she also presented at a woman's rights convention held in Albany in 1854. See Mrs.
Stanton's Address, Albany Convention, in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 591, 599
("[Tlhe signing of this [marriage] contract is instant civil death to one of the parties.... [The wife] can
own nothing, sell nothing. She has no right even to the wages she earns; her person, her time, her
services are the property of another.") (emphasis added); id. at 605 ("Think you the wife of the
confirmed, beastly drunkard would consent to share with him her home and bed, if law and public
sentiment would release her from such gross companionship? Verily, no!") (emphasis added).
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woman's rights movement. 141 In this letter, he argued that women's con-
tinued inequality was largely the result of their dress, which was admit-
tedly constraining and impractical. 49 Stanton, in a forceful and public
reply, explained women's inequality as rooted in their lack of control over
their person. 50 She identified this right as the most important that women
hoped to achieve, more significant than any of the rights for which women
had been publicly agitating since 1848. Indeed, Stanton articulated a view
148. Smith and Stanton had been discussing woman's rights for at least two years, in private
correspondence that mirrored their eventual public writing. Smith, for instance, wrote Stanton at the
end of 1853 to clarify his position. By that point, the general outlines of their dispute were already
distinct. Smith explained:
My wife says that you do not regard me as going far enough. I believe no one can go
further than I do. She says that you claim for every wife the right to her person against the
tyranny and lust of her husband. So do I. But so long as she is dependent and poor, she will
fail to establish this right; and so long as she remains in her clothes-prison, she will be
dependent and poor. I believe you can make no claim for woman to which I do not respond.
Do not regard me as opposing or ignoring any such claim. If we differ at all, it is only that
you do not regard a radical change in the dress of woman to be indispensable to the
achievement of the rights and independence of woman. But I hope we do not differ on this
point.
Letter from Gerit Smith to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Dec. 19, 1853) (on file with author; Elizabeth
Cady Stanton Papers, Library of Congress). As this missive implies, Stanton was never convinced of
the need to prioritize dress reform above all else. In a letter to Smith from the early 1850s, she
presented a different agenda:
Our laws, our customs, our fashions, are founded in some philosophy - All those
relating to woman in the false one that God made woman for man - to grace his home, to
minister to his necessities, to gratify his lust, hence our laws make her a mere dependent, she
has no rights to houses or lands, to silver or gold, not even to the wages she earns. She is
given in marriage like an article of merchandize.... [And] she that is given never dreams
that she herself has the most sacred right to her own person.... The rights of humanity are
more grossly betrayed at the altar than at the auction block of the slave-holder ....
Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerit Smith 1-3 (Jan. 5, 1851?) (on file with author; Elizabeth
Cady Stanton Papers, Library of Congress).
149. Smith's argument proceeded along the following lines:
I admit that the dress of woman is not the primal cause of her helplessness and
degradation. That cause is to be found in the false doctrines and sentiments of which the
dress is the outgrowth and symbol. On the other hand, however, these doctrines and
sentiments would never have become the huge bundle they now are, and they would probably
have all languished, and perhaps all expired, but for the dress....
Were woman to throw off the dress, which, in the eye of chivalry and gallantry, is so
well adapted to womanly gracefulness and womanly helplessness, and to put on a dress that
would leave her free to work her own way through the world, I see not but that chivalry and
gallantry would nearly or quite die out. No longer would she present herself to man, now in
the bewitching character of a plaything, a doll, an idol, and now in the degraded character of
his servant. But he would confess her transmutation into his equal; and, therefore, all
occasion for the display of chivalry and gallantry toward her on the one hand, and tyranny on
the other, would have passed away.
Letter from Gerrit Smith to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Dec. 1, 1855), reprinted in HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 836, 837.
150. Frances D. Gage, another leading figure in the woman's rights movement, also publicly
responded to Smith's letter. She, too, identified a woman's right to herself as the bedrock principle on
which equal citizenship depended, although Gage defined this right broadly to include a woman's
control over both marital intercourse and her own labor. See Letter from Frances D. Gage to Frederick
Douglass' newspaper (Dec. 24, 1855), reprinted in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at
842, 843 ("We must own ourselves under the lawfirst, own our bodies, our earnings, our genius, and
our consciences; then we will turn to the lesser matter of what shall be the garniture of the body.").
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of woman's citizenship that began, locationally, with the body. She under-
stood a woman's right to control her person as the foundational right upon
which political and economic equality needed to rest if they were to have
any value. Yet when Stanton considered what was at stake in having con-
trol over one's person, she did not speak in terms of physical transgres-
sion, condemning the bodily invasion of unwanted intercourse or
unwanted gestation. Instead, she focused on the social work of reproduc-
tion, the work of raising children. Stanton recognized that this work fell
exclusively to women, and her demand for self-possession spoke only to
women's claims. Stanton's argument about the right of self-ownership
was, more accurately, an intensely gender-specific argument about a
woman's particular right. She contended that women needed to have full
control over marital intercourse so that they could determine how many
children they would raise and when. As Stanton explained:
The rights, to vote, to hold property, to speak in public, are all-
important; but there are great social rights, before which all others
sink into utter insignificance. The cause of woman is .... not a
question of meats and drinks, of money and lands, but of human
rights-the sacred right of a woman to her own person, to all her
God-given powers of body and soul. Did it ever enter into the mind
of man that woman too had an inalienable right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of her individual happiness? Did he ever take in the idea
that to the mother of the race, and to her alone, belonged the right
to say when a new being should be brought into the world? Has he,
in the gratification of his blind passions, ever paused to think
whether it was with joy and gladness that she gave up ten or twenty
years of the heyday of her existence to all the cares and sufferings
of excessive maternity? Our present laws, our religious teachings,
our social customs on the whole question of marriage and divorce,
are most degrading to woman .... Here, in my opinion, is the
starting-point; here is the battleground where our independence
must be fought and won.'5 '
This was a claim about the right of every woman to control her own
person. Moreover, Stanton was certain that the vast majority of women,
including those who would never speak publicly, regarded present
151. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Dec. 21, 1855), reprinted in HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 839, 840-41. Stanton's 1852 address at the second Women's
Temperance Convention of the State of New York also expressed deep dissatisfaction with the fact that
most women's lives were devoted wholly to raising children and performing domestic work. She
argued that:
[If] one half our race must forever hold a subordinate position, subject to the will and
dictation of another, thinking no great thoughts, and feeling no true liberty, always confined
to the narrow treadmill round of domestic life, wholly occupied with trifling matters and
ministering to the animal necessities, and lusts of the flesh alone, that part belongs not to
woman.
Stanton, supra note 143, at 40.
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arrangements with "deep and settled disgust."152 At the same time, it is
clear that when Stanton thought about the sacrifice involved in a life un-
willingly devoted to "excessive maternity," she was particularly mindful
of the position of educated and middle-class women, women very much
like herself. These women had the wherewithal and the desire to partici-
pate in public political life, but not the opportunity, in part because of the
temporal demands of child rearing. Elsewhere in her letter to Smith,
Stanton described women's frustration-and suggested the role she envi-
sioned for women in the political community-this way:
[S]uppose yourself a woman. You are educated up to that point
where one feels a deep interest in the welfare of her country, and in
all the great questions of the day, in both Church and State; yet you
have no voice in either. Little men, with little brains, may pour
forth their little sentiments by the hour, in the forum and the sacred
desk, but public sentiment and the religion of our day teach us that
silence is most becoming in woman.'53
Stanton's argument for a woman's right to her person, first fully de-
veloped in public in 1855, remained her pressing concern for years."5 She
consistently pursued the issue, with more or less explicitness, although
she was well aware that a demand to restructure the most intimate rela-
tions of marriage would be extremely controversial. A year after Stanton's
reply to Smith, Lucy Stone, another leader of the woman's rights move-
ment, wrote Stanton privately, asking her to speak out again on "a wife's
right to her own body" at an upcoming National Woman's Rights
Convention, notwithstanding "the censure which a discussion of this
question [would] bring."'55 Stanton agreed to write to the convention, al-
though her public letter was less direct than Stone's private correspon-
dence. Rather than offer a complete account of the claim for control over
one's person, Stanton effectively referenced and invoked her earlier ar-
gument. "Is it any wonder," she asked, "that woman regards herself as a
mere machine, a tool for men's pleasure? Verily is she a hopeless victim
of his morbidly developed passions." In the feminist reordering, woman
would be "the rightful lawgiver in all our most sacred relations." '56
Women reading this letter would have had no difficulty understanding its
intent. In the years to follow, Stanton spoke about a married woman's
152. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith, supra note 151, at 840.
153. Id.
154. For more discussion of Stanton's understanding of a woman's right to herself, see infra text
accompanying notes 194-202.
155. Letter from Lucy Stone to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Oct. 22, 1856), in ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON, supra note 145, at 67, 68.
156. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Lucy Stone and the National Woman's Rights
Convention, Cooper Institute, 1856 (Nov. 24, 1856), reprinted in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
supra note 10, at 860, 860-61.
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right "to her person" again and again.157 She remained convinced that a
wife's right to refuse her husband's sexual demands was the bedrock
foundation needed to support equality. "Woman's degradation is in man's
idea of his sexual rights," Stanton wrote to Anthony. "How this marriage
question grows on me. It lies at the very foundation of all progress."' 58
Stanton's understanding of a married woman's right to her person
was shared throughout the woman's rights movement. Consider Lucy
Stone, who was as prominent a feminist leader as Stanton but one gener-
ally taken to be more moderate. Stone absolutely agreed with Stanton that
a woman's right to herself was the predicate on which equality depended.
She differed from Stanton only in her greater reluctance to discuss the
right in public, out of fear that outraged audiences would react by reject-
ing the entire feminist agenda. Yet despite her strategic hesitancy, Stone
still publicly advocated a wife's right of self-possession, including, as we
will see,'59 through the famous protest she issued upon her own mar-
riage. 16 Stone was more wary of the potential costs of public exposure, but
at the same time she was also determined to create public impetus for re-
form.
The tension in Stone's thought between her substantive commitment
to establishing a woman's right to herself and her fears that public agita-
tion on the question would be counter-productive was evident as early as
157. See Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to the Editor of the New York Tribune (May 30,
1860), reprinted in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 738, 738-39 ("An unmarried
woman can make contracts, sue and be sued, enjoy the rights of property, to her inheritance-to her
wages-to her person-to her children .... It is only in marriage that [woman] must demand her
rights to person, children, property, wages, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.") (emphasis
added); E.C.S., Marriage and Divorce, LIBERATOR (Boston), June 1, 1860, at 88, 88 (same); ADDRESS
OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, ON THE DIVORCE BILL, BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE
NEW YORK SENATE, IN THE ASSEMBLY CHAMBER, FEB. 8, 1861, at 3-4 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co.
1861) ("[1 come to plead] the justice of an entire revision of your whole code of laws on marriage and
divorce.... It is only in marriage, that [woman] must demand her rights to person, children, property,
wages, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.") (emphasis added); The Property Law (note in
pamphlet after Stanton's address), in id. at 13 (noting that the married women of New York were
denied "the control and custody of [their] own persons"); Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to
Wendell Phillips and the National Antislavery Standard (Dec. 26, 1865), reprinted in ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON, supra note 145, at 109, 110 ("[I]f the two millions of southern black women are not to be
secured in their rights of person, property, wages, and children, then their emancipation is but another
form of slavery.") (emphasis added); see also For Women Only: Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton
Discourses on Marriage and Maternity, DAILY IOWA STATE REGISTER (Des Moines, Iowa), July 29,
1871, at 2, 2 ("We must educate our daughters in this order: First-To regard THEIR OWN LIVES AND
BODIES and the laws which govern them.").
158. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (June 14, 1860), in ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON, supra note 145, at 82, 82.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 167-173.
160. Moreover, she also encouraged other feminists to speak publicly. Recall Stone's 1856 letter
to Stanton. See supra text accompanying notes 155-156. The specific purpose of this letter was to urge
Stanton, who had "dare[d] to speak" already, to raise her voice again: "I very much wish that a wife's
right to her own body should be pushed at our next convention," Stone wrote. "It does seem to me that
you are the one to do it." Letter from Lucy Stone to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, supra note 155, at 68.
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1853. By this point, Stanton had resolved to speak publicly about the right
to self-ownership when an agreeable opportunity arose,16' although she
would not actually do so for another two years. 62 Stone, however, re-
mained deeply worried that explicit advocacy was premature. She ex-
plained her concerns in a letter to Stanton this way:
One who is in total darkness, finds his eyes pained by the
sudden admission of bright light-and closes them. So too with
many, who are thinking on the Woman question;-broach in their
hearing, these thoughts, that we must think, and feel, and their
progress is yet so little, that they will be frightened from further
investigation. Such at least, has been my fear. I do not care for any
damnation, that may come from any quarter, when I am sure that
the full time has come.6 3
As this passage indicates, Stone's anxieties did not reflect any doubts as to
the importance of securing a wife's right to her person. She went on to
emphasize that she agreed with Stanton, "in all, except it be the time to
strike. '' 164 "I know," Stone said, "that the abuse in question is perfectly
appalling.... One noble woman told me how she fled from her husband,
to the Shakers, because he gave her no peace either during menstruation,
pregnancy, or nursing."' 6 Stone's eagerness to reform the marital relation
so that wives controlled their husbands' sexual access was so great that
even in a letter devoted to warning Stanton about the risk of public expo-
sure, Stone indicated the appeal that public advocacy on the question held
for her as well: "Shall we keep silence when such curses are inflicted
through woman upon the race?," Stone asked herself as much as Stanton.
"There is, I confess, much force in your reasoning upon the subject.' ' 66
Within two years, Stone herself had issued, on the occasion of her
marriage, a public and widely distributed protest against a husband's legal
control over his wife's person. Stone had long refused to marry because
she was unwilling to submit to the operation of coverture principles. "It
seems to me," she wrote in 1849, "that no man who deserved the name of
MAN, when he knows what a mere thing, the law, makes a married
woman, would ever insult a woman, by asking her to marry."'67 Henry
161. See supra text accompanying note 146.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 147-153.
163. Letter from Lucy Stone to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Aug. 14, 1853), in 1 THE SELECTED
PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 223, 224 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997).
164. ItL
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Letter from Lucy Stone to Antoinette Brown Blackwell (Aug. 1849), in FRIENDS AND
SISTERS: LETTERS BETWEEN Lucy STONE AND ANTOINETTE BLACKWELL, 1846-93, at 53, 56 (Carol
Lasser & Marlene Deahl Merrill eds., 1987); see also id. ("It is horrid to live without the intimate
companionship, and gentle loving influences which are the constant attendant of a true love
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Blackwell, her patient suitor and a reformer in his own right, ultimately
convinced her to change her mind by making clear that, in their marriage,
he would never enforce marital status law against her.'68 In particular, she
would have total freedom to determine the terms of marital intercourse
and, accordingly, unrestrained control over the social relations of repro-
duction. "You shall," Blackwell assured her, "choose when, where & how
often you shall become a mother."'69 At Blackwell's suggestion,' 70 Stone
agreed to make their arrangement public in the form of a protest to be
published immediately after their wedding on May 1, 1855. In this docu-
ment, Stone and Blackwell specifically rejected the theory of consent un-
derlying marital status law, which conclusively presumed agreement from
a couple's decision to wed. They declared that their agreement to marry
"implie[d] no sanction of, nor promise of voluntary obedience to such of
the present laws of marriage, as refuse to recognize the wife as an
independent, rational being, while they confer upon the husband an
injurious and unnatural superiority."'' In listing the features of coverture
that they rejected, Stone and Blackwell cited a husband's right to "custody
of the wife's person" first. 17 This statement was not as explicit as it might
have been, and deliberately so, but it was perfectly understandable to a
nineteenth-century audience. Indeed, it specifically inspired other femi-
nists to speak publicly about a wife's right to control her husband's sexual
access. 73 Soon after her wedding, Stone reviewed her objections to the le-
gal terms of marriage in language more accessible to modem readers:
marriage... but nothing is so bad as to be made a thing, as every married woman now is, in the eye of
Law.").
168. See Letter from Henry B. Blackwell to Lucy Stone (Dec. 22, 1854), in LOVING
WARRIORS: SELECTED LETTERS OF Lucy STONE AND HENRY B. BLACKWELL, 1853 TO 1893, at 108,
108 (Leslie Wheeler ed., 1981) ("The Law by clothing me with unjust powers puts me in the position
of the wrongdoer .... But after all what is the Law? It is nothing, unless appealed to. It is merely 'a
rule of civil action' in case of such appeal. It exists only where it is invoked."). As their protest
specified, Stone and Blackwell agreed to submit any disputes that arose between them to private
arbitration rather than the court system. See Henry B. Blackwell & Lucy Stone, Protest (1855),
reprinted in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 260, 261 ("[M]arried partners should
provide against the radical injustice of present laws, by every means in their power.... [Wihere
domestic difficulties arise, no appeal should be made to legal tribunals under existing laws,. . . all
difficulties should be submitted to the equitable adjustment of arbitrators mutually chosen.").
169. Letter from Henry B. Blackwell to Lucy Stone, supra note 168, at 110.
170. See Letter from Henry B. Blackwell to Lucy Stone (Jan. 3, 1855), in LOVING WARRIORS,
supra note 168, at 115, 115-16 ("I want to make a protest distinct and emphatic against the laws. I
wish, as a husband, to renounce all the privileges which the law confers upon me, which are not strictly
mutual.... Help me to draw one up.... Surely such a marriage will not degrade you ....").
171. Henry B. Blackwell & Lucy Stone, Protest, supra note 168, at 261. This protest was
originally published in the Worcester Spy and the Liberator. See HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra
note 10, at 261.
172. Henry B. Blackwell & Lucy Stone, Protest, supra note 168, at 261.
173. Caroline Dall, for instance, cited this statement from the protest to explain why she could no
longer remain silent about a wife's right to self-possession:
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[lit is clear to me, that [the marriage] question underlies, this whole
movement and all our little skirmishing for better laws, and the
right to vote, will yet be swallowed up, in the real question, viz, has
woman, as wife, a right to herself? It is very little to me to have the
right to vote, to own property &c. if I may not keep my body, and
its uses, in my absolute right. Not one wife in a thousand can do
that now, & so long as she suffers this bondage, all other rights will
not help her to her true position.174
Stone, like Stanton, did not view a wife's right to her person as simply
one of many important rights to which women were entitled. Like
Stanton, she understood this right as the necessary foundation for equal
citizenship, without which all other legal reform would prove near worth-
less.
Stanton and Stone articulated a perspective that was common in the
woman's rights movement. Feminists repeatedly singled out a woman's
right to control marital intercourse as the core component of equality.175
Paulina Wright Davis, president of the 1871 meeting of the National
Women's Suffrage Convention, identified a woman's right to her person
as the most crucial right that women needed to achieve. She explained:
That the evils, sufferings and disabilities of the women, as well as
of men, are social still more than they are political, and that a
The protest signed by Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell on the occasion of their
marriage, seemed to relate to whatever was most objectionable in all law, every where. I take
it, therefore, section by section, as the foundation of whatever remarks I may wish to
make ....
1. The custody of the wife's person.
... Probably no right with which he is invested occasions more suffering than this, yet it
is necessarily of a kind to be passed over in silence, and which,-speak of it impersonally as
we will,--it seems unfit to press publicly upon the attention of an audience. But, if the results
of this right are sustained by the laws of the land; should they be such as we must blush to
speak of; if women die under its inflictions,-are they never to find those of their own sex
strong enough to show the reasons why, and pure enough to remain unsuspected in doing
so?... In relation to such a right, it may be said, that every thing will depend upon the
character of the husband, and that no good man would feel himself justified by it. Precisely
for this reason ought the law to be altered. Only the conduct of a violent, abusive man,
regardless of all holy obligations, is likely to come before a Court under it; and such men
ought not to be sustained by the law ....
Caroline H. Dall, Report Concerning Some of the Laws of Massachusetts in Relation to Women (July
2, 1855), in REPORTS ON THE LAWS OF NEW ENGLAND, PRESENTED TO THE NEW ENGLAND MEETING,
CONVENED SEPT. 19 AND 20, 1855, at 1, 2 (Boston? 1855).
174. Letter from Lucy Stone to Antoinette Brown Blackwell (July 11, 1855), in FRIENDS AND
SISTERS, supra note 167, at 143, 144.
175. Susan B. Anthony, for instance, was convinced that "nearly all the wrongs of which we
complain grow out of the inequality, the injustice of the marriage laws, that rob the wife of the right to
herself and her children-that make her the slave of the man she marries." In marriage, Anthony
concluded, "tyrant law and lust reign supreme." Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention, supra
note 144, at 735 (statement of Susan B. Anthony); see also Clarina I. Howard Nichols, Reminiscences,
in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 171, 194, 197 (recounting an 1858 speech in
which she discussed "the no-right of the white wife and mother to herself' and the systematic sexual
exploitation of slave women by white men).
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statement of woman's rights, which ignores the right of self-
ownership as the first of all rights, is insufficient to meet the
demand, and is ceasing to enlist the enthusiasm and even the
common interest of the most intelligent portion of the
community. 
176
There is no subject, Matilda E.J. Gage agreed, "which lies deeper down
into woman's wrongs" than "the denial of the right to herself."'' 77 A
woman should, Lucinda B. Chandler concurred, "legally hold the custody
and control of her person in wifehood to govern according to her wisdom
and instincts the maternal office.' ' 78 "The repeal of the law of coverture,
leaving the wife free to maintain her self-respect and to determine the
exercise of her function of maternity, will confer the greatest service
legislation can render."' 179
Giving woman the right "to decide when she shall become a mother,
how often & under what circumstances" was only just,8 0 these arguments
continued, because women performed the social work of reproduction.
Like Stanton and Stone, these nineteenth-century feminists used women's
exclusive responsibility for child rearing to insist that women were enti-
tled to control the terms of this work and determine how much of their
lives they would have to spend raising children.'"' Chandler noted that
176. National Women's Suffrage Convention, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S WEEKLY (New York,
N.Y.), May 27, 1871, at 3, 3.
177. Matilda E.J. Gage, Is Woman Her Own?, REVOLUTION (New York, N.Y.), Apr. 9, 1868, at
215, 215; see also id. ("[N]owhere has the marital union of the sexes been one in which woman has had
control over her own body."); Matilda Joslyn Gage, Our Book Table, NAT'L CITIZEN & BALLOT Box
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 1878, at 2, 2 ("The law of motherhood should be entirely under woman's
control, but in order to be that, woman mustfirst of all be held as having a right to herself.").
178. Lucinda B. Chandler, Woman's Sphere of Motherhood, WOMAN'S J. (Boston, Chicago, & St.
Louis), Sept. 13, 1873, at 291,291.
179. Lucinda B. Chandler, Marriage Refonn, in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
WOMEN, ASSEMBLED BY THE NATIONAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.
OF AMERICA, MARCH 25 TO APRIL 1, 1888, at 284, 285 (Washington, Rufus H. Darby 1888); see also
ELIZABETH BLACKWELL, The Benevolence of Malthus Contrasted with the Corruptions of Neo-
Malthusianism (1888), in ESSAYS IN MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 77, 109 (London, no pub. 1899) (contending
that "[t]he ancient legal oppression, which is still upheld under the title of 'conjugal rights,' is a
remnant of that old lustful subjection of the physically weaker to the stronger"); Mattie H. Brinkerhoff,
Woman and Motherhood, REVOLUTION (New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2, 1869, at 138, 138 ("[I]t should be
for [women] to decide when and how often they shall take upon themselves the sacred duties of
motherhood ....").
180. Sarah M. Grimkd, Marriage (1852-1857), in THE FEMALE ExPERIENCE: AN AMERICAN
DOCUMENTARY 89, 91 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1977).
181. At the same time, these activists were also particularly aware, as Stanton was, of the
distinctive opportunities in public political or intellectual life that might be available to educated and
relatively affluent women like themselves, if they could successfully limit the portion of their lives
devoted to physical and social reproduction. See supra text accompanying notes 152-153. Gage
expressed the keen regret of many of these women when she noted that "without the control of one's
own person, the opportunities of the world, which are [the] only means of development, cannot be
used." Matilda Joslyn Gage on the Right of Habeas Corpus, BALLOT Box (Toledo, Ohio), Nov. 1876,
at 1, 1.
1426 [Vol. 88:1373
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1426 2000
CONTESTAND CONSENT
"[o]ne position, with its attendant round of cares and duties, has ever been
acknowledged as especially Woman's-that of Motherhood."' 82 Sarah M.
Grimk6 elaborated:
Surely as upon her alone devolves the necessity of nurturing unto
the fulness of life the being within her & after it is born, of nursing
& tending it thro' helpless infancy & capricious childhood, often
under the pressure of miserable health; she ought to have the right
of controlling all preliminaries. If man had all these burdens to
bear, would not he declare that common sense & common justice
confer this right upon him."8 3
B. Structural Consent and Marriage as Legalized Prostitution
Nineteenth-century feminists often explained that economic and po-
litical equality would be meaningless, unless women had the right to their
own persons in marriage. The statements reflected their view that equal
citizenship needed to be grounded in self-ownership, because a wife's
right to control her husband's sexual access would enable her to determine
the conditions under which she performed reproductive labor. Yet this
point constitutes only part of the feminist claim, and overstates the dis-
tinction that these women drew between personal self-possession, and po-
litical and economic rights. When feminists elaborated their understanding
of consent, they made it clear that they would not be satisfied with legal
reform recognizing a wife's right to herself. Instead, they argued that a
wife could only freely consent to marital intercourse under circumstances
in which she had both the legal right to refuse and realistic alternatives to
submission. This was a structural understanding of consent that
182. Chandler, supra note 178, at 291.
183. Grimkd, supra note 180, at 91; see also id. at 95 ("Look at the unnatural tug upon [the]
constitution [of a mother of six], her night watches, her sore vexations and trials & causes nameless &
numberless, that wear away her life. If men had to alternate with their wives, the duties of the nursery,
fewer & further between would be its inmates."). "A Subscriber" to the Woman's Journal made a
similar point:
As a mother, a woman goes through the tragedy of giving birth to her son, watches over and
cares for his helpless infancy, brings him through all the diseases incident to childhood, is his
nurse, physician, seamstress, washerwoman, teacher, friend, and guide, spending the cream
of her days to bring him up to be a voter .... Then he leaves home and marries a wife, whom
it took some other mother twenty-one years to raise .... Then he votes to help make a law to
disfranchise his wife and these two mothers, who have unitedly spent forty-two years of the
prime of their days for his benefit, without any compensation. And then he makes another
law to compel his wife to do all the same kind of drudgery which his mother had done, with
the addition of giving birth to as many children as in his good pleasure he sees fit to force
upon her.... It is time we stated facts and called things by their right names, and handled
this subject without kid gloves.
After being the recipient of so many favors, such base ingratitude and self-conceit, such
arrogant, pompous, unwarrantable, criminal usurpation of power, such supreme selfishness is
not to be tolerated or forgiven!
A Subscriber, A Wife's Protest, 'WOMAN'S J. (Boston, Chicago, & St. Louis), Mar. 6, 1875, at 74, 74
(emphasis added).
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considered how the structure of the marital relation, rather than simply the
behavior of individual husbands, shaped women's opportunities as a class.
Feminists noted, and attacked, the tremendous legal, social, and economic
pressures that pushed women into marriage and kept them there. A
woman who lived outside a husband's household, or (worse yet) divorced
or separated, was marginalized and often found it extremely difficult to
support herself, given laws and practices that explicitly excluded women
from most jobs and suppressed the wages for women's work. In marriage,
coverture principles stripped a wife of almost all legal claims to her
household's resources and power, leaving her to confront her husband as
an economic, social, and political dependent.
The language of "legalized prostitution" became one of the most
powerful idioms in which nineteenth-century feminists articulated this
structural understanding of consent. Even before the organization of the
first woman's rights movement, Hale and his successors had anxiously
recognized the similarities between the situation of wives subjected to the
marital rape exemption and prostitutes. As we have seen, these lawyers
and judges were never willing, or able, to present a substantive explana-
tion differentiating the work of prostitution from the sexual services that
husbands were entitled to take from their financially dependent wives. In-
stead, the authoritative legal sources sought to distinguish the two classes
of women in jurisdictional terms. They argued that only extramarital in-
tercourse could constitute prostitution, that sex could only be illicit and
degrading if a woman's sexual partner was not her husband."8 The
woman's rights movement emphatically rejected that notion and was con-
vinced that it had spotted a crucial weakness in the defense of a husband's
conjugal rights. Precisely countering the claims of the exemption's sup-
porters, feminists employed the term legalized prostitution to describe the
condition of wives who acquiesced to marital intercourse because they
had no practical alternative, nowhere else to go and no other means of ne-
gotiating their marital relationship. They argued that the legitimacy of
sexual intercourse depended on a woman's genuine consent (understood
structurally), contending that there was little relevant difference between
married women who effectively traded sexual access in return for their
husbands' socioeconomic support, and prostitutes who explicitly sold
their sexuality to strangers because they, too, had no better way to earn a
living. Legal and illegal prostitution were mirrored phenomena in the
feminist vision, understandable on the same terms.185
184. See supra text accompanying notes 78-97.
185. As Reva Siegel has shown, the woman's rights movement and doctors opposed to legal
abortion engaged in a somewhat different contest over the meaning of "legalized prostitution" in the
second half of the nineteenth century. In this debate also, the woman's rights movement used the
language of legalized prostitution to criticize women's subordination in marriage and lack of control
over their reproductive functions. See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11, at 308. But
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The feminist analysis of illegal prostitution focused on the societal
inequities that drove women to the trade, including, very prominently, the
impediments that women faced in securing a living wage. Feminists under-
stood prostitution as a (highly regrettable) substitute for work in the legiti-
mate market, for women who did not have a husband to support them. This
critique was directed outward; it did not account for prostitution in terms of
the internal character flaws or moral worthlessness of its practitioners.
Abby Price, a feminist from Massachusetts, explained that "cruel
necessity" often drove the prostitute to vice. "The washer-woman," Price
elaborated, "works as hard in proportion as the wood-sawyer, yet she
makes not more than half as much by a day's work. Thus by narrowing the
sphere of woman, and reducing her remuneration of labor so unjustly, her
resources are few and she finds it hard to acquire an honorable
independence."'' 6 "It is by no means rare," she added, "to see married
women, widowed, or deserted by their husbands, becoming abandoned,
with the sole object of saving their families from dying with hunger. '
Lucy Stone similarly identified the causes of prostitution. "Women
working in tailor-shops are paid one-third as much as men," she noted.
Someone had calculated that this wage left women "just three and a half
cents a day for bread. Is it a wonder," Stone concluded, "that women are
driven to prostitution?'.. "Is it not time," these women asked, "to throw
open to women, equal resources with men, for obtaining honest
employment?"'' 9
where the defenders of the marital rape exemption were anxious to distinguish marriage and
prostitution, the anti-abortion movement embraced the analogy between the current state of marital
relations and prostitution, "argu[ing] that marriage was a relation of legalized prostitution so long as
man's natural sexual urge were allowed expression in marriage without reproductive consequence." Il
at 309 (original emphasis omitted).
186. Abby H. Price, Address Read to the "Woman's Rights Convention," at Worcester, in THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMAN's RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT WORCESTER, OCTOBER 23D & 24TH,
1850, at 20, 24 (Boston, Prentiss & Sawyer 1851); see also id. at 26 ("I have the authority of Dr. Ryan,
and of Dr. Mayhew, persons of well known integrity ... and they publicly affirm, that nearly all were
driven to dissolute lives because there were no means open to them of obtaining an adequate
maintenance.").
187. Id. at 25 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
188. National Convention at Cincinnati, Ohio, in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 10,
at 163, 166 (statement of Lucy Stone).
189. Price, supra note 186, at 26; see also CAROLINE H. DALL, THE COLLEGE, THE MARKET, AND
THE COURT; OR, WOMAN'S RELATION TO EDUCATION, LABOR, AND LAW 135 (Boston, Lee & Shepard
1867) ("I ask for woman, then, free, untrammelled access to all fields of labor;.., the question which
is at this moment before the great body of working women is 'death or dishonor:' for lust is a better
paymaster than the mill-owner or the tailor .... ); Susan B. Anthony, Social Purity (1875), in 2 IDA
HUSTED HARPER, THE LIFE AND WoRK OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 1004, 1007 (Amo & N.Y. Times
1969) (1898) ("[Women have] but few and meager chances. Only the barest necessaries, and
oftentimes not even those, can be purchased with the proceeds of the most excessive and exhausting
labor.... [C]an we wonder that so many poor girls fall... ?"); Ellen Battelle Dietrick, "Rescuing
Fallen Women," WOMAN'S J. (Boston), May 27, 1893, at 162, 162 ("Society says to all women, 'Go
sew, you belongers in the home, go sew!' ... [A]s a direct consequence of millions of women crowded
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The feminist attack on legalized prostitution in marriage proceeded
along the same lines, explaining why wives were not able to exercise free
choice with regard to marital relations when they had no good alternatives
to acquiescence. "[E]ven in our republic (so called)," Harriot Hunt re-
ported, woman "is denied a finished education, and refused a just
remuneration for her labor, and thus has been driven into legal and illegal
prostitutions."' "[Diollars and a home come to woman through man."''
Wives "prostitut[ed]" themselves "body and soul," Fuller Walker con-
firmed, "for the sake of a home, a shelter, or money enough to buy bread
that the passions of men may be satisfied.'"  While many feminists spoke
of legalized prostitution as marrying "for a home," others contended that
this description was too mild. Grimk6, for instance, argued that marriages
where women functionally traded sexual access for support could not ac-
curately be described in a language of domesticity: "Many a woman (I
call her not wife)," Grimk6 noted, "loathes the unhallowed connection she
has formed & would gladly welcome death as a deliverer from that
polluted prison house, which the world miscalls her home. A revolting
experience has forced upon her the conviction that she is a legal
prostitute."'93
into a channel of labor which cannot comfortably support more than thousands, a large proportion of
them slowly starve or supplement their wages as advised by tempters."); Female Labor Question,
REVOLUTION (New York, N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1868, at 259, 259 ("'Next to the liquor traffic, it is generally
conceded that the greatest cause of vice is the inadequate reward of female labor, and the difficulty of
woman's obtaining employment at any price."' (quoting Susan B. Anthony)); Helen M. Slocum, The
Causes of Prostitution, WOMAN'S J. (Boston), Jan. 18, 1879, at 22, 22 ("I have investigated this matter
to some extent in New York, and I learn from various sources that want of remunerative employment is
the chief cause which leads women first to go down."); id. ("There are in the city of New York, and its
immediate vicinity, many thousand women, outside of domestic service, who are compelled to work
for wages which do not average over $2 per week .... How long would men hold out against such
starvation wages, for the sake of being virtuous ... ?"); The Wages of Work and Sin, REVOLUTION
(New York, N.Y.), Oct. 8, 1868, at 221,221 ("Large establishments that will secure to women and girls
profitable employments will do more to save them from destruction than all the prayer-meetings that
can be organized in the John Allen dance-houses.").
190. HARRiOT K. HUNT, GLANCES AND GLIMPSES 201 (Boston, John P. Jewett & Co. 1856).
191. I. at 384.
192. Fuller Walker, Women Fit for Suffrage, GOLDEN AGE (New York, N.Y.), Sept. 19, 1874, at
2,2-3.
193. Grimk6, supra note 180, at 94; see also id. at 96 ("[M]any so called wives, rise in the
morning oppressed with a sense of degradation from the fact that their chastity has been violated, their
holiest instincts disregarded .... and that, too, a thousand times harder to bear, because so called
husband has been the perpetrator of the unnatural crime."); ADDRESS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON,
ON THE DIVORCE BILL, BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE NEW YORK SENATE, IN THE
ASSEMBLY CHAMBER, FEB. 8 1861, supra note 157, at 7 (explaining that "marriage is, in many cases, a
mere outward tie, impelled by custom, policy, interest, necessity; founded not even in friendship, to say
nothing of love; with every possible inequality of condition and development"); id. at 8 ("[Is marriage
sacred, where a woman] consents to live in legalized prostitution! her whole soul revolting at such
gross association! her flesh shivering at the cold contamination of that embrace! held there by no tie but
the iron chain of the law, and a false and most unnatural public sentiment?"); id. ("What father could
rest at his home by night, knowing that his lovely daughter was at the mercy of a strong man, drunk
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Feminists elaborated on this analysis as it applied to middle-class
women outside the wage labor market, but explained the constraints that
operated on women who performed market work as well. Stanton, par-
ticularly interested in the situation of the middle-class housewife, articu-
lated a multi-tiered set of obstacles to exercising free choice with respect
to marital intercourse. The first obstacle, of course, was legal. Marital
status law gave women no control over their husbands' sexual de-
mands: "A man in marrying gives up no right; but a woman, every right,
even the most sacred of all-the right to her own person."'94 Yet that was
not the only constraint Stanton saw. If marriage was to rise above
"legalized prostitution," wives needed to have "[p]ersonal freedom,"
something more, even, than a legal right to control marital intercourse. 5
This freedom "[did] not and [could not] now belong to the relation of
wife, to the mistress of the isolated home, to the financial dependent."'96
Middle-class women were systematically trained, in Stanton's view, "to
lives of inaction and dependance."' 97 Indeed, they learned "dependance as
a womanly virtue."'98 Marriage gave men enormous legal, economic, and
social control over their wives. But women whose families could afford to
educate them were taught to shun work in the arts, literature, philanthropy
or the academy, which might have provided them with a happy alternative
to marriage where they could not find "a pure and holy love."' 99 Instead,
these women were instructed to devote themselves to attracting a husband.
with wine and passion, and that, do what he might, he was backed up by law and public sentiment?");
A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 22 (Paulina W. Davis comp., New York,
Journeymen Printers' Co-operative Ass'n 1871) ('To [Stanton's] lectures, also, is due a healthier tone
of public sentiment on the marriage question. It is slowly beginning to be felt that in that relation there
is a vast amount of legalized prostitution, bearing the semblance of virtue, but is rotten below the fair
exterior.").
Robert Dale Owen, a prominent divorce reformer, similarly reasoned from domesticity in arguing
against restrictive divorce laws on the ground that they permitted marital rape:
Is it her home where [the unwilling wife] is sitting? Let us not so desecrate the hallowed
word. A bloated wretch, whom daily and nightly debauch has degraded below humanity, has
the right to enter it.... He has the command of torments, legally permitted, far beyond those
of the lash. That bed-chamber is his, and the bed is the beast's own lair. It depends, too, on
the brute's drunken will whether it shall be shared or not. Caliban is lord and master, by legal
right. There is not a womanly instinct that he cannot outrage; not a holy emotion that he may
not profane. He is authorized to commit what more resembles an infamous crime, usually
rated second to murder, and often punished with death, than anything else.
Robert Dale Owen, Divorce, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 5, 1860, at 7, 7.
194. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (July 20, 1857), in ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON, supra note 145, at 69, 70.
195. l
196. Id.
197. Stanton, supra note 143, at 40.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also id. ("Could not fame, distinction, the love of science, of literature, a highly
cultivated taste in the arts, the editor's or professor's chair, authorship or philanthropy as fully satisfy
the soul of woman, as does the inferior position she now looks to as the summun bonum of all
happiness?").
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"[I]f," Lucy Stone agreed, a middle-class woman went "heartily and
bravely to give herself to some worthy purpose, she is out of her sphere
and she loses caste ." 21 As a consequence, these women had, Stanton con-
tinued, little alternative upon reaching adulthood, but "marrying for a
home, a support, a position, a head, a protector, a defender, &c., marrying
to escape the horrors of a single life of inactivity and vacuity, the odious
cognomen of old maid."20' "Teach woman self-dependance," Stanton ad-
vised, "and you end the wholesale degradation of the sacred institution of
marriage."2" "[E]ducate woman," Ernestine Rose concurred, "to enable
her to promote her independence, and she will not be obliged to marry for
a home and a subsistence.""2 3
Of course, it was hardly the worry of poorer women that their lives
had been squandered away in frivolity and indolence. Many women had
no choice but to engage in market work. The woman's rights movement
also described the somewhat different reasons that these women needed
more than the legal right to refuse marital intercourse before they would
be able to exercise genuine control over their own persons. As the femi-
nists noted, most "profitable employments" were closed to women, and
women were paid less for the work they did: "Even for the same services
woman generally receives less than man."2" They concluded that "[t]he
present condition of woman cause[d] a horrible perversion of the marriage
relation."0 5 "As a consequence of her fewer resources, marriage has been
to her the great means of securing position in society."2" Women had to
200. National Convention at Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 188, at 166 (statement of Lucy Stone);
see also id. (noting that "the same society that drives forth the young man, keeps woman at home-a
dependent-working little cats on worsted, and little dogs on punctured paper").
201. Stanton, supra note 143, at 40.
202. Id.
203. Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention, supra note 144, at 732 (statement of Ernestine
L. Rose); see also The Second National Convention in Worcester, in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
supra note 10, at 226, 238 (statement of Ernestine L. Rose) ("[I]t will be said that the husband provides
for the wife .... I wish I had the power to make every one before me fully realize the degradation
contained in that idea. Yes! he keeps her, and so he does a favorite horse; by law they are both
considered his property."); Grimkd, supra note 180, at 96 ("Her imperfect education unfits her for
acquiring that pecuniary independence which would lift her above the temptation to marry for a
home.... [Tihe great work to be done now for woman by woman, is to impress her with the necessity
of pecuniary independence ... ").
204. Ann Preston's Address, Westchester Convention, in HIsTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra
note 10, at 350, 361-62; see also Grimkd, supra note 180, at 96 ("Now [women] work under great
disadvantages and can obtain a mere pittance."); National Convention at Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note
188, at 166 (statement of Lucy Stone) ("The flour-merchant, the house-builder, and the postman charge
us no less on account of our sex; but when we endeavor to earn money to pay all these, then, indeed,
we find the difference."); id. ("Female teachers in New York are paid fifty dollars a year [a fraction of
what male teachers received], and for every such situation there are five hundred applicants.").
205. National Convention at Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 188, at 166 (statement of Lucy Stone).
206. Ann Preston's Address, supra note 204, at 362; see also National Convention at Cincinnati,
Ohio, supra note 188, at 166 (statement of Lucy Stone) ("It is asked of a lady, 'Has she married wellT'
'Oh, yes, her husband is rich."').
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"marry for a home," and were, accordingly, not able to exercise free
choice in selecting, or remaining with, a husband.2 The marital relation,
Ann Preston declared, "which should ever be a 'holy sacrament,' the
unbiased and generous election of the free and self-sustained being-too
often is degraded into a mean acceptance of a shelter from neglect and
poverty !1,201 Woman would not be able to freely choose marriage, until she
had "free access to vocations of profit and honor, the means of earning a
livelihood and independence for herself!"
C. The First Woman's Rights Campaign Against Marital Rape as a
Distinctly Nineteenth-Century Movement
Leading nineteenth-century feminists understood a woman's right to
her person as the core foundation on which equal citizenship needed to
rest. Their definition of consent to marital intercourse, in turn, demanded
both a legal right to refuse, as well as the existence of real socioeconomic
alternatives to marriage and submission. In many ways, these claims still
resonate as distinctly modem. But one should not make the mistake of
conflating nineteenth-century feminism with modern claims against the
marital rape exemption.21
As an initial matter, women were systematically excluded from the
bar in the nineteenth century,2"' and their lack of legal training had impor-
tant consequences for the shape of the arguments that the first woman's
rights movement put forth. Organized feminists clearly wanted to
207. National Convention at Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 188, at 166 (statement of Lucy Stone).
208. Ann Preston's Address, supra note 204, at 362.
209. Id. at 361; see also Anthony, supra note 189, at 1007 ("To [end prostitution in marriage],
girls, like boys, must be educated to some lucrative employment; women, like men, must have equal
chances to earn a living.... Marriage, to women as to men, must be a luxury, not a necessity; an
incident of life, not all of it.").
210. For a discussion of the modem feminist movement's understanding of the harm that marital
rape inflicts upon women, see infra text accompanying notes 434-443.
211. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137-39 (1873) (upholding Illinois
Supreme Court's decision to refuse Myra Bradwell a license to practice law); id. at 141 (Bradley, J.,
concurring) ("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization.., indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood."); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 116-18 (1894) (holding that Virginia could
deny Belva A. Lockwood admission to state bar, even though she had already been admitted to bars of
United States Supreme Court and several other states); In re Application of Martha Angle Dorsett to Be
Admitted to Practice as an Attorney and Counselor at Law in Said Court (Minn. Ct. C.P. Hennepin
County 1876), il SYLLABI, Oct. 21, 1876, at 5, 6 (explaining that lawyers would not be able "to grade
up the profession" if women were admitted to the bar, because women's reproductive responsibilities
would always prevent them from "bestow[ing] that time (early and late) and labor, so essential in
attaining to the eminence to which the true lawyer should ever aspire"); In re Motion to Admit Miss
Lavinia Goodell to the Bar of this Court, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (endorsing women's statutory
exclusion from bar on ground that contrary rule "would be revolting to all female sense of the
innocence and sanctity of their sex" and "shocking to man's reverence for womanhood and faith in
woman, on which hinge all the better affections and humanities of life").
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establish a woman's right to control the terms of marital intercourse. They
meant this to be an independent right, moreover, not one subject to a hus-
band's benevolent agreement. But these women did not clarify what form
of enforcement they had in mind. To my knowledge, the woman's rights
movement never addressed, for instance, the relative merits of criminal
penalties as opposed to civil sanctions for marital rape. Moreover, the
movement did not specify whether husbands were to be punished for
marital intercourse to which their wives had acquiesced for want of palat-
able alternatives. The feminists' understanding of genuine consent was
significantly more far-reaching than any definition that has ever operated
in the criminal law on rape, even outside of the marital context. Criminal
rape law focuses on the interaction between the particular victim and per-
petrator: who did what when, who said what to whom. But the
nineteenth-century feminist understanding of marital rape did not always
turn on what an individual husband did or said. It challenged the volun-
tariness of a wife's consent to sexual intercourse with her husband when-
ever the wife had no realistic socioeconomic alternatives to marriage and
submission, even where the woman's husband had never resorted to force,
threats, or coercion. Perhaps the feminists envisioned subjecting
"legalized prostitution" to the far lesser criminal penalties associated with
illegal prostitution, but they never made that point. Such institutional
questions were not of particular interest to nineteenth-century feminism.
But to be fair, the judicial opinions and legal treatises of the nineteenth
century did not explain the marital rape exemption by reference to institu-
tional claims about the unsuitability of criminal sanctions. The authorita-
tive legal sources argued from an understanding about the nature of
marriage that was grounded in an acceptance of women's legal subordi-
nation, and the woman's rights movement attacked marital rape on those
terms.
Nineteenth-century feminists also had reasons to be wary of marital
intercourse that do not neatly map onto the modern landscape. As we have
already seen, nineteenth-century feminists built on the premise that
women would do all the social work of reproduction, the work of raising
children. Rather than highlight issues of bodily autonomy or inviolateness,
they understood a wife's right to control her husband's sexual access as
the mechanism through which a married woman would determine the
conditions under which she performed this labor. A number of other con-
siderations distinctively structured organized feminism's assessment of
the risks and rewards of marital intercourse.
Nineteenth-century feminists understood male sexuality to be im-
portantly different from female sexuality. This view did not deny the fe-
male sex drive. Indeed, Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman to graduate
from medical school in the United States, devoted much of a treatise to
[Vol. 88:13731434
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disputing the then-common notion that women naturally lacked sexual
passion.2 But feminists did take male sexuality to be "morbidly
developed" in a way that its female counterpart was not.213 On this theory,
woman had "more self-control than man;"'214 irrational or immoral sexual
acts tempted her far less. Stanton was sure that no woman enjoyed acts of
prostitution, because "the true woman in her organization [was] too
refined and spiritual, to be the victim of an over-powering passion" like
that.215 In contrast, this view held that lust and licentiousness systemati-
cally overrode male rationality and constantly tempted men to commit
immoral acts, like insisting on marital intercourse when their wives'
health called for restraint.1 6
Although slightly more nuanced, the feminists' dichotomous ren-
dering of the sexual instincts of man and woman drew heavily on a gen-
eral societal understanding that the female sex drive was far less
pronounced and more easily controllable than its male equivalent I7 As
212. Blackwell argued "that the assertion that sexual passion commands more of the vital force of
men than of women is a false assertion, based upon a perverted or superficial view of the facts of
human nature." ELIZABETH BLACKWELL, THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN SEx 56 (London, J. & A. Churchill
new ed. 1894); see also id. at 49. She noted, however, that the sexual interest of wives was highly
diminished when they did not want to risk reproduction, remembered awkward or brutal conjugal
encounters, or had suffered injuries in childbirth that made intercourse painful. See id. at 49-50. This
argument insisted that women had the right to sexual feelings and called for a restructuring of the
marital relation so that wives could control the terms of their husbands' sexual access.
Other feminists privately indicated their view that women could be active sexual agents. Stanton,
for instance, once remarked in her diary that she had
been reading Leaves of Grass. Walt Whitman seems to understand everything in nature but
woman. In "There is a Woman Waiting for Me," he speaks as if the female must be forced to
the creative act, apparently ignorant of the great natural fact that a healthy woman has as
much passion as a man, that she needs nothing stronger than the law of attraction to draw her
to the male.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Diary Entry (Sept. 6, 1883), in ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, supra note 145, at
210, 210; see also Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Diary Entry (Feb. 22, 1881), in id. at 183, 183 ("I have
come to the conclusion that the first great work to be accomplished for woman is to revolutionize the
dogma that sex is a crime, marriage a defilement and maternity a bane.").
213. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Lucy Stone and the National Woman's Rights
Convention, Cooper Institute, 1856, supra note 156, at 860.
214. Stanton, supra note 143, at 40.
215. Id.
216. See Grimk6, supra note 180, at 95 ("How often is [the pregnant woman] compelled by
various considerations to yield to the unnatural embraces of her husband, and thus to endanger the very
existence of her embryo babe. How often is it sacrificed to the ungoverned passion of its own father &
the health of the mother seriously impaired.").
217. For some notable expressions of this view, see WILLIAM ACTON, THE FUNCTIONS AND
DISORDERS OF THE REPRODUCTIVE ORGANS 162-63 (Philadelphia, Lindsay & Blakiston 3d Am. ed.
1871) ("[r]he majority of women (happily for society) are not very much troubled with sexual feeling
of any kind. What men are habitually, women are only exceptionally.... [E]ven if [women's sexual
feeling is] roused (which in many instances it never can be) it is very moderate compared with that of
the male."); id. at 164 ("Many of the best mothers, wives, and managers of households, know little of
or are careless about sexual indulgences. Love of home, of children, and of domestic duties are the only
passions they feel."); [NICHOLAS FRANCIS COOKE], SATAN IN SOCIETY 143 (Cincinnati, C.F. Vent
1871) ("While we readily admit and claim for our argument that a woman capable of bearing children
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Nancy Cott has most prominently noted, women had a number of reasons
to accept and even promote their reputation for sexual reticence in the
nineteenth century.21 Female passionlessness was culturally associated
with the premise that the natural inclination of womanhood was to moral
seriousness. While women's status as moral exemplars had its own diffi-
culties, it provided a sturdier foundation for respect and equality than ear-
lier, Edenic images of women as sexual temptresses or sexual objects 19
The costs of passionlessness for women, moreover, were mitigated.
Women did not have the freedom to take many sexual liberties, even if
they had been assumed to have interests in that direction. The social and
is also capable of the sexual instinct, the simple fact remains that the majority perhaps-or certainly an
immense proportion-of those who have borne children are innocent of the faintest ray of sexual
pleasure."); ALBERT H. HAYES, PHYSIOLOGY OF WOMAN 225-26 (Boston, Peabody Med. Inst. 1869)
("[Slexual feeling in the female, is, in a majority of cases, in abeyance, and.., it requires positive and
considerable excitement to be roused at all; and, even if roused (which in many instances it never can
be), is very moderate, compared with that of the male."); WILLIAM W. SANGER, THE HISTORY OF
PROSTITUTION 488-89 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1858) ("[For] most females [desire] exists in a
slumbering state until aroused by some outside influences.... [W]ithout ... stimulating cause, the full
force of sexual desise [sic] is seldom known to a virtuous woman. In the male sex nature has provided a
more susceptible organization than in females ....").
218. See Nancy F. Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-
1850, 4 SIGNS 219, 235 (1978) ("[W]omen's participation in the creation of Victorian sexual standards
and the place of passionlessness in the vanguard of feminist thought deserve more recognition. The
serviceability of passionlessness to women in gaining social and familial power should be
acknowledged as a primary reason that the ideology was quickly and widely accepted."); Howard
Gadlin, Private Lives and Public Order: A Critical View of the History of Intimate Relations in the
U.S., 17 MAss. REv. 304, 318 (1976) ("[T]he nineteenth-century double standard was the vehicle for a
desexualization desired by both men and women for opposing purposes. Men wanted to desexualize
relationships to maintain their domination; women wanted to desexualize relationships to limit male
domination.").
219. Cott explains that:
[P]assionlessness served women's larger interests by downplaying altogether their sexual
characterization, which was the cause of their exclusion from significant "human" (i.e., male)
pursuits. The positive contribution of passionlessness was to replace that sexual/carnal
characterization of women with a spiritual/moral one, allowing women to develop their
human faculties and their self-esteem. The belief that women lacked carnal motivation was
the cornerstone of the argument for women's moral superiority, used to enhance women's
status and widen their opportunities in the nineteenth century.
Cott, supra note 218, at 233; see also JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 71 (2d ed. 1997) ("[Mlany middle-class women
accepted the view that women lacked innate sexual desire. For one, it provided a means of elevating
women to spiritual equality with men."); JOHN S. HALLER, JR. & ROBIN M. HALLER, THE PHYSICIAN
AND SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA at xii (1974) ("[Ihe Victorian woman sought to achieve a
sort of sexual freedom by denying her sexuality, by resorting to marital continence or abstinence in an
effort to keep from being considered or treated as a sex object."); CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF
WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK, 1789-1860, at 68 (1986) ("[The 'true' woman, powerfully
repudiated misogynist assumptions about the weaker character of the sex and studiously ignored the
well-worn tales of Eve's transgressions[, banishing] .... the image of the vain, foolish, sexually
duplicitous woman. The dignified Christian woman demanded respect and esteem for her sex.").
For discussions of an earlier, more sexualized understanding of woman's nature, see JOHN DEMOS,
A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 82-84 (1970);LAUREL THATCHER
ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND,
1650-1750, at 89-105 (1982).
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economic penalties for a woman's adultery within marriage and promis-
cuity or pregnancy before it remained extremely high?"0 The available
empirical evidence on sexual practices, furthermore, suggests that many
of the heterosexual experiences that women did have were not pleasur-
able, with men focused solely on their own sexual satisfaction.22'
This vision of female sexuality helped structure the nineteenth-
century feminist conversation on marital rape. Widespread agreement
about women's lesser sexual interest lent support to feminist efforts to re-
sist men's sexual demands. The image of overdeveloped male sexuality,
in turn, gave force to the claim that women needed an enforceable right to
control the terms of marital intercourse because they could not assume
that their husbands' sexual overtures would be tempered by reason and
good moral judgment. Finally, the feminists' understanding that women's
sexual desires were less developed led them to discount the potential costs
of sexual restraint. The woman's rights movement did not criticize marital
intercourse to which the woman had genuinely consented. It would be a
mistake to conclude that nineteenth-century feminists were categorically
hostile to sex. But they did not express any concern that according women
full control over their husbands' sexual access would limit opportunities
for sexual expression or sexual pleasure.
The nineteenth-century feminists' opposition to the use of contra-
ceptive devices and abortion also influenced their understanding of the
risks of marital intercourse. The first woman's rights movement was
highly sympathetic to the reasons why women sought abortions. These
feminists understood the incidence of abortion, in fact, to be rooted in
women's lack of control over marital intercourse, which led desperate
women to resort to abortion in order to control their fertility. They blamed
the husbands who refused to restrain their sexual demands, rather than the
wives forced to submit to them. "Forced maternity, not out of legal
marriage but within it, the complete power of the stronger over the weaker
sex," feminists explained, "must lie at the bottom of a vast proportion of
such revolting outrages against the laws of nature and our common
humanity."22 But nineteenth-century feminists still did not endorse
220. See Cott, supra note 218, at 233 ("[W]omen had to conform to male tastes and wait to be
chosen but resist seduction or suffer ostracism for capitulating .... In sexual encounters women had
more than an even chance to lose, whether by censure under the double standard, unwanted pregnancy
and health problems, or ill-fated marriage."); HALLER & HALLER, supra note 219, at xii ("The options
open to the Victorians were few. Respectable ladies, even in the privacy of their own homes, had to
remain ladies. They could not become promiscuous without attracting the wrath of society .... ).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 106-112, 118-130 (discussing Davis and Mosher studies).
222. Child Murder, REVOLUTION (New York, N.Y.), Mar. 12, 1868, at 146, 146-47; see also id. at
146 ("There must be a remedy even for such a crying evil as this [abortion]. But where shall it be
found, at least where begin, if not in the complete enfranchisement and elevation of woman?"); A.,
Marriage and Maternity, REVOLUTION (New York, N.Y.), July 8, 1869, at 4, 4 ("[Husbands] think it
impossible that they can outrage [their wives]; they never think that even in wedlock there may be the
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abortion or contraceptive devices as means of regulating reproduction.2z
Linda Gordon has posited that nineteenth-century feminists feared that
separating intercourse from reproduction would facilitate male infidelity,
destabilizing marital relationships on which women were enormously de-
pendent, in an environment in which extramarital sexuality remained an
unattractive option for middle-class women.24As Reva Siegel has noted,
supporting abortion would also have been very politically costly for the
feminist movement, given the medical establishment's fierce and organ-
ized opposition to abortion in the second half of the nineteenth century.as
This focus on limiting intercourse as the only means of curtailing repro-
duction, however, made nineteenth-century feminists extremely conscious
of the costs and perils of each act of marital intercourse. These risks,
moreover, encompassed more than the possibility that a woman would
have to raise too many children, too quickly. They also included the
physiological dangers associated with reproduction. Women still com-
monly died, or were permanently disabled, by pregnancy and childbirth in
the nineteenth century.226
very vilest prostitution; and if Christian women are prostitutes to Christian husbands, what can we
expect but the natural sequence-infanticide?"); L.B. Chandler, Motherhood: Its Power Over Human
Destiny, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S WEEKLY (New York, N.Y.), May 13, 1871, at 1, 2 ("The practice of
feticide is becoming one of the crying evils of our time, and there is but the alternative of an
undesigned and undesired maternity, at which the soul of the mother not only shrinks, but stands
outraged,. . . or a free, unhindered, God-inspired motherhood, never imposed by selfishness and
lust,"); Child Murder, REVOLUTION (New York, N.Y.), Apr. 9, 1868, at 217,217 ("[C]ould you look in
upon the wretched homes where heartbroken women work.., to provide food for the little ones whom
the brutal lusts of a drunken husband have forced upon them, you would not wonder that they did not
choose to add to their number."); Gage, supra note 177, at 216 ("I hesitate not to assert that most of this
crime of 'child murder,' 'abortion,' 'infanticide,' lies at the door of the male sex."); Grimkd, supra note
180, at 90 ("Has she not, too often, when thus compelled to receive the germ she could not velcone,
refused to retain & nourish into life the babe, which she felt was not the fruit of a pure connubial
love?"); Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11, at 306-07; GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY,
WOMAN'S RIGHT, supra note 11, at 108.
223. See BLACKWELL, supra note 179, at 115 ("mhe wife must determine the times of union; this
is the only natural method of regulating the size of the family.... The [contraceptive] methods
recommended to women by Neo-Malthusians are ineffectual, and if widely practised will subject
women to a more degrading slavery than has hitherto been devised by the insanity of lust."); For
Women Only: Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton Discourses on Marriage and Maternity, supra note 157, at
2 ("One lady asked a question which hinted at prevention by other than legitimate means, and Mrs.
Stanton promptly replied that such views of the matter were too degrading and disgusting to touch
upon, and must be classed in the category of crime alongside of infanticide."); GORDON, WOMAN'S
BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT, supra note 11, at 97-101; Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did
Not Support "Birth Control," supra note 11, at 144-47; Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note
11, at 304-05.
224. See GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT, supra note 11, at 98, 111, 119.
225. See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11, at 305 n.175, 280-323.
226. See Carroll Smith-Rosenberg & Charles Rosenberg, The Female Animal: Medical and
Biological Views of Woman and Her Role in Nineteenth-Century America, 60 J. AM. HIST. 332, 345
(1973) ("Death from childbirth, torn cervixes, fistulae, prolapsed uteri were widespread 'female
complaints' in a period when gynecological practice was still relatively primitive and pregnancy every
few years common indeed."); GoRDoN, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT, supra note 11, at 106;
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Finally, the first woman's rights movement predicted horrific
eugenic consequences for the children that unwanted marital intercourse
produced. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Americans in-
creasingly understood their country in demographic terms, locating the
key constitutive act of nation building in women's reproductive capacity
and articulating a wide variety of claims in a eugenic idiom. The dominant
eugenic arguments of the period endorsed America's hierarchies of na-
tional origin and race, contending that this ordering was natural, physio-
logical, and unchangeable. These arguments faulted native-born white
women for producing too few children while foreign-born and African-
American women were producing too many. The claim featured heavily
in the antiabortion literature of the day. Horatio R. Storer, the leader of
that campaign, advised native-born white women that "the future destiny
of the nation" rested "upon their loins." If unchecked, their supposedly
disproportionate propensity for abortion would leave America "filled"
with the children of aliens.227 Similar fears about the nation's demographic
fate lent support to the rash of antimiscegenation laws prohibiting interra-
cial marriage that states enacted in the aftermath of the Civil War.22
Historians have frequently noted that some nineteenth-century femi-
nists directly appealed to this tradition on occasion. In particular, the de-
bates over the Fifteenth Amendment led some women to make eugenic
claims in support of the contention that native-born white women de-
served the vote more than black men or male immigrants?29 But there was
more to the feminist argument about eugenics than this account suggests.
Regina Markell Morantz, Making Women Modem: Middle Class Women and Health Reform in 19th
Century America, 10 J. Soc. HIST. 490, 497-98 (1977).
227. HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT?: A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 85 (Boston, Lee &
Shepard 1866); see also JOHN TODD, SERPENTS IN THE DOVES' NEST 16 (BOston, Lee & Shepard 1867)
(anti-abortion tract warning "that while our foreign population have large families, our own native
American families are running out, and, at this rate, must and will entirely run out"); Jill Elaine
Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1344-45 (1998); Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11, at 299 ("Translating the creed of manifest destiny into
reproductive terms, Storer fused America's populations, territories, and women in a powerful image of
reproductive potentiality.... In this vision, the state was its populations, and its identity was
determined by the reproductive conduct of its female citizens."); CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG,
DISORDERLY CONDuCr: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 238 (1985) ("Equally political
race-suicide arguments, which, beginning in the 1870s and 1880s, put the birth-control and abortion
issue in a racist and xenophobic context, also singled out bourgeois matrons as the 'unnatural'
perpetrators of 'unnatural' acts.").
228. See Hasday, supra note 227, at 1344-45. As one white Southerner articulated the danger of
interracial union:
"If we have social equality we shall have intermarriage, and if we have intermarriage we
shall degenerate; we shall become a race of mulattoes; we shall be another Mexico; we shall
be ruled out from the family of white nations. Sir, it is a matter of life and death with the
Southern people to keep their blood pure."
DAVID MACRAE, THE AMERICANS AT HOME 297 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1952) (1870).
229. Ellen DuBois, for instance, has explained that postbellum suffrage arguments
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Like the dominant purveyors of eugenic theories, the woman's rights
movement developed eugenic arguments that supported its moral and le-
gal claims."At least when feminists described the eugenic consequences
of depriving wives of control over their persons, their attention rested on
environmental conditions of structured inequality rather than on race or
national origin. In the (convenient) thinking of the movement, forced
marital intercourse not only undermined a woman's freedom and equality,
it was also eugenically disastrous for her children. Feminists assumed the
inheritability of acquired characteristics and contended that a husband's
licentiousness and a wife's unhappiness about her impending maternity
contained a strong theme of race antagonism, a reaction to the strategic antagonism between
black suffrage and woman suffrage.... Woman suffragists criticized the Fifteenth
Amendment because "a man's government is worse than a white man's government" and
because the amendment elevated the "lowest orders of manhood" over "the higher classes of
women." The racism of such protests was expressed in hints of sexual violence, in the
suggestion that women's disenfranchisement would mean their "degradation," "insult," and
"humiliation." Those overtly racist arguments reflected white women's special fury that men
they considered their inferiors had been enfranchised before them.
DuBois, supra note 13, at 849-51; see also FLEXNER, supra note 23, at 225 ("Another reason for the
widening gap between working and more privileged women in the suffrage movement was the
antagonism many of the latter felt for the huge and increasing numbers of immigrants.... [T]hese
women resented the fact that such men, speaking little or no English, stood between them and the
vote."); ELISABETH GRIFFITH, IN HER OwN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 124
(1984) ("The insistence of abolitionists and Republicans that black male suffrage take precedence over
female suffrage enraged Stanton. In defense she adopted an antiblack, antimale, profemale argument.
According to Stanton, it was better and safer to enfranchise educated white women than former slaves
or ignorant immigrants."); HERSH, supra note 13, at 94 ("Like most feminists, [Stanton] found it
particularly galling that the 'lowliest white man' (and later the most ignorant black man, whom Stanton
contemptuously referred to as 'Sambo') was given suffrage before the most educated woman.");
KRADITOR, supra note 136, at 44 ("The suffragists, belonging to the same native-born, white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant, middle class as the men who were rethinking the meaning of natural right ['as it
applied to the new immigrants'], also began [by the late nineteenth century] to put less emphasis on the
common humanity of men and women."); LEACH, supra note 12, at xiv ("[Stanton's] speeches often
resonated with elitism, with contempt for the 'ignorant foreigners and other riff-raff who refused to
support suffrage, and with conviction that the 'Saxon race' above all others was 'destined' to 'carry the
new gospel of women's equality to all the nations of the earth."' (quoting WOMEN'S TRIB., July 5,
1890)); MELDER, supra note 136, at 154 ("Paulina Wright Davis and Elizabeth Cady Stanton were
more concerned for women's interests than for the needs of blacks, and when offered a choice in the
struggle over the fifteenth amendment, between giving the vote to black males and denying it to
women, they turned against the Negro."); Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support
"Birth Control," supra note 11, at 149-50 ("Elizabeth Cady Stanton's appeal for giving the vote to
educated women in preference to ignorant men is of a piece with trade unionists' denunciation of
Blacks as scabs even as they excluded them from their unions.").
The final version of the Fifteenth Amendment states that: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
230. Cf. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11, at 293 (noting that doctors in the second
half of the nineteenth century "attacked both abortion and contraception as violations of marital
obligation, and, to prove this, emphasized the danger they posed to women's health") (original
emphasis omitted). Siegel argues that this "[s]cientific construal of the human body was a form of
sexual politics, transposing religious and legal norms into physiological imperatives in a way that
obscured questions of 'justice and inherent right."' Id. at 313.
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would be transmitted to their child before birth, forever diminishing the
child's capabilities and prospects. A "corrupt, licentious, drunken brute"
had the legal right, a subscriber to the feminist Woman's Journal warned,
to "debauch and outrage [his wife's] person," to "force her to give birth to
unwelcome children, the exact pattern of the father, to curse the world."''
"Medical jurisprudence," Gage also advised, "has begun to accumulate
facts on this point, showing how the condition and feelings of the mother
mould not only the physical and mental qualities of the child, but its moral
nature." 2 "[S]o long as children are conceived in weariness and disgust,"
Stanton agreed, "you must not look for high-toned men and women
capable of accomplishing any great and noble achievement." 3
Such arguments demarcated a field of harm, predicting that the ad-
verse consequences of marital rape would be felt intergenerationally. But
they also held out the possibility of change and salvation. The leading
eugenic theories of the period described large portions of the population
as irredeemably inferior, and used that to justify their continued subordi-
nation. Feminists, committed to more emancipatory principles, presented
the mirror image of that claim, promising that the character of subsequent
generations would improve if women had the right to control marital in-
tercourse. Furthermore, where standard eugenic arguments blamed
women for using their reproductive capacity unwisely, feminists laid the
responsibility for eugenically undesirable children squarely at men's feet,
on the ground that men controlled the terms on which reproduction oc-
curred. As intended, these claims only increased what was at stake in
marital intercourse. Nineteenth-century feminists sought to establish a
231. A Subscriber, supra note 183, at 74 (emphasis added); see also id. ("The fruit of such
marriages fill our alms houses with paupers, our penitentiaries with criminals, our lunatic asylums with
incurable maniacs, and our other public institutions with idiots and spendthrifts. Such marriages spread
wickedness, misery, ruin, and death, everywhere throughout the world.").
232. Gage, supra note 177, at 215.
233. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith, supra note 151, at 841; see also
ISABELLA BEECHER HOOKER, WOMANHOOD: ITS SANCTITIES AND FIDELITIES 15 (Boston, Lee &
Shepard 1874) ("[A] great part of the physical and moral deterioration of the present day arises, it
seems to me, from the fact that children are not conceived in the desire for. them, and out of the pure
lives of their fathers, as well as their mothers .... "); HUNT, supra note 190, at 9-10 ("[T]he reception
of every child has much to do with its whole life.... The child accepted as a necessity-nursed and
tended grudgingly-has one birthright. But the child, loved and cared for in embryo, and received in
the fulness of conjugal, paternal, and maternal love,--has quite another birthright!"); Harriot Stanton
Blatch, Voluntary Motherhood, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN OF THE
UNITED STATES, ASSEMBLED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 22 TO 25, 1891, at 278, 280 (Rachel
Foster Avery ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) ("Poets sing and philosophers reason about
the holiness of the mother's sphere, but men in laws and customs have degraded the woman in her
maternity. Motherhood is sacred,-that is, voluntary motherhood; but the woman who bears
unwelcome children is outraging every duty she owes the race."); id. at 282 ("Ever since the
patriarchate was established there has been a tendency to cramp the mother in her maternal rights; so
we see no race improvement comparable with our advance in material science.... mhe remedy does
not lie in depriving women of public freedom, but in according them absolute domestic liberty.").
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wife's control over her husband's sexual access in order to achieve equal
citizenship for women. They also insisted that placing the regulation of
marital intercourse in female hands was the only way to guarantee the
health, vigor, morality, and developmental soundness of the future gen-
eration. "Truly," Stanton concluded, "are the sins of the father visited
upon the children. God, in his wisdom, has so linked together the whole
human family, that any violence done at one end of the chain is felt
throughout its length."'
Participants in the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement ar-
gued that a wife's right to her own person was the foundation on which
women's equality and freedom depended. This view reflected their under-
standing that the right of self-possession would enable women to deter-
mine the conditions under which they raised children. Organized feminists
in the nineteenth century, as should be clear at this point, did not contest
women's responsibility for this work, or sanction other means of regulat-
ing the frequency of childbirth, like contraception or abortion. They saw
limiting marital intercourse as the only legitimate method of regulating
the work of motherhood and, for precisely this reason, were determined to
give control over marital intercourse to wives. Accordingly, where
authoritative sources in the criminal law argued that a wife's consent to
marital intercourse could be legally and irretrievably presumed from her
decision to marry, the woman's rights movement demanded both a legal
right to refuse and real socioeconomic alternatives to submission.
1Il
ALTERNATE ITERATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRITIQUE OF
MARITAL RAPE
Criticism of marital rape in the nineteenth century was not limited to
the members of the organized woman's rights movement. Accounts of the
harm that marital rape inflicted on wives appeared in other iterations, both
on the fringes of feminism and, more remarkably, in the popular prescrip-
tive literature on marriage, health, and reproduction. The nature and di-
rection of the causal links between these social conversations is, to be
sure, difficult to trace precisely. Most likely, the causation was circular, so
that the organized feminist campaign was facilitated by growing
234. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Paulina Wright Davis (Oct. 20, 1850), in THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT WORCESTER, OCTOBER 23D & 24TH,
1850, supra note 186, at 51, 54; see also Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention, supra note 144,
at 719 (statement of Elizabeth Cady Stanton) ("Men and brethren, look into your asylums for the blind,
the deaf and dumb, the idiot, the imbecile, the deformed, the insane.., and there behold the terrible
retributions of your violence on woman!"); Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Lucy Stone and the
National Woman's Rights Convention, Cooper Institute, 1856, supra note 156, at 860-61 ("[Woman]
suffers not alone! Man too pays the penalty of his crimes in his enfeebled mind, dwarfed body, and the
shocking monstrosities of his deformed and crippled offspring.").
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opposition to marital rape outside the movement, at the same time that the
efforts of organized feminism helped foster and give momentum to this
wider opposition. What is striking, though, is that there was a near simul-
taneous broaching of the question of marital rape in a number of different
social communities in the latter half of the nineteenth century, suggesting
that the woman's rights discourse about a supposedly unspeakable subject
was far more centrist and in dialogue with customary norms than one
might have otherwise assumed.
One site of opposition to marital rape outside of the organized
woman's rights movement in the nineteenth century centered on the advo-
cates of what was then known as "free love." These figures, less the con-
stituents of a cohesive movement than a series of loosely affiliated
individual thinkers, occupied the left-most part of nineteenth-century
feminism, although at the margins there was some overlap in membership
with the woman's rights movement. The free lovers agreed with the
essential elements of the organized feminist argument for a woman's right
to her own person. But they articulated their critique of the current struc-
ture of marital relations more radically and expansively, and called for
even more transformative change than the woman's rights movement en-
visioned. Many members of the woman's rights movement resented the
controversial free lovers and labored to disassociate themselves from free
love in the popular mind. Yet it is hardly clear that the advocates of free
love hampered the woman's rights movement's campaign against marital
rape. The work of the free lovers added to the reasoning underlying the
organized feminist attack on a husband's conjugal prerogatives. And the
free lovers' deliberately provocative style may have made the woman's
rights movement appear less radical by comparison.
More importantly, perhaps, the popular prescriptive literature con-
tains powerful evidence that the feminist campaign against marital rape
resonated with changing social norms about good marital behavior. Doz-
ens of mainstream prescriptive writers began to publish extensive discus-
sions of the moral, physiological, and eugenic harm caused by marital
rape almost immediately after the organized feminist movement began to
address the issue. This literature, however, did not contest a husband's le-
gal right to determine the terms of marital intercourse. Rather, it sought to
convince husbands to voluntarily refrain from exercising their
acknowledged legal prerogatives, assuring them that the accommodation
would benefit men as much as their wives. Feminists insisted on a wife's
right to control her own person, to be pursued in the interest of ending
women's marital subordination. The prescriptive literature certainly
helped disseminate societal recognition of the proposition that marital
rape inflicted injury on women. But that literature's version of the claim
recommended only noncompulsory strategies for marital health,
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1443 2000
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1373
happiness, and harmony, to be pursued at a husband's discretion so long
as they furthered his self-interest.
Let's begin, though, with the free lovers.
A. The Advocates of Free Love
The advocates of free love parted company with the nineteenth-
century feminist movement mainly over the ultimate desirability of the
marital relation. The woman's rights movement sought to radically re-
structure marriage so that wives exercised much more power and control
within it, but organized feminism endorsed marital monogamy and stabil-
ity. Free lovers rejected the marriage form altogether. They argued that
the law should create absolutely no constraints on consensual love and
sex, and understood the prohibition on extramarital intercourse as such a
constraint. 5 In the free love vision, each person had the "'right to love
when she will, where she will and how she will.' ' 2 6
235. See Victoria Woodhull, The Beecher-Tilton Scandal Case, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S
WEEKLY (New York, N.Y.), May 17, 1873, at 3,4-5 ("'[Ihe marriage institution ... is now effete, and
in a general sense injurious .... I mean by marriage in this connection, any forced or obligatory tie
between the sexes, any legal intervention or constraint to prevent people from adjusting their love
relations.., in complete personal freedom....' (quoting herself)); E.H. HEYWOOD, CUPID'S
YOKES: OR, THE BINDING FORCES OF CONJUGAL LIFE 22 (Princeton, Co-operative Publishing Co.
1877?) ("Sexual organs are not less sacredly the property of individual citizens than other bodily
organs .... The belief that our Sexual Relations can be better governed by statute, than by Personal
Choice, is a rude species of conventional impertinence ...."). Thomas Low Nichols and Mary S. Gove
Nichols contended that a loveless and inescapable marriage could actually be fatal:
In this marriage a man is bound to live with a woman he does not love, and to renounce
all hope of enjoying any intimate relation with any other woman whom he does love; for the
law of marriage makes such enjoyment a crime punishable in many States by a long
imprisonment. He must support a woman for whom he has no attraction; one who, from the
very fact of a loveless marriage, becomes peevish, ill-tempered, and finally diseased. Our
graveyards are filled with the corpses of women who have died at from thirty to thirty-five
years of age, victims of the marriage institution.... The cares, the responsibilities, the
monotony, the dissatisfaction, the disgust, the perpetual struggle between inclination and
duty, make life a burthen and death a welcome relief.
T.L. NICHOLS & MARY S. GovE NICHOLS, MARRIAGE: ITS HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND RESULTS 84-85
(Cincinnati, Valentine Nicholson & Co. 1854).
236. A Spicy Time on Free-Love-Very Broad Doctrines Freely Avowed, N.Y. TilEs, June 29,
1858, at 1, 1 (quoting Julia Branch); see also id. ("'I believe in the absolute freedom of the affections,
and that it is woman's privilege, aye, her right, to accept or refuse any love that comes to her. She
should be the ruling power in all matters of love ....' (quoting Julia Branch)).
Notwithstanding the charges of their many critics, free lovers did not advocate promiscuity.
Indeed, they phrased much of their critique in terms of an attack on the impurity inherent in "'fidelity
to a legal bond, where there is no Love-where there is Force on one side and Fear on the other."'
Letter from Stephen Pearl Andrews to Horace Greeley, in LovE, MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE 60, 70
(Stephen Pearl Andrews ed., New York, Stringer & Townsend 1853) (quoting Mary S. Gove Nichols).
"'Promiscuity in sexuality [was] simply the anarchical stage of development wherein the passions rule
supreme."' Vic's Vagaries, CHI. TiS, Oct. 17, 1875, at 9, 9 (quoting Victoria Woodhull). "'[The
very highest sexual unions [were] those that [were] monogamic, and ... these [were] perfect in
proportion as they [were] lasting."' Id. The free lovers wanted love and intimacy, believed they could
only flourish if freely chosen by both woman and man, and concluded that they could only be freely
chosen if the state placed no limits at all on their operation. This was not only a normative claim, but a
1444
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Not surprisingly, nineteenth-century conservatives were ferocious
critics of free love. They abhorred its rejection of legal marriage, which
they took to be a simple promotion of "Libertinism" and licentiousness.l
Many-although not all-members of the organized woman's rights
movement, in turn, were anxious to distinguish themselves from the more
radical free lovers, particularly since one of the most effective, if
statement of law as well. The free lovers contended that both natural rights theory and the United States
Constitution, properly understood, already recognized the liberty they demanded. Victoria Woodhull,
one of the most prominent free lovers, explained that she had "'an inalienable, constitutional and
natural right to love whom [she wanted]; to love as long or as short a period as [she could]."' VIcTORIA
C. WOODHULL, THE ELIXIR OF LIFE; OR, WHY Do WE DIE? 19 (New York, Woodhull & Claflin 1873)
(quoting herself) (emphasis added). Ezra Heywood argued that "statutes against adultery and
fornication, [were] unreasonable, unconstitutional, unnatural and void." HEYWOOD, supra note 235, at
22 (emphasis added).
237. The Free Love System, N.Y. DAILY TIMEs Sept. 8, 1855, at 2, 2; see also Concerning Free
Love, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., July 20, 1871, at 4, 4 ("[Free love destroys] those ideas of conjugal duty, with
which society has succeeded for some centuries .... [T]he obligations of fidelity are to last no longer
than the [sexual] impulse.... Mrs. Davis's vagaries may be fun to men, but they are death to
women."); Of Free Love, Finally, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 1, 1871, at 4, 4 ("These are the only two
logical results of the doctrine of Free Love. With pure women.., it means no love at all. With the
other kind, it means the promiscuous license of the beasts that perish.").
238. Much talk at the 1869 meeting of the Equal Rights Association, for instance, was devoted to
the question of how the woman's rights movement could best distance itself from the advocates of free
love. A variety of participants agreed on this goal; they differed only in their analysis of the best
strategy for achieving it. Mary Livermore, a feminist from Chicago, wanted the Association to pass a
strong resolution endorsing "the sanctity of the marriage relation .... At the West, she said, this
woman's movement had to contend against the obloquy of being in favor of the free-love doctrine; she
wanted this resolution to rebut that false charge to the fullest extent." Equal Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, May
14, 1869, at 8, 8. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, the first woman ordained as a minister in the United
States, "speaking on behalf of New England, agreed with Mrs. L. as to the necessity of making the
resolution stronger on this point." Id. Lucy Stone, in contrast, "thought the resolution and the whole
discussion concerning it out of place. The subject should not even be hinted in this connection. If any
one said that the women who urge this suffrage reform had any affiliation with the detestable doctrine
of free love," she declared, "let the lie stick in his throat." Id. Ernestine L. Rose concurred with Stone.
She
objected to the resolution on account of its being in effect a plea of guilty. If a man said to
her he was not a thief, she would immediately look out for her pocket-book. The prominent
workers in this movement had been before the nation a long time, and none dare assert that
their moral characters were stained. It was not the thing now, after thirty-three years of toil,
and when success was ready to crown their efforts, for the women who desired simply equal
political rights for their sex to come out and voluntarily declare that they were not prostitutes.
Id.; see also 1 HARPER, supra note 189, at 322-26 (similar account of 1869 meeting).
A decade earlier, Sarah M. Grimkd had also taken care to "exculpate 'the woman's rights
movement,' from the charge of 'tending directly and rapidly to the Free Love system, & nullifying the
very idea of Marriage as anything more than a partnership at will.' On the contrary," she explained,
"our great desire is to purify & exalt the marriage relation & destroy all licentiousness." Grimkd, supra
note 180, at 93 (quoting the New York Times).
Not every member of the organized woman's rights movement, however, was so concerned about
distancing herself from the free lovers. Stanton, for instance, deeply resented the popular attacks on
Victoria Woodhull that focused on her reputation for (un)chastity rather than her political views. "We
have had women enough sacrificed to this sentimental hyper critical, prating about purity," Stanton
concluded. "This is one of man's most effective engines, for our division, and subjugation." Letter
from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Lucretia Mott (Apr. 1, 1872) (on file with author; Elizabeth Cady
Stanton Papers, Vassar College). Isabella Beecher Hooker and Susan B. Anthony, in turn, agreed that
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unsubstantiated, charges leveled against the woman's rights movement in
the nineteenth century was that it advocated free love. 9 Nonetheless, the
free lovers' willingness to operate at the left-most reaches of public dis-
course may have helped deaden the shock of the mainline feminists' only
somewhat more moderate claims. Moreover, for all the differences be-
tween free love and organized feminism on the value of the marriage
form, the free lovers' attack on marital rape was closely aligned to that
articulated by the woman's rights movement, even if couched in a more
explicit and provocative idiom. The free lovers constituted another set of
voices making the feminist case for a woman's right to self-possession.
The free lovers agreed with organized feminism that a woman's
control over her own person was the necessary foundation for her equal
citizenship.' They characterized a husband's sexual imposition on his
unwilling wife as the violation of a "Woman's Natural Right to ownership
of and control over her own body-self,-a right inseparable from
Woman's intelligent existence; a right unquestionable, precious,
inalienable, real-beyond words to express.1'24' But where the organized
feminist movement's critique of marital rape left its preferred mode of en-
forcement unspecified, the free lovers charged-at great length and to
tremendous publicity-that unwanted sex in marriage was no different
from the nonmarital outrages already prohibited and severely punished in
criminal rape statutes. "Night after night there are thousands of rapes
committed," Victoria Woodhull reported, "under cover of this accursed
[marriage] license." 2' "The world has got to be startled... into realizing
that there is nothing else now existing among pretendedly enlightened
nations, except marriage, that invests men with the right to debauch
women, sexually, against their wills."243 "To the unmarried woman,"
Thomas Low Nichols and Mary S. Gove Nichols added, "a rape, or the
violent possession of her person, is an outrage, which the laws of most
countries punish with death." Yet after the marriage ceremony, "not only
does the law justify the outrage, but she is severely blamed by a virtuous
the woman's rights movement should avoid criticizing Woodhull in public. See Letter from Isabella
Beecher Hooker to Susan B. Anthony (Mar. 11 and 14, 1871), in THE LIMITS OF SISTERHOOD: THE
BEECHER SISTERS ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND WOMAN'S SPHERE 205, 206-09 (Jeanne Boydston et al.
eds., 1988).
239. See, e.g., The Free Love System, supra note 237, at 2 ("The Woman's Rights movement tends
directly and rapidly in the same direction [as free love],-that extreme section of it, we mean, which
claims to rest on the absolute and indefeasible right of woman to an equality in all respects with Man,
and to a complete sovereignty over her own person and her conduct.").
240. See NICHOLS & NICHOLS, supra note 235, at 117 ("Woman's one, single, and supreme right,
and the one which includes all others, is her right to herself.").
241. [EzRA H. HEYWOOD], FREE SPEECH: REPORT OF EZRA H. HEYWOOD'S DEFENSE BEFORE
THE UNITED STATES COURT IN BOSTON, APRIL 10, 11 AND 12, 1883, at 16 (Princeton, Co-operative
Publishing Co. 1883?).
242. VICTORIA C. WOODHULL, TRIED AS BY FIRE 8 (New York, Woodhull & Claflin 1874).
243. Id.
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society for not submitting to the man, to whom her person, her whole
being forever belongs!"24
The free lovers also compared a wife's sexual subjection in marriage
to slavery. This was the most powerful reformist analogy available in
postbellum America. After generations of debate over slavery and four
years of war, the nation had just declared that particular form of subordi-
nation to be illegitimate. It was an open, and highly contested, question
just how far the logic of freedom and equality that had undergirded the
emancipation of the slaves would be permitted to extend in the postbellum
period. But it was clear that other status relations would be more vulner-
able the more they were understood to resemble slavery. The advocates of
free love, taking full advantage of the rhetorical possibilities, constantly
described marital rape in the language of bondage. Wives, they said, were
"Sexual Slaves."'245 Under "legal sexual slavery," '24 a wife's duty was
"submission." 47 Her husband's will was "her only law.""24 Indeed, in the
decade before the Civil War, the Nicholses had devoted an entire chapter
of their work on marriage to the parallel between a wife and a slave.249
This discussion drew a specific analogy to the systemic sexual exploita-
tion of slave women by white men, which was a constitutive element of
chattel slavery in the United States."0 The Nicholses advocated abolition,
244. NICHOLS & NICHOLS, supra note 235, at 102; see also id. at 336 ("[The crime of rape] exists
chiefly in the marriage relation."); [MosEs HARMAN), THE NEXT REVOLUTION: OR WOMAN'S
EMANCIPATION FROM SEX SLAVERY 7 (Valley Falls, Lucifer Publishing Co. 1890) (condemning
"legalized rape" in marriage).
245. HARMAN, supra note 244, at an unnumbered back page.
246. VICTORIA C. WOODHULL, THE SCARE-CROWS OF SEXUAL SLAVERY 22 (New York,
Woodhull & Claflin 1874); see also icL at 21-22 ("I hope I may break up every family in the world that
exists by virtue of sexual slavery .... [I will] stand even upon the scaffold, if need be, that my sisters
all over the world may be emancipated, may rise from slavery to the full dignity of womanhood."); id.
at 22 ("Marriage slavery has slaughtered more women than ever there were men slaughtered on the
gory fields of battle.").
247. NICHOLS & NICHOLS, supra note 235, at 85.
248. 1l; see also id at 306 (condemning "the domestic servitude of marriage," in which wives are
subject to "involuntary, compulsory, and repugnant maternity"); Letter from Theresa Hughes to the
Lucifer (Apr. 26, 1890), reprinted in HAIRtMAN, supra note 244, at 63, 63 ("She [the author's married
friend] was a slave in every sense of the word, mentally and sexually, never was she free from his
brutal outrages, morning, noon and night, up almost to the very hour her baby was born, and before she
was again strong enough to move about."); WOODHULL, supra note 242, at 37 ("[A] woman... is
compelled to submit herself, sexually, to a legal master whenever he demands it, even to the extent of
brutality!"); Letter from Stephen Pearl Andrews to Horace Greeley, supra note 236, at 70 (identifying a
wife as "'a legal slave"' to her husband's sexual demands (quoting Mary S. Gove Nichols)); A Spicy
Time on Free-Love-Very Broad Doctrines Freely Avowed, supra note 236, at 1 ("Why should woman
tame herself into calm submission, and be the slave and toy and play-thing of man? ... Women are
bought and paid for, as the negro slave is." (quoting Julia Branch)).
249. See NICHOLS & NICHOLS, supra note 235, at 90-96.
250. For a discussion of sexual exploitation under slavery and the abolitionist advocacy that
contested it, see Hasday, supra note 227, at 1332-34.
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defined broadly to include all forms of sexual subjugation that denied a
woman-slave or wife-the right to refuse a man's sexual demands."'
In criticizing marital rape, the free lovers stressed that a woman
needed control over her own person in order to determine the conditions
under which she performed the work of raising children. 2 But the free
lovers' focus on the work of motherhood was not particularly tight. In
contrast to the leaders of the organized woman's rights movement, who
251. Indeed, in their enthusiasm to make the connection between marital rape and slavery, the
Nicholses contended that a wife's sexual vulnerability to her husband was actually more absolute than
a slave woman's vulnerability to her master, the (highly unconvincing) theory being that any one slave
had a greater chance to escape her master's notice and abuse than a wife had to escape her husband's
notice and abuse:
The female slave may be compelled to submit to the embraces of her master-the wife
is compelled to submit to the embraces of her husband, however disagreeable, painful,
revolting, or dangerous to health and life....
The female slave has little chance of choosing who shall be the father of her children-
the civilized wife has still less power of choice.... [T]he power to refuse does not exist in
one [marriage] in a thousand....
The master may be a kind and benevolent man, giving his slave every indulgence; so
may the husband; but the wife, in vital matters concerning the affections, is far less likely to
be indulged in freedom than the slave.
NICHOLS & NICHOLS, supra note 235, at 93-94. Fifteen years later, John Stuart Mill offered an even
more extreme version of the same argument in The Subjection of Women, first published in England in
1869. Mill also charged that women were more sexually subordinated in marriage than in slavery, but
his claim turned on the wholly inaccurate premise, see supra note 250 and accompanying text, that a
female slave had the right to reject her master's sexual advances outright. As Mill explained:
Above all, a female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right, and is considered
under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the
wife: however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to-though she may know
that he hates her, though it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel
it impossible not to loathe him-he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of
a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her
inclinations.
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 33 (Susan Moller Okin ed., Hackett Publishing Co.
1988) (1869). For a discussion of the nineteenth-century feminist campaign against marital rape in
England, see MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND, 1850-1895, at 156-88 (1989).
252. Woodhull "protest!ed] against the custom which compels women to give the control of their
maternal functions over to anybody. It should be theirs to determine when, and under what
circumstances, the greatest of all constructive processes-the formation of an immortal soul-should
be begun." VICTORIA C. WOODHULL, A SPEECH ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL FREEDOM 36 (New
York, Woodhull & Claflin 1874). Woman, Eliza W. Farnham explained, had an "'indefeasible right'
to "'that freedom and control of her person in the marriage relation which alone would enable her to
consult her nature, and its physical and spiritual capacity to assume at any time the office of mother."'
A Spicy Time on Free-Love-Very Broad Doctrines Freely Avowed, supra note 236, at 1 (quoting Eliza
W. Farnham); see also id. ("'[W]omen of the Nineteenth century! The marriage institution gives you
one right ... the right to bear children.... [Ilit is the law of wise men, who know very much better
than you do when you want a child, and when you ought to become a mother."' (quoting Julia
Branch)); HEYWOOD, supra note 241, at 9 ("Do you believe that maternity is a matter concerning which
women should be consulted, that they should do therein what seems to them right and best; or do you
think it right or expedient to subject women to forcible impregnation ... ? In other words are you
opposed to Rape?"); NICHOLS & NICHOL, supra note 235, at 102 ("[Women are] compelled to submit
to the toils and sufferings of a maternity for which they have no desire... [T]he duty of a woman to
bear children against her own will, is a part of the marriage system .... ").
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concentrated on limiting the downside risks of sexuality for women, the
advocates of free love also justified a woman's right to control her hus-
band's sexual access by reference to rights of the body: namely, female
sexual autonomy and pleasure. Woodhull, who always made the woman's
rights movement seem substantially more traditional by comparison, was
concerned about wives who were sexually unfulfilled because "compelled
to undesired relations with the legal owners of their sexual organs. '
"The mind," she elaborated, "in rebellion at the enslaved condition, has
such an effect upon the sexual act that it becomes impossible for [the
woman] to respond or reciprocate."' In Woodhull's view, sexual apathy
actually threatened a wife's health and longevity. She cited medical
authority for the proposition that: "'If the [sex] act is complete, so that
both body and mind are satisfied, no disease arises, though there be
frequent repetitions; but if the act be incomplete, the organs being irritated
merely, and the mind not satisfied, then disease will surely follow." 5 The
Nicholses concurred in finding that "[t]he apathy of the sexual instinct in
woman is caused by the enslaved and unhealthy condition in which she
lives." 6 "A healthy and loving woman," they reported, "is impelled to
material union as surely, often as strongly, as man.2 7 These women were,
the couple warned, "destroyed by being made bond-women." '258
The free love critique of forced oral sex in marriage was another sign
of their concern with women's sexual autonomy and pleasure, as well as
their willingness to delve publicly into topics that brought the issue of
marital rape to the fore even as they made the organized woman's rights
movement seem almost tactful by comparison. The conduct here was nec-
essarily not procreative, but many women in the nineteenth century
thought oral sex was inherently degrading. The issue was whether a wife
had the right to refrain from sex acts in which she did not want to
253. WOODHULL, supra note 236, at 9.
254. WOODHULL, supra note 242, at 42.
255. Id. at 42-43 (quoting Dr. John M. Scudder, Professor of the Diseases of Women in the
Cincinnati Medical College); see also id. at 43 ("'Therefore,' he adds, 'the wife should not lose control
of her person in marriage. It is hers to rule supreme in this regard."' (quoting Scudder)). A
correspondent to Moses Harman's Lucifer offered a similar diagnosis in describing the plight of a
woman whose "health and strength left her after her marriage." The writer surmised that:
This would not have occurred, however amative her husband might have been, if he had been
kind and careful, but instead, he played the brute the first night after their marriage. To use
her own expression, "he went to work like a man a mowing," and instead of a pleasure as it
might have been, it was most intense torture.
He kept this up for a little less than a year, then, as you know, she was laid in the grave,
and he is just as much her murderer, as though he had killed her in any other manner.
I believe that a strong, healthy, well organized woman will have sexual desires, and if
less so than man, it is because she is less active in the fresh outdoor air.
Letter from Sadie Athena Magoon to the Lucifer, reprinted in HARMAN, supra note 244, at 8, 9.
256. NiCHOLS & NICHOLS, supra note 235, at 202.
257. Id.
258. Il
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participate, even when the possibility of maternity was not at stake. The
free lovers answered that question, not surprisingly, with a resounding
yes. The Lucifer, a journal devoted to free love principles, published a se-
ries of letters in 1890 detailing the particular humiliation that wives expe-
rienced upon being compelled to perform oral sex. "I know of one case,"
one correspondent reported, "where a man when his wife was so near her
confinement that he did not care to enforce his claim in the natural way,
forced her to relieve him by making a 'sucker' of her and she would vomit
with the disgust and nausea thus caused." 9 "So long as these revolting,
disgusting, horrible things are," these writers agreed, "they may as well
be made known, that they may be done away with. The fact that they do
exist is enough to make any person having any humanity in them, struggle
to enlighten the race on the right use of sex."2"
Like the organized woman's rights movement, the free lovers went
on to demand more than a wife's legal right to refuse. They also con-
demned the structure of marriage more generally, joining organized femi-
nism to explain that wives functioned as legalized prostitutes whenever
they had no realistic alternatives to marriage and submission.26" ' Woodhull,
like Stanton and Stone, repeatedly stressed that women would never
achieve sexual freedom until they were "self-reliant and self-supporting
individuals,""2 2 no longer "dependent upon [men] for the means of
subsistence."263 "Sexual relations," she declared, "should be the result of
entirely different motives than for the purpose of physical support. ' 2" The
259. Letter from Lois Waisbrooker to Moses Harman, editor of the Lucifer (Mar. 27, 1890),
reprinted in HARMAN, supra note 244, at 35, 36. "The young man of whom I knew," added a second
writer, "threatened his bride of a week with a sharp knife in his hand, to compel her to perform the
office of 'sucker."' Letter from Lucinda B. Chandler to the Lucifer, reprinted in id. at 48, 49. Another
wife successfully resisted her husband's demands, but not before "he dragged her out of bed, kicked,
choked, pinched and bit her, and then left her lying on the floor unconscious." Letter to Moses Harman,
editor of the Lucifer, reprinted in id. at 13, 14.
260. Letter to Moses Harman, editor of the Lucifer, reprinted in id. at 13, 14.
261. See WOODHULL, supra note 246, at 24 ("[A] blessed emancipation shall dawn for
womankind, such as eye hath not seen nor heart conceived, in which no woman will ever even seem to
be compelled to sell her body to any man for a permanent home, or for the means to procure a
temporary one."); WOODHULL, supra note 242, at 19 ("In the exact sense, the woman who sells her
body promiscuously is no more a prostitute than she is who sells herself in marriage without love. She
is only a different kind of a prostitute."); id. at 43 ("Sexual freedom, then, means the abolition of
prostitution both in and out of marriage; ... means the end of her pecuniary dependence upon man, so
that she may never even seemingly, have to procure whatever she may desire or need by sexual
favors ...."); Sixteenth Amendment. Woman as a Social Element., WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S WEEKLY
(New York, N.Y.), May 28, 1870, at 4, 4 ("Public prostitution is but nothing compared to that practiced
under the cloak of marriage. The latter is increasing to such an extent as to threaten the existence of the
former.").
262. WOODHULL, supra note 252, at 35.
263. Sixteenth Amendment. Woman as a Social Element., supra note 261, at 4.
264. WOODHULL, supra note 252, at 35. Stephen Pearl Andrews seconded the view that woman
would not control her own person until she "possess[ed] the Freedom to bestow herself according to the
dictates of her own affections, wholly apart from the mercenary considerations of shelter, and food, and
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free lovers ultimately rejected the marriage form entirely, going signifi-
cantly beyond what the woman's rights movement endorsed.2 6 But the
free lovers' analysis of marriage as it was currently constituted resonated
deeply with the organized feminist effort against marital rape.
Feminists across the spectrum in the latter half of the nineteenth
century agreed that a husband's conjugal rights were a crucial constitutive
element in women's subordination and campaigned for a wife's right to
her own person. The advocates of free love offered a critique of marital
rape which reinforced that advanced by the organized woman's rights
movement, even as the free lovers spoke in a more radical and explicit
voice. But feminists were not alone in their opposition to marital rape.
Very soon after feminists began to address the question, the popular pre-
scriptive literature on marriage started to broach the subject as well.
B. The Popular Prescriptive Literature
The prescriptive literature on marriage in the second half of the
nineteenth century was preoccupied with warning husbands to refrain
from marital intercourse when they did not have their wives' consent.
Popular authors, like the woman's rights reformers, were remarkably
frank, even verbose, in their discussion of the issue.266Marriage manuals,
written by both men and women and widely read, warned husbands that
subjecting one's wife to marital intercourse when she did not want to risk
the possibility of motherhood was immoral and dangerous to the health of
raiment." Letter from Stephen Pearl Andrews to the editor of the New York Tribune, in LOVE,
MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE, supra note 236, at 39, 47; see also HEYWOOD, supra note 235, at 21 ("[In
marriage,] social pleasure, being an object of common desire, becomes a marketable commodity, sold
by her who receives a buyer for the night, and by her who, marrying for a home, becomes a 'prostitute'
for life."); NIcHOLS & NiCHOtLs supra note 235, at 85 (describing the sufferings of a wife who "has
married for a home-for position-because her friends will not hear of her refusing a good offer" and
now finds "[h]er body ... prostituted to [her husband's] morbid passions").
265. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.
266. This literature did not take mutual consent to be a sufficient condition for marital intercourse.
It opposed all intercourse where reproduction was not sought and desired, instructing readers that
"[p]assional enjoyment must be made wholly incidental, never pursued as an end." Nicholas E. Boyd,
To the Studious and Thoughtful, in Dio LEWIS, CHASTITY; OR, OUR SECRET SINS 312, 316
(Philadelphia, George Maclean & Co. 1874). But it did advise husbands to accept mutual consent as a
necessary condition for marital sex. See also id. ("It is right, then, to exert the sexual function when
children are desired, and rightly desired, and only then ...."); JOHN COWAN, THE SCIENCE OF A NEW
LIFE 112-13 (New York, Fowler & Wells Co. 1869) ("[Slexual connection was intended only for the
propagation of the species; for had God intended it otherwise, He would, in the greatness of His
wisdom, have adapted some peculiarity of structure in the sexual organism that would have enabled
mankind to exercise the lustful of their natures without the danger of impregnation following."); E.B.
DUFFEY, THE RELATIONS OF THE SEXES 235 (New York, M.L. Holbrook & Co. 1885) ("It is a solemn
thing to evoke a human being to life-a being.., whose everlasting good or ill may depend directly
upon ourselves. Are we justified, then, in calling such a being lightly into existence, at a lustful
impulse, and then blasphemously throwing the responsibility upon God?").
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man, woman, and unwillingly produced child?67 They called on husbands
not to exercise their legal prerogatives and proposed a wide array of
stratagems to facilitate that result. In this way, criticism of marital rape
registered and reverberated in a wider popular conversation about inti-
macy in marriage in the nineteenth century.
It is important to recognize, however, the differences between the
feminist rights discourse on marital rape and the work of mainstream pre-
scriptive writers. First, the popular prescriptive literature focused on each
individual husband's behavior. These texts wanted husbands to refrain
from nonphysical coercion, as well as physical force compelling a wife to
submit to marital intercourse. But their understanding of a wife's consent
did not include the structural concerns about marriage that occupied femi-
nists; these writers did not suggest an inquiry into the limited economic
and social opportunities that pushed women into marriage and kept them
there.
More fundamentally, the operative premise behind the popular pre-
scriptive literature's argument for a husband's voluntary restraint was that
he had the authority to act differently. This literature explicitly addressed
social norms, rather than the law. Yet the two were never fully separable.
The law shaped the prescriptive literature's understanding of society, even
as that literature urged husbands to act better in practice than the law re-
quired. The prescriptive literature's entire discussion of manly self-
restraint assumed and accepted the baseline proposition that a husband
had the right to control the terms of marital intercourse. He might be per-
suaded not to avail himself of that entitlement, by tracts promising that
marital mutuality would benefit a husband at least as much as his wife.
But prescriptive writers acknowledged that the choice was ultimately his.
This was the very proposition that the woman's rights activists vigorously
disputed. Nineteenth-century feminists explained a husband's conjugal
prerogatives as an instrument of women's subordination and demanded
rights that women could enforce against their husbands. In the prescriptive
literature, this rights discourse was transformed into suggested strategies
for marital health, happiness, and harmony, to be pursued in a husband's
interest and at his discretion.
267. A number of the women that Mosher surveyed, for instance, reported having carefully
reviewed the popular prescriptive literature on marriage before their own weddings. Several women
specifically cited Alice Stockham's Tokology. See MOSHER, supra note 113, at 21 (Blank No. 2); id. at
29, 41 (Blank No. 3); id. at 111 (Blank No. 10). Others mentioned John Cowan's The Science of a New
Life, see id. at 195 (Blank No. 17); id. at 273 (Blank No. 24), works by George Napheys,see id.; id. at
299 (Blank No. 26), and works by R.T. Trail, see id. at 21 (Blank No. 2). One woman reported having
read the "best pages" of Orson Squire Fowler. Id. at 273 (Blank No. 24).
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1. The Prescriptive Account of the Harm of Marital Rape
Like the nineteenth-century feminists, prescriptive writers elaborated
at length on the harm that marital rape inflicted. But the prescriptive lit-
erature's focus was not on wives alone. This literature warned that marital
rape inflicted severe injuries on wives that were morally untenable. It
went on, however, to report that marital rape ultimately operated against a
husband's self-interest as well, appealing directly to the party who re-
tained the right of control.
Prescriptive writers put forth three prominent moral arguments ex-
plaining the harm that marital rape caused wives. These arguments were
not feminist in their reasoning; they did not consistently recognize the
fundamental equality of men and women. But they were real and empa-
thetic nonetheless. The prescriptive literature's first moral argument was
grounded in a view of the animal world, which supposed that intercourse
among lower animals was always under the female's control. This argu-
ment, in essence, was a claim that women should be treated as well as
other female animals, not a claim for women to be treated as well as men.
Although put forth in an effort to mitigate the functional consequences of
women's subordination to men, the argument did not challenge that hier-
archical ordering. 2 It simply contended that what was natural (and there-
fore right) for lower animals, was right for women as well. When R.T.
Trall declared that "GOD and Nature have given to the female the supreme
control of her own person," he cited the practice of "[t]he whole animal
kingdom below man" as his sole piece of supporting evidence. 9 "No male
animal offers violence to the female," Trall explained. "[H]e never
compels her to submit to the sexual embrace against her desire, nor forces
her to bear offspring against her inclination or will. But, when she is in
condition to propagate her kind, and desires the co-operation of her male
partner, she informs him of it.""27 William McLaury similarly advised hus-
bands to "take a lesson from the lower animals, and not coerce or
over-persuade, but await the wife's invitation at this time."27
268. Indeed, only a few of the prescriptive authors ever spoke in terms of human nature and a
woman's human rights. Sylvanus Stall explained that a woman, as "a free moral agent," was fully
capable of assuming responsibility for the regulation of her own maternity and had a "personal right[]"
to do so. SYLVANUS STALL, WHAT A YOUNG HUSBAND OUGHT TO KNOW 152 (Philadelphia, Vir
Publishing Co. 1897). A wife, Eliza Duffey added, did "violence to her own moral nature, by yielding
unwillingly to demands or pressing importunities." DUFFEY, supra note 266, at 209; see also HAYES,
supra note 217, at 54 ("The conjugal embrace should never be indulged in against her [the wife's]
wishes.... She is a free, moral agent, as well as himself.").
269. R.T. TRALL, SEXUAL PHYSIOLOGY: A SCIENTIFIC AND POPULAR EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIOLOGY at xi (New York, Miller, Wood & Co. 4th ed. 1867).
270. Id.
271. Wm. M. McLaury, Remarks on the Relation of Menstruation to the Sexual Functions, 20 Am.
J. OBSTETRICS 158, 161 (1887). Orson Fowler agreed: "This is the 'male and female' law throughout
all the kingdoms of animal, feathered, and even insect life," he wrote. "In no single instance, except
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Marriage manuals also argued that women should control their hus-
bands' sexual access because wives would have to do the work of bearing
and nursing any children conceived. Grounded in a gender-specific appre-
ciation of the work that women performed, this argument did track the
predominant feminist claim for a wife's right to her own person. The
feminist reformers focused on the work of raising children, identifying it
as the most time-consuming and taxing part of motherhood. The prescrip-
tive literature spoke about the physiological aspects of reproduction
(childbirth and lactation), a form of labor that was perhaps easier for a
popular audience to recognize as onerous work. John Cowan explained
that a wife needed the right "to her own person-the right to deny all
approaches, save and only when she desired maternity,"' 2 because she
bore all of the risks of gestation and childbirth: "It]he pains, the troubles,
the heart-burnings, the sickness, the danger of premature death."273
"[Jiustice and reason dictate," Nicholas Boyd agreed, "that she who feeds
the unfolding germ with her very life-blood, endures the pangs of travail
and nurses the babe at her own breast, should be left to decide freely,
without compulsion or entreaty, when she is ready to undertake the holy
office of maternity."'274
among human, does the male ever obtrude himself upon the unwilling female." O.S. FOWLER, SEXUAL
SCIENCE 682 (Philadelphia, National Publishing Co. 1870). Even Stall relied on evidence from the
animal kingdom: "[A]ny one who has given attention to the reproductive act among animals," he
reported, "will have noticed that in no instance can the male force this relation upon the female without
her acquiescence, and in most instances the time of copulation is wholly determined by the condition of
the female." STALL, supra note 268, at 128. Stall could not "but believe that this is also intended to be
the rule among human beings." dA; see also Boyd, supra note 266, at 318 ("It is for the female to
determine when impregnation shall take place. Observing the lower animals alone would favor this
conclusion .... ); Letter from Mrs. Z.R. Plumb to M.L. Holbrook, in PARTURITION WITHOUT PAIN; A
CODE OF DIRECTIONS FOR ESCAPING FROM THE PRIMAL CURSE 124, 126 (M.L. Holbrook ed., New
York, M.L. Holbrook 14th ed. 1882) ("'Enforced and unwilling maternity is not the habit of the brute;
why of the human, so-called, enlightened world?").
272. COWAN, supra note 266, at 394.
273. Id. at 109.
274. Boyd, supra note 266, at 318-19. It would, Dio Lewis concurred, be "a tyranny and outrage"
for a wife to have no "right to deny her husband," where every "sexual intimacy mean[t] a possible
pregnancy with all its deprivations and discomforts, a parturition with all its sufferings and dangers, a
long period of lactation-in brief, motherhood, with all its weighty responsibilities and incessant
labors." LEwIs, supra note 266, at 18-19; see also E.B. DUFFEY, WHAT WOMEN SHOULD KNOW 132-
33 (Philadelphia, J.M. Stoddart & Co. 1873) ("[The woman] has to endure the pains, penalties and
responsibilities [of bearing children], both before and afterward, and she can best judge of her fitness
and her powers of endurance.... [I]t is the extreme of cruelty for her husband to force child-bearing
upon her."); HAYES, supra note 217, at 54 ("The conjugal embrace should never be indulged in against
[the wife's] wishes. The husband may have the power, but he is a brute, if he imposes upon his wife the
pains of labor and the perils of maternity against her consent."); TRALL, supra note 269, at 202 ("It is
for [woman] to nourish and sustain the new being; it is her health and life that are directly imperiled by
being compelled to bear children .... [I]t is her absolute and indefeasible right to determine when she
will, and when she will not, be exposed to pregnancy."); HENRY C. WRIGHT, THE UNWELCOME CHILD;
OR, THE CRIME OF AN UNDESIGNED AND UNDESIRED MATERNITY 23 (Boston, Bela Marsh 1858) ("Who
shall say how often, for what purposes, and under what conditions, the wife shall subject her person to
1454
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Finally, the postbellum prescriptive literature's last moral argument
in favor of voluntary restraint warned husbands that subjecting an un-
willing wife to marital intercourse meant treating her like a prostitute, a
fundamentally immoral and degrading course of action. As this commen-
tary repeatedly explained, prostitution could exist inside marriage under
essentially the same terms on which it operated outside the marital rela-
tion.275 When feminists made this point, they used it to draw attention to
women's socioeconomic dependence on their husbands and to indicate
how this inequality hampered women's ability to refuse marital inter-
course. 6  The prescriptive literature took a somewhat different
tack: These writers argued that the essence of prostitution, inside mar-
riage and out, was a sex act in which the man used the woman simply to
satisfy his sexual desire, without any attempt to modify his sexual de-
mands and without any concern, more generally, for the woman's welfare
or state of mind. Eliza Duffey described wives "who feel that they bear
the brand of the prostitute within their souls, because they are forced to
yield their bodies unwillingly to gratifying that which they can regard in
no other light than as a selfish lust, hallowed as it is by no mutual desire,
nor exalted by self-forgetting impulses." '77 As an article entitled
Prostitution Within the Marriage Bond concluded, "marriage, home, and
posterity are alike dishonored when women are forced to submit to sexual
abuses which are revolting to their souls."278 "He is an ill husband,"
Sylvanus Stall agreed, "that uses his wife as a man treats a harlot, having
no other end but pleasure."279
The prescriptive literature supplemented these moral claims against
marital rape with a series of physiological arguments that made clear that
the injury caused by marital rape was not limited to wives. This literature
warned that the practice of marital rape actually endangered the health of
a relation which renders her liable to become a mother, and to the suffering and anguish of developing
and giving birth to a child?").
275. See COWVAN, supra note 266, at 104-05 ("The honeymoon is one nightly repetition of
legalized prostitution, sinking the pure, high and holy into the low, debasing and animal.... [T]he
result of marital excess is as disastrous to the body, mind and soul of the individual as is unlegalized
prostitution."); ALICE B. STOCKHAM, TOKOLOGY, A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 154 (Chicago, Alice B.
Stockham & Co. rev. ed. 1889) ("Is it too strong language to say [a wife] is the one prostitute taking
the place, for the man, of many, and not like her, having choice of time or conditions? In consequence
she not only suffers physically, but feels disgraced and outraged to the depths of her soul."); B.O.
Flower, Prostitution Within the Marriage Bond, 13 ARENA 59, 70 (1895) ("[P]rostitution, even though
sanctioned by the church and state in the marriage ceremony, is none the less prostitution, and... its
fruits are altogether debasing.").
276. See supra text accompanying notes 184-209, 261-264.
277. DusFEY, supra note 266, at 207.
278. Flower, supra note 275, at 70.
279. STALL, supra note 268, at 93 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). How could it be
a wife's duty, Henry Clarke Wright similarly asked, "to submit to such a relation, when her own soul
not only does not sanction, but loathes it! ... A duty to become a prostitute,-a mere tool of her
husband's gratification! It is a horrid mockery!" WRIGHT, supra note 274, at 39-40.
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its male perpetrator. It also indicated that the physiological injury that
marital rape inflicted on women and the children they unwillingly bore in-
evitably redounded to men's material, emotional, and dynastic detriment
as husbands and fathers. Nineteenth-century feminists, demanding a
woman's enforceable right to her own person, focused on the injury that
marital rape caused women. Prescriptive writers, hoping to appeal to the
self-interest of husbands, explained the physiology of marital rape in
much more male-centered terms than those feminists employed,"' using
their own health claims to establish their own (male-centered) case for
voluntary restraint.
In contending that husbands put their own health at risk when they
subjected their unwilling wives to marital intercourse, prescriptive writers
built on a widespread understanding that a man could endanger his pros-
pects by expending sexual energy. Many articulate Americans in the
nineteenth century envisioned the male body as a closed energy system
and sexual activity as a taxing drain, so that the outlay of sexual effort
would leave a man physically weakened and with less vigor to devote to
intellectual, economic, and moral pursuits. This presupposition was en-
dorsed by leading medical professionals,2"' popular guides to men's
health," 2 and even some of the utopian experimental communities of the
day, which taught their male followers to avoid sexual climax." 3
280. See supra text accompanying notes 227-234.
281. See, e.g., BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DISEASES OF
THE MIND 347 (Hafner Publishing Co. 1962) (1812) (warning that sexual appetite, "when excessive,
becomes a disease both of the body and mind," with potential consequences including "seminal
weakness, impotence, dysury, tabes dorsalis, pulmonary consumption, dyspepsia, dimness of sight,
vertigo, epilepsy, hypochondriasis, loss of memory, manalgia, fatuity, and death"); W., Remarks on
Masturbation, 12 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 94, 96 (1835) ("[T]his drain upon the system
[ejaculation] should... be made but sparingly. Sturdy manhood, in all its vigor, loses its energy and
bends under the too frequent expenditure of this important secretion; and no age or condition will
protect a man from the danger of unlimited indulgence, [even if] legally and naturally exercised.");
Gail Pat Parsons, Equal Treatment for All: American Medical Remedies for Male Sexual
Problems: 1850-1900, 32 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sc. 55, 59 (1977) ("Doctors believed that the
healthy body, whether male or female, maintained an equitable distribution of this static quantity of
nerve force.... Too much sexual excitement ... could upset a delicate health sustaining equilibrium.
Excessive sexual activity attracted this force to the genitals and withdrew it from other areas of the
body ....").
282. For some of the more extreme manifestations of this argument, see SYLVESTER GRAHAM, A
LECTURE TO YOUNG MEN 20 (Arno Press 1974) (1834) (warning that sexual "excesses" will "produce
the most terrible effects. The nervous system... is tortured into a shocking state of debility.., and the
muscles generally, become relaxed and flaccid; and consequently, all the organs and vessels of the
body, even to the smallest capillaries, become extremely debilitated; and their functional power,
exceedingly feeble."); HENRY G. HANCHETr, SEXUAL HEALTH 25-26 (New York, Charles T. Hurlburt
1887) ("The sexual act is an exhausting one. It takes hold of the whole body, and demands the best
energies of every part of the system. It requires so much of nerve-force that it ought always to be
followed by a period of rest."); FREDERICK HOLLICK, A POPULAR TREATISE ON VENEREAL DISEASES,
IN ALL THEIR FORMS 361 (New York, Excelsior Publishing House 50th ed. 1881) ("When a man
expends too much Semen... he does the same thing as if he really destroyed a portion of his brain,
because he takes away that which is necessary to nutrify it. Nature will not produce enough of these
1456 [Vol. 88:1373
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The prescriptive literature on marriage contained analogous warnings
about the still more severe physiological consequences for men who had
marital intercourse without their wives' consent. Dr. Cowan issued one of
the most complete accounts of the potential dangers. "[I]f the husband
demands his rights from the wife, who only accedes through dread of
consequences," he warned, "the effect on the man's brain and nervous
system is very little different from that produced by self-abuse. ' 2" Indeed,
Cowan elaborated a progression of symptoms with starkly debilitative
consequences: "a general weakness of the nervous system;" the "inability
to promptly digest ordinary food;" "a weakening of the joints, and
especially the joints of the knees, a softening of the muscles, a want of
strength, and a motion of an unsteady, dragging nature, differing so
noticeably from the springing, strong, elastic carriage of the continent
individual;" "dyspepsia;" "general debility;" "consumption;" "weakened
and impaired" memory; "disordered vision;". "impaired" hearing; and
"[p]aralysis of the lower extremities." '285 Henry Clarke Wright went so far
substances to make Brain and to allow of licentious indulgence at the same time."); see also G.J.
BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNowN LIFE: MALE ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN
AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 180-88 (1976); STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, SEX,
DIET, AND DEBILITY IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SYLVESTER GRAHAM AND HEALTH REFORM 25-38
(1980); JAYME A. SOKOLow, EROS AND MODERNIZATION: SYLVESTER GRAHAM, HEALTH REFORM,
AND THE ORIGINS OF VICTORIAN SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 12-14, 77-99 (1983); RONALD G. WALTERS,
PRIMERS FOR PRUDERY: SEXUAL ADVICE TO VICTORIAN AMERICA 32-48 (1974); Ben Barker-Benfield,
The Spennatic Economy: A Nineteenth-Century View of Sexuality, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN
SOCIAL-HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 336, 340-44 (Michael Gordon ed., 1973).
283. Most notably, a utopian community in Oneida, New York practiced "male continence,"
sexual intercourse without male orgasm or ejaculation, under the leadership of John Humphrey Noyes.
Noyes argued that the habit would "give new speed to the advance of civilization and refinement. The
self-control, retention of life, and ascent out of sensualism, which must result from making freedom of
love a bounty on the chastening of physical indulgence," would, he promised, "raise the race to new
vigor and beauty, moral and physical." JOHN HUMPHREY NOYES, MALE CONTINENCE 16 (Oneida,
Office of Oneida Circular 1872), reprinted in THE BEREAN, MALE CONTINENCE, ESSAY ON SCIENTIFIC
PROPAGATION (Arno Press 1969); see also LAWRENCE FOSTER, RELIGION AND SEXUALITY: THREE
AMERICAN COMMUNAL EXPERIMENTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 74, 93-98 (1981); LAWRENCE
FOSTER, WOMEN, FAMILY, AND UTOPIA: COMMUNAL EXPERIMENTS OF THE SHAKERS, THE ONEIDA
COMMUNITY, AND THE MORMONS 81-84 (1991); LOUIS J. KERN, AN ORDERED LOVE: SEX ROLES AND
SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN UTOPIAS-THE SHAKERS, THE MORMONS, AND THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY
224-44 (1981); SPENCER KLAW, WITHOUT SIN: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY
130-32 (1993); IRA L. MANDELKER, RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND UTOPIA IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 36-37, 118-19 (1984).
The Shaker community, which practiced complete abstinence, similarly believed that sexual
expenditure "taxe[d] severely every part of the vital economy" of the body. "[U]nchastity causes in the
aggregate, a tremendously expensive, inane and profitless drain upon the vital forces," Shakers
explained. "It penetrates every part of the system and drains therefrom the finest essence of brain and
blood and nerve, the seeds of health, vigor, life and motion, and expels them as food for demons of
darkness that feed on the vices of mortals." A.G. HOLLISTER, MISSION OF ALETHIAN BELIEVERS,
CALLED SHAKERS 7 (Mount Lebanon, A.G. Hollister 1892-1899); see also KERN, supra, at 77-91.
284. COWAN, supra note 266, at 105.
285. Id. at 105-06. George Napheys similarly observed that:
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as to suggest that "[i]ntemperance, war, slavery, unsuitable food, dress
and habitations, exposures to heat, cold, and excessive toil" had histori-
cally been less dangerous to the health of the male population than
"uncalled for and unwarranted" marital intercourse. 6 Duffey made the
intent of such health advisories perfectly explicit. Even if a husband was
too much of a "sensualist" to consider moral arguments or the interests of
anyone but himself, the consequences for a man's own health-
"diminished strength, diminished nervous force, and diminished mental
powers"-were "sufficiently serious for men to pause, at least, in their
selfish course, and consider a little.""2 7
The prescriptive literature also described the marital disfunction, fi-
nancial strain, and household disorder that would come to pass if wives
were physiologically damaged by unwanted marital intercourse, explain-
ing women's welfare in terms of their husband's self-interest. These tracts
reported that undesired intercourse was devastating to a woman's health,
even putting aside the risks involved in gestation and childbirth. Augustus
Gardner, for instance, advised men that just one night of excess could
have lasting consequences. Unless a wife retained control over her person
on her wedding night, "permanent disorganizations," "uterine weakness
with its whole train of nervous sympathies," were likely. 8
Here again, the marriage manuals relied on a wider medical and pre-
scriptive discourse, one that located women's physical and psychological
vulnerability in their reproductive and sexual capacity. Most notably,
doctors in the latter half of the nineteenth century were preoccupied by the
increasing number of middle-class, urban women stricken with "hysteria,"
The ordinary results of an abuse of the conjugal privilege are, in the man, very much the
same as those brought on by self-abuse. Locally there is over-excitation, irritability, and
possibly inflammation. The digestion becomes impaired, dyspepsia sets in, the strength is
diminished, the heart has spells of palpitation, the spirits are depressed, spermatorrhea may
arise, the genetic powers lose their vigor, there is unusual sensitiveness to heat and cold,
sleep is not refreshing, and a jaded, languid indifference takes the place of energy and
ambition.
GEORGE H. NAPHEYS, THE TRANSMISSION OF LIFE: COUNSELS ON THE NATURE AND HYGIENE OF THE
MASCULINE FUNCTION 179-80 (Philadelphia, H.C. Watts & Co. new ed. 1884).
286. HENRY C. WRIGHT, MARRIAGE AND PARENTAGE: OR, THE REPRODUCTIVE ELEMENT IN
MAN, AS A MEANS TO His ELEVATION AND HAPPINESS 172 (Boston, Bela Marsh 1854); see also
AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND HEALTH 78 (New York,
Hurst & Co. rev. ed. 1874) ("Excess in lawful desire is subject to the same corporeal laws as in
unlawful, and its penalty is disease and debility."); WILLIAM GOODELL, LESSONS IN GYNECOLOGY 436-
37 (Philadelphia, D.G. Brinton 1880) ("Destroy the reciprocity of the union, and .... Nature exacts a
forfeit .... [W]itness [the husband's] ill health and ill temper .. "); STALL, supra note 268, at 130
(predicting a "destruction of physical power" and "weakening of the intellect," which would leave the
husband "unfit for study, mental activity, and oftentimes for all kinds of business").
287. DUFFEY, supra note 266, at 220-21.
288. GARDNER, supra note 286, at 79. "So serious was the hemorrhage" resulting from one
husband's initial use of force, Gardner wrote, "that the services of several of the most eminent surgeons
of this city were requisite, and the life of the blooming bride was for several days most seriously
jeoparded." Id. at 77.
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a newly discovered medical condition that manifested itself in pain, pa-
ralysis, chronic fatigue, and general "nervousness. ' 9 Medical science
could discover no organic basis for hysteria, but physicians speculated
that its predominance reflected an emotional instability and physical
weakness inherent in women's nature.' 9 Many doctors thought, more spe-
cifically, that the onset of hysteria was linked to a woman's reproductive
cycle and that women with a history of sexual excess were far more likely
to fall victim to the disease.291 Notwithstanding such insights, physicians
could devise no reliable cure for hysteria; the victims' families were often
faced with medical bills of mounting size and disruptions of indeterminate
length.292
The prescriptive literature's description of what happened to wives
subjected to unwanted marital intercourse, which included both verifiable
somatic ailments and reports of the sort of "nervous weakness" associated
with hysteria, resonated with widespread popular awareness of the hys-
teria phenomenon. According to these popular experts on marriage, hus-
bands-perhaps without even realizing it-were making their wives
pathologically "weak and nervous" and imposing upon themselves "large
financial outlays for medical advice and attendance. '293 Whenever a hus-
band did not permit his wife to regulate their marital intercourse, the
woman's "tender, delicate organs of generation" were prone to "become
inflamed, and ulcerate, and render the woman an invalid." 94 "' [D]ireful
diseases, insanity and consumption"' were the usual result.295 Stated most
bluntly, these experts warned that husbands intent on claiming their "legal
289. See SIITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 227, at 204-05; BARBARA J. BERG, THE REMEMBERED
GATE: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, THE WOMAN AND THE CITY, 1800-1860, at 112-14, 116-19
(1978); BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE
EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 103-05 (1978); RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF
ORGASM: "HYSTERIA," THE VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 4-5, 7-8, 35 (1999);
Ann Douglas Wood, "The Fashionable Diseases": Women's Complaints and Their Treatment in
Nineteenth-Century America, 4 J. INTERDISC. HIsT. 25, 26-29 (1973).
290. See SITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 227, at 204-06; EHRNREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 289,
at 110-11.
291. See SIMTH-ROSENBERG, supra note 227, at 206-07; BERG, supra note 289, at 114-15;
EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 289, at 110-11, 134; MAINES, supra note 289, at 36, 38, 41;
Wood, supra note 289, at 28-29, 36.
292. Indeed, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has suggested that women may have become hysterics
precisely because it became a socially acceptable way in which they could deviate from routine
responsibilities that had proven deeply unsatisfying. See SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 227, at 207-08;
see also BERG, supra note 289, at 116, 120; EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 289, at 107-08, 133-
40; Wood, supra note 289, at 35-36. Rachel Maines has offered a somewhat narrower explanation,
positing that the victims of hysteria may have been expressing a dissatisfaction and frustration that was
particularly sexual and somatic in nature. See MAINES, supra note 289, at 5 ("When marital sex was
unsatisfying and masturbation discouraged or forbidden, female sexuality, I suggest, asserted itself
through one of the few acceptable outlets: the symptoms of the hysteroneurasthenic disorders.").
293. STALL, supra note 268, at 131.
294. DUFFEY, supra note 266, at 215.
295. Id. at 216 (quoting Dr. Dixon).
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right" were "destroy[ing] and oft-times murder[ing] their wives" and, with
them, their marriages.296
The physiological dangers confronting the children that these wives
unwillingly conceived were hardly less severe. In this context, too, the
prescriptive literature advised husbands that they would ultimately bear
the cost of the injury they inflicted through marital rape, in this case
through a diminution in the quality of their offspring. Like the leaders of
the woman's rights movement,297 prescriptive writers in the latter half of
the nineteenth century contended that acquired characteristics were inher-
itable. This meant that a wife's despair about her pregnancy would be for-
ever stamped on her-and her husband's-child. Wright warned that
when a wife became "a mother from necessity rather than from choice,"
her child would "partake of her degradation."2 98 "[D]eveloped in joyless,
lifeless imbecility, or intense anguish," it would be "born an idiot, or
without sufficient vital force to develop it into life with the ordinary
energies and faculties of a man or woman."299 The child would also be
permanently marked by his father's base carnality in forcing marital
296. COWAN, supra note 266, at 311; see also GOODELL, supra note 286, at 437 (explaining that
unwanted marital intercourse reduced a wife to a "wreck of body and of mind"); TRALL, supra note
269, at 244 (reporting that "[m]any a man who would have been a good husband if he had only known
how" had "destroyed [his wife's] health, happiness and life" by denying her control over marital
intercourse).
Marriage manuals often warned husbands that their wives' health was particularly impaired by
sexual intercourse during pregnancy or lactation. See [WILLIAM A. ALCOTT], THE PHYSIOLOGY OF
MARRIAGE 158 (Boston, John P. Jewett & Co. 1856) ("[I]f young men as a general rule, could
see.., all the diseases of mind and body to which, by their sensual indulgence during pregnancy, they
subject their wives and children, they would hesitate in their career of thoughtlessness and
recklessness."); STALL, supra note 268, at 215 ("[T]he consequences [of sex during pregnancy] have
entailed permanent injuries upon the young wife, and oftentimes resulted in death itself."); STOCKHAI,
supra note 275, at 159-60 ("The sexual relation at this time [during gestation] exhausts the mother ....
It is worth investigating, whether the cause of much of the pain at parturition may not also be removed
by the practice of continence during gestation.") (internal quotation marks omitted); WRIGHT, supra
note 286, at 217 ("[Sex during pregnancy] deranges the action of the whole generative system; the
pains and perils of childbirth are greatly aggravated, and the life of child and mother is oftentimes
endangered."); Boyd, supra note 266, at 319 ("To prostitute her while pregnant to merely sensual uses
inflicts atrocious wrongs both on her and on her offspring. (It causes the woman a variety of distressing
maladies .... The same holds true in a measure so long as the infant draws its mother's milk.)").
297. See supra text accompanying notes 231-234.
298. WRIGHT, supra note 274, at 116.
299. Id. at 40; see also COWAN, supra note 266, at 131-32 ("The originating of children in God's
own image should be an intensely active, loving desire on the part of both man and wife.... Children
can as easily be brought into the world with happy, sunny, laughing natures, as with cross, fretful,
irritable natures."); HAYES, supra note 217, at 54 ("The children born of such enforced embraces are, in
the language of Michelet, an outrage on their mothers."); TRALL, supra note 269, at xii ("[The] mental
states ... of both paients at the moment of conception, affect the future being for life... [The
mother's] happy or unhappy circumstances, through the periods of gestation and lactation, continually
affect and modify the organization of the offspring for good or for evil."); Flower, supra note 275, at
70 ("When a woman is forced to bear children to a man she hates or no longer loves.... the child is
cursed before it is born.... I can conceive of few crimes greater than the bringing into the world of
children of lust or hate.").
1460
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1460 2000
CONTEST AND CONSENT
intercourse. "Witness," Cowan observed, the thousands of children born
predisposed to be "the idiotic, the weak, the diseased, the drunkards, the
gluttons, the debased."' These children, Alice Stockham elaborated, were
endowed before birth "with lustful passions and morbid appetites. ' 0 '
Benjamin Flower similarly concluded that the "children of lust," born to
women whose husbands refused to recognize their "rights and desires,"
could never rise much above the manifest qualities of their fathers; they
were destined to fill "prisons and insane asylums.""
2. Manly Self-Restraint and Self-Interest
The marriage manuals and health guides of the second half of the
nineteenth century offered an extensive account of the injury that marital
rape inflicted, on husbands along with their wives and children. But this
literature did not proceed to advocate legal reform. Unlike the nineteenth-
century feminist movement, it accepted a husband's right to determine the
terms of sex in marriage. The prescriptive literature described the harm
that marital rape caused in order to set the stage for the presentation of
strategies designed to encourage husbands to refrain voluntarily from ex-
ercising their admitted legal prerogatives. Having recognized a husband's
sexual entitlement, these strategies appealed to a man's self-interest ex-
plicitly and without apology. Prescriptive writers acknowledged that a
husband's conjugal restraint would benefit his wife, but hastened to reas-
sure their male readers that voluntarily ceding control over marital inter-
course would always strengthen and solidify a husband's power and
position in his family. Their arguments for voluntary restraint were di-
rected at a man's self-esteem and his property interest in his wife's wel-
fare. Storer, the leader of the anti-abortion movement, offered the
quintessential explanation for his recommendation that husbands no
longer subject their wives to unwanted intercourse, characterizing a wife's
improved health and longevity solely as an aspect of her husband's well-
being:
And here let me say, that I intend taking no ultra ground; that I am
neither a fanatic nor professed philanthrope; and that in loosing, as
I hope to do, some of woman's present chains, it is solely for
professional purposes, to increase her health, prolong her life,
extend the benefits she confers upon society-in a word, selfishly
to enhance her value to ourselves.0 3
300. COWAN, supra note 266, at 138.
301. STOCKHAMI, supra note 275, at 154.
302. Flower, supra note 275, at 67.
303. HoRATIo ROBINSON STORER, Is IT IV: A BOOK FOR EVERY MAN 89 (Boston, Lee & Shepard
1868).
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Much of the prescriptive literature evoked similar themes, albeit in some-
what less blatant and extreme form.
A number of writers proposed that a husband think of voluntarily
ceding control over intercourse to his wife as the best possible manifesta-
tion of manliness, a way to confirm and display his noble character. This
was a particularly powerful approach because it connected to an enormous
body of existing sentiment which insisted that the key characteristic of
successful masculinity was self-restraint in the face of strong temptation.
The contention was especially prominent in discussions of male sexuality,
which simultaneously recognized the fierce sexual desires of young men
and urged them to direct their energy to matters intellectual and economic
instead. 4 Reformers in other arenas, however, also profitably relied on
the prevalent association between ideal masculinity and self-restraint. Ac-
tivists seeking to change white America's initially cavalier attitude toward
the lynching of African-American men in the South, for instance, effec-
tively depicted lynch mobs as lustful, passionate, undisciplined, and ac-
cordingly unmanly. 5
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, prescriptive writers
brought the weight of this understanding of masculinity to bear on the
question of forced sex in marriage. Boyd emphasized that "it is for woman
to determine when (and when only) the closest relations may be
assumed," by reminding husbands that "[iut is the part of a true man to
render instinct and desire wholly subject to reason and conscience.'"" In-
deed, he compared a husband's sexual desire to a formidable racehorse
that needed to be broken by masculine human will. "If a mettlesome
young blood-horse becomes your property, do you let him tame you and
drive you?," Boyd asked. If a husband did, "such failure would betray
weakness and lack of manhood. Just so with regard to the amative
propensity; you are to get the upperhand and keep it. Your manliness is
shown when you possess yourself and master passion, not when passion
overpowers and possesses you."3 7 Duffey seconded the idea that "true
manliness" in a husband entailed "a wise restraint of the passions for his
304. See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text; see also NoYES, supra note 283, at 20
("Male Continence in its essence is self-control, and that is a virtue of universal importance.").
305. See GAIL BEDERMAN, "The White Man's Civilization on Trial": Ida B. Wells,
Representations of Lynching, and Northern Middle-Class Manhood, in MANLINESS &
CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1917, at
45, 58-59 (1995) ("[Ida B.] Wells [a leading anti-lynching activist] depicted lynch mobs as vile,
unmanly and cowardly, hiding their own rampant lusts with sanctimonious calls for chastity, and
excusing their brutal murders by invoking the honor of harlots.... Northern men could only regain
their manliness by ending lynching."); see also id. at 70 (concluding that Wells's campaign "force[d]
some long-lasting, if subtle, shifts in whites' approaches to lynch law .... After 1894, most Northern
periodicals stopped treating lynching as a colorful Southern folkway .... It became a truism that
lynching hurt America in the eyes of the 'civilized world."').
306. Boyd, supra note 266, at 319.
307. Id.
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wife's sake."3°s As Wright also explained, "[h]uman law and custom" gave
the husband complete authority over marital intercourse, but a man who
was "pure, honest, noble, manly' would never "demand[] sensual
gratification, against the wishes of his wife."3 9
Many authors also counseled husbands that ceding control over
marital intercourse was the only way to preserve the enormous personal
benefits of marital love, happiness, and harmony. "The first great
requirement necessary in those whose desire is for a happy and lovable
married life," Cowan advised, was that it "be allowed by the husband that
with the wife should rest the question as to the time when she wished to
accept the sacred trust of maternity." 30 Where a wife was reduced to
"loathing submission," William Goodell agreed, "love and affection
change[d] into aversion and hate." ' McLaury took pains to make clear to
husbands that exercising their marital rights would simply produce
"morose, angular, and disagreeable" wives; "peaceful rest" only blessed
marriages in which the husband allowed his wife to determine the terms
of marital intercourse." 2
On a related note, the prescriptive literature promised husbands that
their voluntary restraint would ultimately lead to more pleasurable marital
intercourse, making a husband's self-interest in his wife's welfare clearer
still. Duffey predicted that a husband who continued to court his wife's
affection after marriage and wait for reciprocation would find "greater
delight" in a "monthly marital conjunction" than a selfish sensualist could
obtain from "daily or semi-weekly excesses. '313 A husband, she wrote,
"will have only himself to blame, if he is bound all his life to an apathetic,
irresponsive wife." ' 4 Cowan, a less elegant if more direct writer, surmised
that "nearly all women... who are used by their husbands simply as
chattels.., lie passive and motionless." "As to the possible pleasure to
him of such a union," Cowan suggested that a husband "might as well
308. DUiFY, supra note 266, at 284.
309. WRIGHT, supra note 286, at 184, 182 (emphasis added); see also J.H. KELLOGG, PLAIN
FACTS FOR OLD AND YOUNG 264-65 (Burlington, I.F. Segner 1884) ("The duty of the husband [to
restrain himself] is very plain, and to him the wise physician will appeal in a manner which cannot fail
to arouse him to a sense of his duty if there is yet left unconsumed by the fires of lust even a vestige of
genuine manhood."); STALL, supra note 268, at 102 ("[T]he man who gains the mastery [of his sexual
nature] grows more manly, more noble, while the man who is overcome becomes less manly, and if
lust be given the sway he becomes increasingly beastly.").
310. COWAN, supra note 266, at 394.
311. GOODELL, supra note 286, at 436-37.
312. McLaury, supra note 271, at 161. Wright, too, spoke again to instruct husbands that they
should "ask not what the law allow[ed]," but "govern themselves by the one only law of the heart."
WRIGHT, supra note 286, at 139. If a husband loved his wife and wanted to keep her love, he could
"never, intentionally nor unintentionally, impart to her the germ of a new existence, till she demands it,
and is ready, cheerfully and joyfully, to receive, nourish and develop it." Id. at 184.
313. DUFFEY, supra note 266, at 223.
314. Id. at 206.
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practice solitary indulgence." '315 Stall agreed that a man's exercise of his
marital rights would always be self-defeating in sexual terms. It would
only render his wife "incapable of marital pleasure, and also render[] her
incapable of bringing to him the satisfaction which he seeks."3"6
Even outside the woman's rights movement and the domain of the
free lovers, the question of marital rape was hardly unthinkable or un-
speakable in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The popular pre-
scriptive literature agreed with feminists, publicly and at length, that
marital rape inflicted severe harm. But feminists made a rights claim put-
ting forth women's interests, as distinct from and defined against the in-
terests of men. They wanted a wife to have the legal right and
socioeconomic ability to refuse her husband's sexual demands against his
will, recognizing that voluntary concessions were an unreliable defense
against potentially recalcitrant, dangerous, and selfish husbands. The
popular prescriptive literature, in contrast, did not situate its opposition to
marital rape in an analysis of women's subordination, and did not support
giving women enforceable rights against men. It left decisive control over
marital intercourse in the husband's hands, to be exercised in his own in-
terest as he saw fit. Popular prescriptive writers promised that the interests
of husband and wife coincided on the issue of marital rape (although one
could deduce from their descriptions of contemporaneous marital relations
that many husbands had been slow to recognize that fact). The prescrip-
tive account of the injury that marital rape produced focused as much at-
tention on the costs to husbands as wives. Yet it was clear which party to
the marriage would prevail when marital mutuality broke down.
IV
CIRCUMSCRIBED LEGAL REFORM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE
LAW OF DIVORCE
In the end, authoritative legal sources in the latter half of the
nineteenth century refused to alter the law's treatment of marital rape,
with the exception of marginal changes in the terms on which divorce was
available. The fate of the feminist campaign for a woman's right to her
own person reveals a deep reluctance to tamper with a husband's conjugal
315. CowAN, supra note 266, at 111; see also HAYEs, supra note 217, at 54 ("[W]here the woman
is enforced to yield to her husband's lust, coition then becomes purely animal on the part of the
husband, and he might as well gratify himself upon a stuffed figure.").
316. STALL, supra note 268, at 130-31; see also FOWLER, supra note 271, at 684 ("OBLIGING HER
to submit, against her inclinations, prevents your enjoyment and disgusts her of you, infuriates you
against her, diseases her, and thus cuts off your own and her future sexual pleasures, and outrages
Nature's sexual ordinances."); STOCKHAM, supra note 275, at 156 (describing a married couple in
which "a single [voluntary] coition in a month gave the husband more satisfaction than the many had
done previously"); WRIGHT, supra note 286, at 191 ("Manly passion is not in itself repulsive or
unwelcome to the purest heart of woman, when it is the voice, as it ever should be, of a love
unspeakable.").
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prerogatives, in an era when lawmakers were willing to ameliorate the
property rights of married women and, eventually, to ratify woman suf-
frage. Social recognition of the proposition that marital rape inflicted se-
vere harm on women was widely disseminated. But in this context where
marital intercourse and reproduction were so manifestly at stake, legal
authorities-like popular prescriptive writers-were strongly disinclined
to incorporate into the law a recognition of marriage as a possible site of
antagonism and danger, in which women might need and merit enforce-
able legal rights protecting them from their husbands.317
Authoritative legal sources considering marital rape in the last dec-
ades of the nineteenth century were only willing to make limited adjust-
ments at the peripheries of the divorce regime. Over time, in some
jurisdictions and in some extreme circumstances, it became easier for a
(privileged) woman to secure a divorce based on her husband's unwanted
sexual demands, or to prevent her husband from divorcing her because
she refused marital intercourse. These changes took feminists' concerns
into account, but in a severely modified form.
A. A Husband's Unwanted Sexual Demands as Legal Cruelty
The first site of change in the law's treatment of marital rape in the
nineteenth century revolved around the question of whether, and when, a
husband's unwanted sexual demands might constitute legal cruelty enti-
tling his wife to divorce. This was a significant issue because divorce in
the nineteenth century was available only for cause, and the recognized
grounds of fault were highly limited, the most important being adultery,
desertion, and cruelty 8 In the first half of the nineteenth century, courts
were almost completely silent on the question of whether marital rape
could ever be cruelty. The one notable case on the subject during this pe-
riod, Shaw v. Shaw,"9 suggested that wives would encounter extreme dif-
ficulty in establishing the claim.
Emeline Shaw's petition for a divorce on the ground of intolerable
cruelty reached the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in 1845. Mrs.
Shaw needed to avoid sexual intercourse for clear and undisputed health
reasons, which the court acknowledged. But her husband, Daniel Shaw,
had repeatedly and forcibly compelled her to submit, despite her protests
317. The strength with which legal authorities clung to a husband's right of sexual access, even as
they accommodated some expansion of women's economic and political rights, might be read as
support for Catharine MacKinnon's argument that sex-based domination takes its deepest and most
fundamental form in control over sexuality. MacKinnon contends that "[s]exuality," rather than
property or politics, "is the social process through which social relations of gender are created,
organized, expressed, and directed." MACKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 8, at 3.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
319. 17 Conn. 189 (1845).
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and attempts to escape 2 The supreme court of errors agreed with Mrs.
Shaw that involuntary marital intercourse might constitute cruelty in cases
where the wife had physiological grounds for refusal. Yet it denied her a
divorce, on the theory that there was insufficient evidence that her hus-
band had known the state of her health and understood the consequences
of his behavior. Mrs. Shaw, the court admitted, had told her husband that
his sexual demands endangered her health. But she could not prove, the
court reasoned, that he believed her.32' In coming to this judgment, the
court focused on the "frailty" of Mr. Shaw, rather than his wife, and made
its deep reluctance to reorder the marital relation clear. The court con-
tended that the law had to allow a husband room for irrationality and will-
ful blindness when his marital prerogatives were at stake. "Are we," the
court asked, "to allow nothing to the frailty of human nature, excited by
passion?" '322 The court thought not and invoked the language of pri-
vacy: "In a case of so delicate a nature, the court ought not to interfere,
but for the most substantial reason." 3"This line of argument placed no
weight on the injuries that Mrs. Shaw had already suffered and the high
likelihood that Mr. Shaw would subject his wife to forced sex again if she
had to return to his household. Although the trial court had found that
Mrs. Shaw "had just reason to fear, that he would compel her to occupy
the same bed with him regardless of the consequences to her health," the
supreme court of errors considered this possibility "too contingent, and
too remote, to lay a foundation for the action of this court. 324
Within less than a decade, however, the Shaw decision was being
criticized, even in legal treatises. As early as 1852, Joel Bishop, author of
one of the leading family law treatises, concluded that Mr. Shaw had ex-
ercised his marital prerogatives "to a very questionable extent."3" Bishop
noted, quite sharply, that the Connecticut court had not indicated how a
husband "was to be made acquainted with the injurious tendency of his
conduct, when he refused to inform himself after such warning [from his
wife], or how a wife could ever protect herself from the devouring
consequences of ungoverned lust, warring against her under the cover of
marital right."326 Caroline Dall, a Massachusetts feminist who apparently
learned of Shaw by reading Bishop's work, was more demanding. She ar-
gued in 1855 that the case constituted clear evidence in favor of eliminat-
ing a husband's marital prerogative, on the ground that voluntary restraint
offered wives insufficient security: "In relation to such a right, it may be
320. See id. at 190-91, 195-96.
321. See id. at 195-96.
322. Id. at 196.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 196-97.
325. BISHOP, supra note 32, at 392.
326. Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added).
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said, that every thing will depend upon the character of the husband, and
that no good man would feel himself justified by it. Precisely for this
reason ought the law to be altered." "Have the law and the Courts," she
wondered, "so little interest in the welfare of the State, that the personal
degradation of the wife, which this law involves, is nothing to them?"327
The law of divorce for cruelty did soon move away from the position
articulated in Shaw. By 1873, Bishop confidently reported "that the
majority of our American judges would differ from the conclusion to
which the majority of the Connecticut court arrived on these facts. ''3" Yet
judges in the nineteenth century hardly adopted Dali's proposed reform.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, some courts found le-
gally cognizable cruelty where a husband had subjected his wife to exces-
sive sexual demands and those demands had endangered her health.
Allowing these women to divorce their husbands was, it should be noted,
a liberalization. Indeed, the decisions were part of a larger liberalization of
divorce law in postbellum America, a period in which the number of di-
vorces granted to women claiming cruelty escalated dramatically.32 9 These
successful divorce suits for sexual cruelty suggest that the critique of
marital rape articulated, in different forms, by feminists and popular pre-
scriptive writers was influencing social understandings about appropriate
marital behavior, at least in arenas otherwise receptive to change.330
327. Dall, supra note 173, at 2. As Dall noted, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors had
"refused to grant [Mrs. Shaw's] prayer, because the husband had no means of ascertaining that her
health was injured, except,-her own assertion! Will it be believed," she asked, "that the Court neither
required the husband to find such evidence for the future, nor instructed the injured wife as to some
legal way of resisting such demands?" Il
328. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE 631
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1873). Nonetheless, at least one decision rejecting a sexual
cruelty claim in the last quarter of the nineteenth century cited Shaw with approval. In Youngs v.
Youngs, 33 111. App. 223 (1889), an Illinois Appellate Court held that Marie Youngs's charge that her
husband had compelled her "to submit to excessive sexual intercourse" would "not amount to cruelty
unless it is shown that it is persisted in by the husband against the will of the wife, and when he knows
that the act is injurious to her bodily health," id. at 225 (citing Shaw). The Illinois Supreme Court also
rejected Mrs. Youngs's sexual cruelty charge on appeal, noting only "that in our opinion it fails to
show such state of facts as would amount in law to cruelty." Youngs v. Youngs, 22 N.E. 806, 808 (Ill.
1889).
329. See Robert L. Griswold, Law, Sex, Cruelty, and Divorce in Victorian America, 1840-1900,38
AM. Q. 721,722 (1986) ("From 1867 to 1906, wives received 218,520 divorces because of cruelty and
husbands 39,300. Next to nonsupport, cruelty cases rose more sharply than cases based on any other
cause .... Comparing the years 1902-1906 with 1867-1871, divorces granted to wives on the ground
of cruelty jumped 960 percent, and to husbands 1,610 percent.").
330. In analyzing some of the cases discussed in this section, Robert Griswold has argued that
these decisions reflected and reinforced a growing understanding among male judges and male
prescriptive writers that appropriate masculinity required large measures of self-restraint. See Robert L.
Griswold, Sexual Cruelty and the Case for Divorce in Victorian America, 11 SIGNS 529, 529-30, 532-
34 (1986); Griswold, supra note 329, at 738-39; ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN
CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890, at 114-16 (1982) [hereinafter GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DivoRcE]. This social
understanding, discussed above, certainly helps explain the courts' increasing willingness to grant
women divorces for cruelty based on their husbands' excessive and unwanted sexual demands. See
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But the liberalization was strictly limited. First, the potential avail-
ability of divorce for cruelty did not change the law governing intact mar-
riages. The legal possibility of exit may have given some wives more
leverage in negotiating the terms of marital intercourse; yet it did not do
more than that to protect wives from their husbands' sexual demands
while the marriage lasted. Husbands retained their prerogatives without
the threat of either criminal sanction or any other legal intervention. Until
divorce, Hale's theory of irretractible consent remained in place.
Second, divorce was not an available or attractive option for wide
segments of the female population in the nineteenth century. Pursuing a
divorce petition for sexual cruelty was expensive and risky. Judicial rec-
ognition of cruelty could be explicitly class-conscious, with poorer wives
expected to endure more?3t The public exposure involved in such a di-
vorce suit might also be highly humiliating. As Dall observed, "women
know that the coarsest woman [would have to] have suffered in no
ordinary degree, before she could [be] driven into a public statement of
such grievances." '332 More fundamentally, many women, even if they could
have successfully weathered a divorce suit, lacked real socioeconomic al-
ternatives to marriage-a point feminist critics made abundantly clear. "I
Women were likely to be particularly concerned about the well-being of
their children and their ability to support them. Indeed, the economic vul-
nerability that most women and children experienced upon divorce led a
number of nineteenth-century feminists to actively oppose the liberaliza-
tion of divorce laws as a general matter." In addition, many women had
supra text accompanying notes 304-309. But Griswold does not discuss the feminist campaign against
marital rape. Indeed, he suggests that feminists spoke about marital rape only amongst themselves and
in private. See GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE, supra, at 115 ("The right of women to say no to their
husbands, early feminists confided privately, was at the heart of female emancipation."). In his account,
the successful sexual cruelty cases are evidence of shared norms of companionate marriage, which
evolved over time under men's stewardship. See id. at 119-21, 170, 173; Griswold, supra note 329, at
738-39. In fact, the feminist attack on marital rape was public and remarkably frank. It suggests that
legal norms and social customs about marital conduct were radically more contested than Griswold
posits and that they were importantly shaped by women's advocacy as well as men's self-definition.
331. See infra text accompanying notes 358-373.
332. Dall, supra note 173, at 2.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 184-209, 261-264.
334. As Antoinette Brown Blackwell explained:
The advantage, if this theory of marriage [with liberalized divorce rules] is adopted, will not
be on the side of woman, but altogether on the side of man. The cure for the evils that now
exist is not in dissolving marriage, but it is in giving to the married woman her own natural
independence and self-sovereignty, by which she can maintain herself.
Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention, supra note 144, at 728 (statement of Antoinette Brown
Blackwell). Henry B. Blackwell (Antoinette's brother-in-law) agreed, contending that "indissoluble
marriage or free divorce, marital fidelity or unbridled licentiousness, have literally nothing to do with"
women's enfranchisement. "Since Free Love, as it is called, would be, practically, freedom of
unworthy men to leave their wives and children to starve, while it could not give similar freedom to
mothers to leave their children, there is no danger that women will ever favor such a system." H.B.B.,
Woman Suffrage and Free Love, WOMAN'S J. (Boston, Chicago, & St. Louis), Sept. 12, 1874, at 294,
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profound religious or moral objections to divorce. Opposition to divorce
remained widespread among American churches in the second half of the
nineteenth century (especially in the absence of adultery).335Even some
members of the woman's rights movement argued that marriage vows
represented an unseverable commitment.33 6
Third, the cruelty decisions accepting a husband's unwanted sexual
behavior as ground for divorce only recognized harm in a confined cate-
gory of cases. Under this case law, a wife could not secure a divorce sim-
ply because her husband had raped her. Marital rape, standing alone, was
not a recognized cause for divorce. Instead, petitioning wives had to dem-
onstrate: (a) that their husband's unwanted demands were unusual, either
quantitatively excessive or particularly brutal; and (b) that these demands
had jeopardized their health. It is to this third limitation that we turn first.
The leading cases where a wife subject to unwanted sexual demands
won a divorce for cruelty all fit within a discernible, if narrow, pattern. In
each case, the husband had acted in a manner that the court understood to
be extraordinary. The jurisprudence described these men in the language
of deviance.337 Some were very violent; they had acted "'rashly and
294; see also Blatch, supra note 233, at 284 ("It is because divorce merely shifts the disease from one
home to another, because it in no way lessens our trouble-the financial dependence of women, and
enforced maternity-that the carrying of legislation upon the lines of easier dissolution of the marriage
contract proves but a barren victory."); Clark, Matrimonial Bonds, supra note 138, at 47-48; DuBois,
supra note 13, at 843.
335. For instance, the Catholic Church and all the major Protestant denominations were charter
members of the National Divorce Reform League, an organization founded in 1885 to oppose
liberalized divorce laws. See NATIONAL DIVORCE REFORM LEAGUE, AN ABSTRACT OF ITS ANNUAL
REPORTS, OCTOBER, 1885, at 1-2 (Montpelier, National Divorce Reform League 1885). One year
earlier, the Methodist Episcopal Church had resolved "'[t]hat no divorce shall be recognized as lawful
by the Church except for adultery."' JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST
EPISCOPAL CHURCH, HELD IN PHILADELPHIA, PA., MAY 1-28, 1884, at 334 (Rev. David S. Monroe ed.,
New York, Phillips & Hunt 1884). In 1883, the Presbyterian Church found "the action of the civil
courts, and the divorce laws in many of the States" to be "in direct contravention of the law of God." 7
MINUTES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 689 (New York, Presbyterian Board of Publication 1883).
336. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, for example, articulated one reason for her opposition to
divorce this way:
Mrs. Stanton calls marriage a "tie." No, marriage is a relation .... Let, then, the two parties
deliberately, voluntarily consent to enter into this relation. It is one which, from its very
nature, must be permanent. Can the mother ever destroy the relation which exists between
herself and her child? Can the father annul the relation which exists between himself and his
child? Then, can the father and mother annul the relation which exists between themselves,
the parents of the child? It can not be.
Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention, supra note 144, at 724 (statement of Antoinette Brown
Blackwell).
337. I have not been able to find any American cruelty cases from the nineteenth century in which
a wife sued for divorce because her husband had subjected her to forced sodomy. As nineteenth-
century American treatises noted, however, English precedent might have supported such a claim. See
BISHOP, supra note 32, at 382; WM. HARDCASTLE BROWNE, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF DIVORCE
AND ALIMONY 112 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1890). In N- v. N-, decided by the English Court
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in 1862, a wife sued for divorce on the ground of cruelty,
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roughly and unreasonably,"'338 interested only in "the brutal gratification
of [their] lustful passions."339 Other husbands were "abnormal" in the fre-
quency of their "incessant" demands.34 In each case, also, the conduct at
issue had impaired the wife's health, or even "endanger[ed] her life by
degrees."" These opinions detailed afflictions that necessitated a
woman's abstention from intercourse and made sex "painful and
hurtful. ' ' 2 They involved marital relations where "a continuance of [the
husband's behavior] would seriously and permanently injure [his wife's]
health. ' '34 They described women who "had become weak, pale, nervous,
spiritless and utterly broken down."3 4 In a number of cases, the husband
contending that her husband had forcibly sodomized her. See 3 Sw. & Tr. 234, 234-36, 164 Eng. Rep.
1264, 1264 (1862). The court indicated that forced sodomy could constitute cruelty, but held that a wife
needed to present more than her own sworn testimony to prove the charge. See 3 Sw. & Tr. at 238, 164
Eng. Rep. at 1265 ("The crime here imputed is so heinous and so contrary to experience, that it would
be most unreasonable to find a verdict of guilty where there is simply oath against oath, without any
further evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the charge.").
338. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 23 A. 966, 967 (Conn. 1891) (quoting finding of trial court).
339. Melvin v. Melvin, 58 N.H. 569, 571 (1879); see also Walsh v. Walsh, 28 N.W. 718, 720
(Mich. 1886) (noting that Mr. Walsh had "used violent means to accomplish" sexual intercourse with
his wife); Maget v. Maget, 85 Mo. App. 6, 8 (1900) ("[Lena Maget testified] that on one occasion when
she declined to submit herself to the gratification of his insatiable lust he became very angry and struck
her a violent blow on the back.").
340. Commonwealth v. Monroe, 9 Kulp 369, 369 (Pa. Ct. Quarter Sessions Luzerne County
1899); see also Grant v. Grant, 54 N.W. 1059, 1059 (Minn. 1893) (finding "that the defendant had
continuously compelled the plaintiff to submit to excessive intercourse with him"); Fulmer v. Fulmer,
11 Ohio Dec. 795, 796 (Sup. Ct. Summit County 1884) ("Plaintiff showed by her physician also (a fact
stated to him by defendant), that he had sexual intercourse with his wife not less than three times every
night straight through."); Gardner v. Gardner, 58 S.W. 342, 342 (Tenn. 1900) (describing husband as "a
man of inordinate lust," who forced his wife to submit to "excessive indulgence").
341. Melvin, 58 N.H. at 571.
342. Walsh, 28 N.W. at 719.
343. Grant, 54 N.W. at 1059.
344. Fulmer, 11 Ohio Dec. at 796; see also Mayhew v. Mayhew, 23 A. 966, 967 (Conn. 1891)
(reporting that trial court found "'injury to the plaintiff and to her health' and "'that the plaintiff could
not safely cohabit with [her husband any] longer"'); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 18 Kan. 419, 424 (1877)
(affirming trial court's judgment that husband was guilty of extreme cruelty, where husband had, inter
alia, "compell[ed] his wife to sleep with him against her wishes, when she was diseased" in the womb,
and wife's health had become "so bad that the physician who examined her, and testified at the trial,
stated that he did not think she ever would be well"); Maget, 85 Mo. App. at 13 ("The acts complained
of when not excessive and in ordinary circumstances were not per se unlawful, injurious or dangerous,
but [they constitute cruelty] when carried to the excess shown by the evidence, with a knowledge on
the part of defendant that such acts were injurious to the plaintiffs health and endangered it .... );
Gardner, 58 S.W. at 342 (noting that Mr. Gardner was accused of having "seriously impaired" the
health of his wife, "a delicate woman").
In addition, the New Jersey Court of Chancery noted in Weigel v. Weigel, 47 A. 183 (N.J. Ch.
1900), that Alice Weigel would have established a divorce claim for cruelty, if she had been able to
prove her allegation that her husband "violently and against [her] will, while she was sick and
enfeebled, forcibly compelled her to submit to sexual intercourse, and that this conduct was so frequent
and continued that it had caused [her] to have a number of miscarriages, and had undermined her health
and endangered her reason," id. at 184.
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had communicated a venereal disease to his wife.' 5
These were extreme circumstances, already singled out by legal rule
and social custom alike. The unrelenting physicality of the husbandly
conduct at issue in the successful sexual cruelty cases resonated with the
larger jurisprudence on divorce for cruelty, which began by recognizing
only physical attacks that caused somatic harm and long continued to
privilege physical over mental injury. 6The female plaintiffs in these
cases, in turn, seemed to prove the veracity of the myriad warnings in the
prescriptive literature about the physiological consequences of unwanted
marital intercourse for women?' Under these extreme circumstances,
courts in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were willing to grant a
wife's cruelty suit for divorce. Even the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors upheld a cruelty-based divorce in 1891, in a case where the trial
court had been careful enough to find that the husband actually "'knew
the condition of [his wife], and the suffering and injury [his "brutal and
unendurable" conduct] would be likely to inflict on her, and her inability
to safely and properly accede to his wishes."'"
These successful divorce suits marked an important change in the
law's treatment of marital rape. They constituted, for the first time, some
acknowledgment that a husband could "abuse[] his right to his wife's per-
son" in a way the law would recognize. 9 They prompted James Schouler,
who had seen no need to mention a husband's marital prerogatives in the
first two editions of his family law treatise (published in 1870 and 1874),
to discuss the question in his third edition, published in 1882. Schouler
had no doubt about the continued vitality of the criminal exemption, but
he carefully noted that "a husband who wantonly abuses his wife so as to
inflict needless pain and injury upon her, and disregards her health and
delicate organization, is guilty of legal cruelty."35
The limits of this liberalization are easiest to discern in the unsuc-
cessful cruelty suits that wives brought during approximately the same
345. See Morehouse v. Morehouse, 39 A. 516, 519 (Conn. 1898); Holthoefer v. Holthoefer, 11
N.W. 150, 150 (Mich. 1882); Canfield v. Canfield, 12 Mich. 519, 519 (1876); McMahen v. McMahen,
40 A. 795, 797-98 (Pa. 1898); see also BISHOP, supra note 32, at 380 ("A husband's attempts, when
affected with venereal disease, to force his wife to his bed, is of a mixed nature, partly cruelty and
partly evidence of adultery."); THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOP)EDIA OF LAW, supra note 32,
at 795; BROWNE, supra note 337, at 112-13; HENRY FOLsOM PAGE, A VIEW OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO
THE SUBJECT OF DIVORCE, IN OHIO, INDIANA AND MICHIGAN 145 (Columbus, J.H. Riley & Co. 1850).
346. See PAGE, supra note 345, at 138-41; Robert L. Griswold, The Evolution of the Doctrine of
Mental Cruelty in Victorian American Divorce, 1790-1900, 20 J. Soc. HIsT. 127, 127, 130, 135, 138
(1986); Griswold, supra note 329, at 729.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 288-296.
348. Mayhew, 23 A. at 967 (quoting finding of trial court).
349. BROWNE, supra note 337, at 112.
350. SCHOULER, supra note 30, at 63. For similar statements, see THE A iERiCAN AND ENGLISH
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 32, at 795; BROWNE, supra note 30, at 66; NELSON, supra note 32,
at 328-30; Irving Browne, Oral Cruelty as a Ground of Divorce, 46 CENT. L.J. 81, 82 (1898).
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period. Consider Moores v. Moores, 3 ' decided by the New Jersey Court of
Chancery in 1863. Israel Moores had compelled his wife Mary to submit
to marital intercourse, and she had become pregnant against her will?52
But unconsensual sex and unwilling maternity, by themselves, did not
constitute the basis for a successful divorce suit for cruelty. Mrs. Moores
lost because she could not demonstrate that the circumstances of her mar-
riage were atypical. There was, the court found, "no pretence of any pe-
culiar debility or physical infirmity on the part of the wife" and "no
allegation of any violence" by the husband.353 The court observed, in par-
ticular, that "sickness" associated with pregnancy did not constitute
physiological harm for purposes of establishing cruelty." Other failed di-
vorce suits told the same story. Almost twenty years after Moores, in
1880, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Prudence Lockwood a divorce
because she had not proved "that [her] illness was caused by her hus-
band's conduct towards her, or that she was seriously ill at any time. 355
Ida Louisa Dignan, suing for divorce in 1896, alleged "roughness or vio-
lence in sexual intercourse."3"6 But the Supreme Court for New York
County found no marital cruelty, reasoning that "[t]he copulation itself
was in the exercise of [her husband's] marital right, and it is not shown
either that its ill consequences were due to any wanton brutality on his
part, or of serious detriment to the plaintiff." '357
Even when a husband's behavior had been extraordinary and his
wife's health endangered, a woman could still lose a divorce suit for cru-
elty. The courts hearing these claims, and the treatises discussing them,
differentiated on the basis of class, so that they were more likely to see
cruelty higher up the socioeconomic scale. In Walsh v. Walsh,3 5 which
granted a divorce based on a husband's unwanted sexual demands,359 class
signals were distributed throughout the opinion. The Supreme Court of
Michigan took care to observe that the Walshes were comfortably well-
off: They lived "in a fine house, well furnished, and provided with all the
conveniences;" Mrs. Walsh "was furnished with elegant clothing, a horse
and carriage."" The court, moreover, found that Mr. Walsh had acted in-
appropriately in light of his social station. In reviewing letters that he had
sent to his wife after she fled his household to escape his violent insis-
tence on intercourse, the court determined that "[t]hey are such as no man,
351. 16 N.J. Eq. 275 (Ch. 1863).
352. See id. at 279.
353. Id
354. Id.
355. Lockwood v. Lockwood, 43 Mich. 230,230 (1880).
356. Dignan v. Dignan, 40 N.Y.S. 320, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
357. Id.
358. 28 N.W. 718 (Mich. 1886).
359. See id. at 720-2 1.
360. Id. at 719.
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of any rank in life, could write to his wife, in his right senses, unless he
was brutal and beastly in his nature.
361
In English v. English,362 which denied a divorce petition for cruelty,
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals acknowledged that John
English had subjected his wife Abby to brutal, dangerous, and unwanted
sexual demands. As the trial court found, Abby English had suffered inju-
ries in childbirth that made sex "'agonizing[ly]"' painful.363 Her husband
nonetheless insisted on intercourse virtually every night, "frequently even
using force to accomplish his purpose. To her entreaties and expressions
of apprehension that the intercourse would be fatal to her, he would reply,
'No fear of its killing you; you will not die until your time comes; you
know how I am-I cannot control myself."' 3 Moreover, John English's
violence against his wife escalated over time. During their last encounter,
he "struck her in the back with his fist" as she attempted to escape his bed,
and "in holding her down [to the bed] he bruised her limbs so that they
were lame and sore for more than two weeks afterwards." '365
Although Abby English's claim certainly equaled the evidence in
other, successful cruelty suits, the court of errors and appeals erected an
additional barrier to divorce in this case. It rejected Abby English's peti-
tion on the ground that she had failed to establish that her husband would
continue to subject her to forced sex if a divorce was denied.366 In reaching
this judgment, the English court suggested, quite directly, that it was more
reasonable to expect Mrs. English to tolerate her husband's past conduct
because the couple occupied a middling class status. Mr. English was a
"tinsmith" and "comparatively unlearned," although he "had accumulated
a moderate fortune. '367 The court took this as evidence that his behavior
should be interpreted as the carelessness of a simple man, rather than the
product of any conscious bad intent. "The point for determination is not
whether the husband, in his rudeness, has injured his wife without
sufficient thought or care of her physical health, while doing an act which,
in ordinary cases, is not unlawful, injurious or dangerous," the court ex-
plained. "[T]he true inquiry is whether the conduct of the husband has
been such as to raise a reasonable apprehension that further acts of the
same abuse will be committed if the wife should return to him."36 Indeed,
the court noted that Mrs. English might be making too much of the inju-
ries she had suffered. Dr. Thomas, "a physician who ha[d] made women's
361. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
362. 27 N.J. Eq. 579 (1876).
363. English v. English, 27 N.J. Eq. 71, 72 (Ch. 1876) (quoting Abby English).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 72-73.
366. See English v. English, 27 N.J. Eq. 579, 585-86 (1876).
367. Id. at 583.
368. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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diseases a speciality," testified at trial that, "although there would be pain"
whenever Mrs. English was subjected to intercourse, "a large proportion
of married women assent under exactly those circumstances. 369 In pre-
dicting Mr. English's future conduct, the court relied heavily on his at-
tempts at reconciliation after his wife left him. It evaluated these attempts
very favorably, partially on the theory that they represented a greater ef-
fort precisely because Mr. English was "unlearned." Describing one letter
that Mr. English sent to his wife, the court wrote: "He is not a scholar, but
this letter is a most tender appeal to a wife, under any circumstances.""37
The treatises were even more explicit about their understanding
that cruelty claims were to be evaluated with class in mind. In explaining
how a court should decide whether there was cruelty justifying divorce in
any particular case, Schouler flatly stated that "[t]he age, temperament,
and disposition of the two spouses, and to some extent their rank and
condition, ought fairly to be estimated."37' Bishop agreed: "'[W]hat may
aggravate the character of ill-treatment,"' he reported, "'must be deduced
from various considerations-in some degree from the station of the
parties."'372 The same conduct, in other words, might cause greater harm to
a more refined woman. William Browne used the example of marital bat-
tery: "Between persons of education, refinement and delicacy, the
slightest blow in anger might be cruelty, while between persons of a
different character and walk in life, it might not mar to any great extent
their conjugal relations, nor materially interfere with their happiness." '373
The willingness of some courts in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century to recognize a husband's unwanted sexual demands as legal cru-
elty meriting divorce was an important adjustment in the law's treatment
of marital rape, and some evidence of growing social uneasiness about
marital rape. But it was a very limited change: confined to the law of di-
vorce, reserved for the most extreme circumstances, and class-sensitive
even then. A similar pattern emerged around the other important site of
legal reform during this period, the cases on whether a husband could di-
vorce his wife because she refused marital intercourse.
369. Id. at 582.
370. Id. at 584.
371. JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WiFE 540 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 1882) (emphasis added).
372. BISHOP, supra note 32, at 383 (quoting Sir John Nicholl).
373. BROWNE, supra note 337, at 103-04; see also BISHOP, supra note 32, at 384 ("'A blow
between parties in the lower conditions and in the highest stations of life, bears a very different
aspect."' (quoting Sir John Nicholl)); PAGE, supra note 345, at 144-45 ("[I]f a nobleman of high rank
and ancient family, uses personal violence to his wife ... such conduct, in such a person, carries with it
something so degrading to the husband, and so insulting and mortifying to the wife, as to render the
injury itself far more severe and insupportable.").
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B. A Wife's Refusal of Marital Intercourse as Grounds for Divorce
In the last third of the nineteenth century, a number of husbands sued
for divorce, claiming either desertion or cruelty on the ground that their
wife had left the marital bed and refused all marital intercourse. These
were not cases in which a wife had departed from her husband's house-
hold. During the time periods at issue in these suits, the wife had remained
in her husband's house and continued to perform domestic and childcare
services for him and the family. The only services the wife would not per-
form were sexual. A majority of the courts that heard these petitions de-
nied them. The denials constituted an important, but highly incremental,
victory for married women.
In these divorce suits, husbands had named their wives as the party at
fault. Divorce always placed tremendous social and economic burdens on
women in the nineteenth century. These burdens were exponentially in-
tensified when the wife was adjudged to be the guilty party. That judg-
ment carried tremendous social stigma for women. More concretely,
alimony and dower (a wife's common law right to a life estate in one-third
of her husband's real property at his death)374 were not available at com-
mon law to wives found to be responsible for their divorce, and any prop-
erty a woman brought into her marriage remained vested with her
husband?7 Denying a husband's divorce petition spared his wife the
hardship of negotiating life as a divorced woman held responsible for her
own condition. These decisions also represented some legal toleration of a
wife's refusal to submit to intercourse, at least to the extent of holding that
this was not a sufficiently bad act to merit divorce.
The boundaries of this reform were severely limited, of course. Even
if a court refused to grant a husband a divorce, a judgment on a divorce
petition did not prevent a man from forcibly compelling his wife to submit
to intercourse or from placing her under various nonphysical forms of
374. On alimony and dower, see MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 292-93; RODGERS, supra note 31,
at 320-21; SCHOULER, supra note 19, at 11; BASCH, supra note 18, at 53; Siegel, Home as Work, supra
note 11, at 1082.
375. See ADDRESS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, ON THE DIVORCE BILL, BEFORE THE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE NEW YORK SENATE, IN THE ASSEMBLY CHAMBER, FEB. 8, 1861, supra
note 157, at 5 ("The laws on divorce are quite as unequal as those on marriage; yes, far more
so.... [I]f the husband be the guilty party, he still retains a greater part of the property! If the wife be
the guilty party, she goes out of the partnership penniless."); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 416 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1856); MANSFIELD,
supra note 29, at 254; PAGE, supra note 345, at 293; REEVE, supra note 43, at 210; RODGERS, supra
note 31, at 376-77. By the middle of the nineteenth century, only a few state legislatures had altered the
common law rule. See BISHOP, supra, at 416.
Even in jurisdictions where a "guilty" wife could collect alimony, a finding of fault typically led to
much smaller payments. See Tumbleson v. Tumbleson, 79 Ind. 558, 559-60 (1881) ("Ordinarily, where
a wife... is divorced without her fault, she ought to receive as alimony more than $100 where her
husband's property is worth $2,500. But the appellant did not fulfil her obligations as a wife.... [so]
the decree of the court below for alimony was large enough.").
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pressure to acquiesce. Denying a husband a divorce also did nothing to
make divorce a more viable economic and social option for women who
might have preferred, everything else being more equal, to live apart from
their husbands. These decisions, moreover, did not help a wife who had
left her husband's household entirely in order to escape his sexual de-
mands. Finally, some of the courts that heard these cases granted the hus-
band a divorce because his wife had refused marital intercourse. These
judgments did not constitute a total defeat for the wives who resisted
them: The existence of civil remedies for disgruntled husbands arguably
left wives better off than if they had been perpetually subject to their hus-
band's use of the self-help remedy of forced sex. But these divorces left
women highly vulnerable nonetheless, and constituted judicial reinforce-
ment of a husband's marital prerogatives. Let's begin, however, with the
cases in which a husband's divorce petition failed.
In most of these cases, it was clear that the wife did not have a
physiological condition that made sexual intercourse unusually hazardous
or painful. These wives refused to submit to marital intercourse because
they did not want to have any more children376 or because they no longer
loved their husbands.377 One woman was protesting her husband's decision
to allow their son to enlist in the Union army during the Civil War . 71 Not
only did the criminal law accord them no right to refuse, these wives
could not have won a divorce suit for cruelty if their husbands had forced
them to submit. But a majority of the courts that heard their stories denied
376. See Steele v. Steele, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 505, 505 (1874) ("[Tlhe defendant had assigned as
a reason for denying matrimonial intercourse to the complainant that she did not desire to have any
more children."); Magill v. Magill, 3 Pittsburgh Rep. 25, 25-26 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Allegheny County 1866)
(assuming as true Mr. Magill's allegation that his wife made "declarations that she would never bear
children to him"); see also Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 11 S.E. 289, 292 (Va. 1890) ("[A]fter the
birth of her fourth child .... the plaintiff declared her intention never to have another child, or to permit
the defendant to occupy her bed again, since which time they have occupied separate apartments,
although there has been no actual separation ....").
377. See Watson v. Watson, 28 A. 467, 467 (N.J. Ch. 1894) ("[Ulpon the occasion of a
disagreement, at which the husband, as he says, merely scolded her, the wife withdrew from his
bed .... [Thereafter,] communications between the husband and wife were rude and severely
constrained .... ); Scott v. Scott, 61 Tex. 119, 121 (1884) (noting "an occasional outbreak of temper
on the part of the wife, improper and perhaps insulting expressions used towards the husband in the
presence of third parties on a few occasions" and concluding "[tihe worst effect her words could
possibly have had was to make bystanders believe that his wife had but little respect for him, and
perhaps no love, and gave vent to her feelings at ill chosen times").
378. See Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327, 327-28 (1867) ("[T]aking offence because the
husband allowed their eldest son to enlist in the army, [she] withdrew from the [marital] bed-room ....
and from that time occupied at night a separate bed-room from which she constantly excluded her
husband .... No considerations of health or physical disability appeared to justify her refusal .... ).
Miranda Southwick elaborated at the time "that she 'did n't intend to have any more boys for Mr.
Southwick to send to the war,' that she 'had no love for him,' .. and that 'he was nothing but a
boarder."' Id. at 328.
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their husbands a divorce nonetheless.379 The reasoning offered in these
cases was similar. Where a husband had sued for desertion, courts held
that "desertion" signified the renunciation of all marital obligations. Mar-
ried women certainly had a duty to have intercourse with their husbands,
judges explained, but this was only one of many duties?8 So long as a
wife continued to perform her other obligations, she had not deserted.381
The courts took two other sorts of wifely obligations to be par-
ticularly essential. First, they employed the language of companionate
marriage to explain that a wife was duty-bound to live in the same house-
hold as her husband. Desertion meant "a cessation of cohabitation, a
refusal to live together,"382 which would deprive the deserted party "of all
real companionship." '383 Second, they focused on a wife's obligation to
provide uncompensated domestic services to her husband and children,
"the thousand ministrations to the physical comforts .... in consideration
of the marriage obligation, and without ceaseless thought of pecuniary
379. See Steele, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) at 506; Fritts v. Fritts, 28 N.E. 1058, 1058-59 (111. 1891);
Stewart v. Stewart, 7 A. 473, 474 (Me. 1887); Southwick, 97 Mass. at 328-29; Segelbaum v.
Segelbaum, 39 N.W. 492, 493 (Minn. 1888); Watson, 28 A. at 468; McKinney v. McKinney, 9 Ohio
Dec. 655, 657 (Hamilton C.P. 1900); see also Reid v. Reid, 21 N.J. Eq. 331, 332-33 (Ch. 1871)
(holding that husband's desertion of his wife was not justified by fact that she had refused him marital
intercourse); Throconorton, 11 S.E. at 292 (holding that husband had not deserted wife where he
occupied a separate bedroom at her insistence).
380. See Stewart, 7 A. at 474 ("Sexual intercourse is only one marital right or duty. There are
many other important rights and duties. The obligations the parties assume to each other and to society
are not dependent on this single one."); Southwick, 97 Mass. at 329 ("[The] refusal of matrimonial
intercourse... [is] a breach or violation of a single conjugal or marital duty or obligation only .... );
Watson, 28 A. at 468 ("The lawfulness of [sexual] intercourse is perhaps a prominent and
distinguishing feature of married life, but it is not the sum and all of it.").
381. See Fritts, 28 N.E. at 1058 ("We think that the willful desertion here referred to [in the
Illinois divorce act] was intended to mean the abnegation of all the duties of the marital relation, and
not of one alone."); Stewart, 7 A. at 474 ("We do not think our legislature intended to call the denial of
this one obligation an 'utter desertion,' while the party might be faithfully, and perhaps meritoriously,
fulfilling all the other marital obligations."); Southwick, 97 Mass. at 328-29 ("The word desertion in the
statute... [signifies] an abnegation of all the duties and obligations resulting from the marriage
contract."); Watson, 28 A. at 468 ("[The deserted party must be deprived of... every substantial duty
which the other owes to him or her."); see also BROWNE, supra note 337, at 153 ("Refusal of sexual
intercourse, although not occasioned by considerations of health, does not justify desertion. A refusal to
cohabit implies much more than a refusal of sexual connection.").
Danforth v. Danforth, 33 A. 781 (Me. 1895), represents the flip side of these cases. Here, a court
found desertion where a wife had left her husband's house, but had engaged in sexual intercourse with
him for one brief period during their separation. Just as the cases above held that a refusal of marital
intercourse, standing by itself, was not sufficient to establish desertion, Danforth held that the presence
of marital intercourse, standing by itself, was not sufficient to defeat a desertion claim. See id at 781.
382. Southwick, 97 Mass. at 329; see also THE AmERtCAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOREDIA OF LAW,
supra note 32, at 800 ("One of the elements of desertion is that the parties must have separated; there
must be a cessation of cohabitation. Ceasing to cohabit means.., ceasing to have a common home. It
does not mean ceasing to have sexual intercourse." (citing Southwick, Reid, Steele)).
383. Watson, 28 A. at 468.
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recompense."3 4 Phrased another way, then, the courts that denied hus-
bands a divorce for desertion when their wives refused sexual intercourse
made clear that these women were still subject to deep obligations to their
husbands, including obligations that men did not bear in return. They also
explained that a husband retained his sexual prerogatives. The only de-
parture in these cases was their finding that sexual prerogatives were not
the irreducible core of the marital relation.
The courts that rejected husbands' divorce petitions for cruelty pre-
sented a related line of argument.385 They agreed that a wife had the duty
to submit to marital intercourse, a duty that the wives at issue had violated
without just cause?86 But they reasoned that a divorce for cruelty was only
available to a man who could demonstrate that his health or life had been
endangered by his wife's conduct.387 The petitioning husbands had made
384. Id.; see also Segelbaum, 39 N.W. at 493 ("[T]he parties lived together as husband and wife
from the date of their marriage until February 27, 1884, she having the care of their household and
children, except that from the month of January, 1883, until the commencement of this action, she has
refused to occupy his bed.").
385. See Cowles v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 298, 298 (1873); Magill v. Magill, 3 Pittsburgh Rep. 25,
26-27 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Allegheny County 1866); Scott v. Scott, 61 Tex. 119, 120-21 (1884).
During the same period, several wives also unsuccessfully sued for divorce on the ground of
cruelty where their husbands had denied them marital intercourse. See Burton v. Burton, 27 A. 825,
826 (N.J. Ch. 1893); Disborough v. Disborough, 26 A. 852, 853 (N.J. Ch. 1893); Duhme v. Duhme, 3
Ohio Dec. Reprint 95, 97, 100 (Hamilton C.P. Ct. 1859); Schoessow v. Schoessow, 53 N.W. 856, 857
(Wis. 1892); see also Eshbach v. Eshbach, 23 Pa. 343, 343, 345 (1854) (holding that husband's refusal
to "cohabit with respondent as man and wife" did not justify wife's desertion, as "the fact that the
husband lay in a separate bed" was not cruelty).
386. See Magill, 3 Pittsburgh Rep. at 26 ("It cannot be denied that such conduct ["the refusal of a
wife to allow her husband his marital rights"] is a violation of the marital vows, and greatly calculated
to provoke unkind feelings on the part of the husband .... "); see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 566 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 6th ed.
1881) ("The law gives the husband the right to have his wife occupy the same bed with himself. But, if
she refuses his embraces, it is not cruelty in her toward him [citing Cowles]. On the other hand, if he
forces her, it is not rape.").
387. See Cowles, 112 Mass. at 298 ("[T]he cruelty charged must appear to be such as shall cause
injury to life, limb, or health, or create a danger of such injury, or a reasonable apprehension of such
danger.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Magill, 3 Pittsburgh Rep. at 27 ("Judge King
[has stated that] ... 'In limiting our intervention in matrimonial cases, in which cruelty is charged, to
cases in which life or health are in any way involved, we occupy safe and prudent grounds.' This seems
to me to comprehend the true principle ... ") (citation omitted); Scot4 61 Tex. at 121 ("[U]nless the
excesses charged are such as produce bodily harm or the fear of it, a divorce cannot be granted."); see
also BISHOP, supra note 328, at 612 ("[T]his doctrine [that withholding marital intercourse is not
cruelty], to be sound, as applied to cases where no good reason, such as the health of the party refusing,
prompts the refusal, must proceed on the assumption that the health of the other party is not injured
thereby.").
For similar physiological reasoning in cruelty cases where the wife was the petitioner for divorce,
see Burtorn 27 A. at 826 ("I do not think that such separation from bed and home is 'extreme cruelty,'
as used by the statute, in the absence of evidence that it has had, or tends to have, serious effect upon
the health of the wife. There is no such evidence in this case."); Duhme, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint at 100
("[Tihe law has defined [extreme cruelty]. It says there must be either personal violence, or the
reasonable apprehension of personal violence; or a systematic course of ill treatment, affecting the
health and endangering the life of the party against whom it is directed."); Schoessow, 53 N.W. at 857
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no showing to that effect, and accordingly lost their divorce suits.388 One
court, moreover, expressed doubts about whether a man would ever be
able to make such a showing. "If non-access to a man or woman's bed has
such startling effects," a Pennsylvania judge remarked, "a great portion of
our race must be in a pitiable condition."389 These decisions carved out a
small space for female resistance in an interesting way. They did not ex-
cuse or express empathy for the wives who denied their husbands marital
intercourse. They argued, in essence, that their husbands had overreacted
to this breach of duty, that the harm caused was not as troubling as the
men suggested. This judgment did not challenge a husband's marital pre-
rogatives, but it helped undercut one possible defense for those preroga-
tives (a defense already fiercely disfavored in the prescriptive
literature): namely, the theory that healthy male physiology necessarily
and always depended on regular sexual outlet.
No notable case law, moreover, disputed this understanding of legal
cruelty.39 Courts granting divorce petitions because a wife refused marital
intercourse relied on desertion rationales. In particular, they adopted the
arguments that a number of treatise writers, including most prominently
Joel Bishop, urged with great force during this period.391 Bishop noted that
("[Tihe bare fact of refusal to permit sexual intercourse .... does not, either in reason or authority,
constitute 'cruel and inhuman treatment.' No injury to the plaintiff, either mental or bodily, is alleged
or proven to have resulted from such refusal; nor is her health claimed to have been impaired.").
388. See Scott, 61 Tex. at 121 ("To put the worst phase upon the conduct of the wife in this case,
there is nothing in what she said or did from which the husband could possibly fear that she would do
him bodily harm ... ").
389. Magill, 3 Pittsburgh Rep. at 26.
Three treatise writers were more confident that some husbands, at least, might potentially be able
to demonstrate the requisite injury to their health. William Nelson suggested an analogy to the
impotency jurisprudence, where medical testimony in one case had established "that if the wife
continued to occupy the same bed with her impotent husband her health would be impaired and her
nervous system so injured that she would be subject to hysteria by her being obliged to occupy his bed
without proper gratification of passions thereby excited. Under similar testimony," he reasoned, "it is
possible that our courts would grant a divorce for persistent refusal of sexual intercourse." NELSON,
supra note 32, at 331. Bishop also relied on the impotency case law to conclude "that a capable person,
whether man or woman, may in this way inflict an injury to the health of the other party to the marriage
on account of which a divorce for the cruelty ought to be granted." BISHOP, supra note 328, at 612-13.
Browne simply asserted that "it [was] undoubtedly the fact that a capable party refusing to cohabit,
may inflict an injury to the health of the other, where they sleep together, which might be cruelty."
BROWNE, supra note 337, at 111.
390. See, e.g., Holyoke v. Holyoke, 6 A. 827, 829 (Me. 1886) (holding that a husband could make
out a claim for cruelty based, inter alia, on his wife's refusal of marital intercourse, but only if he could
establish at trial that his wife's actions had "seriously injure[d] or threaten[ed] to injure and impair [his]
physical health").
391. See Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866) ("It is laid down by
Bishop... that the refusal of the husband or wife to dwell with the other party to the marriage; as
husband or wife, is desertion. The same authorities hold that there may be desertion though the parties
continue to occupy the same house."). This case arose in a somewhat unusual posture. TheHeernance
court had to determine whether Rachel Heermance had deserted her husband, in order to resolve an
alienation of affections suit that Mr. Heermance had brought against another man, Mr. James. See id at
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the right to engage in licit sexual intercourse existed only within the
marital relation. He took this to mean that marital intercourse was, in fact,
the defining mark of marriage. 3 2 So that if a wife refused sex without
cause, one could no longer characterize her relationship with her husband
as marital. 93 Bishop also drew analogies to the jurisprudence of
impotency, which held that incapacity at the time of marriage was ground
for dissolution because the impotent party could not perform all of the
obligations of the relation.3 This analogy was not perfect, as impotency
121-23. Heermance found desertion on a demurrer, although Mrs. Heermance had not left her
husband's house, because she had allegedly refused him marital intercourse. See id. at 125-27. For
cases holding that a husband could win a divorce for desertion on the ground that his wife had denied
him intercourse, see Whitfield v. Whitfield, 15 S.E. 543, 543 (Ga. 1892) (per curiam) (quoting
husband's testimony that his wife "'continued to live in the same house in which we had previously
lived .... but would never recognize me as her husband.... [She said] more than once that she would
have her throat cut from ear to ear before she would do so."'); Leach v. Leach, 27 P. 131, 132 (Kan.
1891) ("[T]he refusal of the defendant to cohabit with the plaintiff as his wife for more than five
years ... was sufficient [to authorize a divorce for "gross neglect of duty"]. Probably a much shorter
period of time would be sufficient .... ").
Several cases also granted women divorces for desertion where their husbands had remained in the
same house but ceased having marital intercourse with them. See Stein v. Stein, 5 Colo. 55, 56-57
(1879); Evans v. Evans, 20 S.W. 605, 606 (Ky. 1892).
In addition, Fitts v. Fitts, 46 N.H. 184, 184-85 (1865), and Dyer v. Dyer, 5 N.H. 271, 272-74
(1830), granted divorces under specific New Hampshire statutes that permitted marital dissolution
where the petitioner's spouse had joined a religious society that took marital intercourse to be unlawful
(for example, the Shakers).
392. See BISHOP, supra note 386, at 586 ("[T]here is but the one thing, which is special to
marriage, and is lawful in no other relation. All else pertaining thereto a man and woman may mutually
contract for, and do, without taking the first step toward marriage.").
393. Heernance quoted a key passage from Bishop:
"It may be laid down as a rule, (says Bishop,) that if one party refuse to the other whatever
belongs to marriage alone, from causes resting in the will, and not from physical inability, the
refusing party would thereby voluntarily withdraw from whatever the relation of marriage,
distinguished from any other relation existing between human beings, is understood to imply;
therefore he should be holden to desert thereby the other."
Heermance, 47 Barb. at 126-27. Sisemore v. Sisemore, 21 P. 820 (Or. 1889), approvingly quoted a
similar passage from Bishop, but in that case the wife had both refused marital intercourse and left her
husband's house, see id. at 821-22; see also Stein, 5 Colo. at 56-57 ("Matrimonial cohabitation must
certainly comprehend a living together as husband and wife, embracing relative duties as such.
Otherwise, all the married couples residing in a hotel, boarding or lodging house, might be said to be
cohabiting promiscuously."); NELSON, supra note 32, at 115-16 ("Desertion... means the ceasing to
live together as husband and wife. Marriage is the union of opposite sexes, and sexual intercourse is the
distinguishing feature of that union .... [This] is an undisputed fact of nature recognized in many ways
in our laws. Such intercourse is lawful only in marriage."); SCHOULER, supra note 30, at 63 ("Living in
the same house, but wilfully declining matrimonial intimacy and companionship, is per se a breach of
duty, tending to subvert the true ends of marriage.").
394. See BISHOP, supra note 328, at 649-50 ("[The common law] makes the marriage voidable
where from the time of its solemnization onward there is no power of copula .... [I]f the ends of
marriage are frustrate when there is no power of copula, much more are they so when the same thing is
wilfully and perpetually refused."); see also NELSON, supra note 32, at 117 ("If the impotence of a
party defeats the purpose of marriage, it must be conceded that a wilful, continued and unjustifiable
refusal of sexual intercourse will do so, especially where the party remains in the same house to create
further discord and hatred by her harrowing presence.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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that developed after the wedding did not provide cause for termination. 95
But Bishop did state that he would exempt women who had physiological
reasons for their refusal from divorce for desertion.396 With that caveat in
place, Bishop-and the minority of courts that followed his line of rea-
soning-positioned a wife's duty to submit to her husband's sexual de-
mands at the center of the marital relation and sought to reinforce a
husband's marital prerogatives through civil judgments for desertion.
The law's treatment of marital rape was not the product of consen-
sual agreement in the nineteenth century. The vision of marital rape as un-
contested terrain until the last quarter of the twentieth century effaces a
vibrant movement in opposition. Feminists, in the first organized
woman's rights movement and on its left-ward periphery, demanded a
woman's right to control her own person in marriage, arguing for both an
enforceable prerogative to refuse marital intercourse and palatable socio-
economic alternatives to submission. This campaign was intense, public,
and remarkably frank. It recognized marriage as a potentially antagonistic
or abusive relation, and strove to provide women with rights and re-
sources they could utilize independent of their husbands' agreement, to
defend themselves from a husband's unwanted sexual demands.
This was a radical agenda, yet criticism of marital rape was neither
unthinkable nor unspeakable in the popular discourse of the latter half of
the nineteenth century. Very soon after the woman's rights movement ini-
tiated its public battle against marital rape, sustained accounts of the harm
that marital rape inflicted on wives began to appear in the mainstream
prescriptive literature on marriage, reproduction, and health. This litera-
ture, however, did not support legal change. Instead, it urged husbands to
practice voluntary restraint, on the ground that the concession would
benefit them at least as much as their wives. In the pages of the prescrip-
tive literature, the feminist rights discourse was recast as a series of sug-
gested strategies for marital harmony, health, and happiness. The popular
prescriptive literature promised that the interests of husbands and wives
were actually and always aligned on the question of marital rape, but left
final control over a wife's person with her husband, to be wielded at his
discretion.
395. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
396. See BIsHol,, supra note 32, at 407 ("But if, aside from all special or temporary
considerations, as of health, a wife should utterly refuse to dwell with her husband as a wife, why is not
such refusal, upon principle, a desertion, even though she consent to remain with him as a servant, or a
daughter?"); Heermance, 47 Barb. at 126 (quoting Bishop for proposition that only a person who
refused marital intercourse "'from causes resting in the will, and not from physical inability' would be
vulnerable to divorce for desertion); see also SCHOULER, supra note 371, at 559 ("[W]e would suggest
that, by a slight stretch of statute construction, one partner's denial of sexual intercourse,... if
persisted in wilfully, without some proper excuse such as ill health might furnish.... might, upon the
usual lapse of time, be treated as legal desertion .... ").
2000]
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Ultimately, the law's treatment of marital rape changed just margin-
ally in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Women never won the
right to control their own persons in marriage that feminists had sought.
Indeed, by century's end, the only legal protection a wife could muster
against an uncooperative husband was the slender solace provided by
tepid liberalization of the divorce law. Social recognition of the harm and
prevalence of marital rape was widely disseminated. Yet authoritative le-
gal sources-like popular prescriptive authors-remained unwilling to
structure women's legal rights around the proposition that spousal nego-
tiations over the terms of marital intercourse might be a site of divergent
interests and danger, where wives needed and justly deserved the ability
to protect themselves from their husbands.
V
THE MODERN DEBATE OVER THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
As the feminist movement increasingly turned its attention to suf-
frage in the early twentieth century and then lost much of its organiza-
tional spark after suffrage was won,397 debate over marital rape dwindled.
The first sustained contest over marital rape was coterminous with the life
span of the first woman's rights movement in the United States. Begun
almost immediately upon the organization of nineteenth-century femi-
nism, it dissipated when the movement disbanded.39 It was not until the
last quarter of the twentieth century that the legal status of marital rape
was again subject to significant attack, led this time by the second organ-
ized women's movement. Here too, however, the resulting reform has
been partial and uneven.
397. See BUECHLER, supra note 27, at 148-215; FLEXNER, supra note 23, at 222-345; KRADITOR,
supra note 136, at 261-64. As Nancy Cott has observed, many women channeled their energy in the
early twentieth century into voluntary organizations that were predominantly female in membership,
but not feminist. She explains:
What some of the older generation likely missed in modem women's organizations was
the emphasis on womanhood, the proudly sex-defined sentiment that had powered so many
earlier associations.... The newer women's organizations were so more by habit and
expedience than commitment, it might be said .... Where their nineteenth-century
predecessors collectively constituted the woman movement and would have recognized
themselves as such, the twentieth-century women's voluntary associations did not
collectively constitute the feminist movement-nor would most members have recognized
themselves as feminists; indeed, they had varying and ambivalent relations to feminism,
some opposing it directly.
NANCY F. Corr, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 96-97 (1987).
398. As Rebecca Ryan's history of the marital rape exemption in the period after World War II
notes, authoritative legal sources in this period felt little need to reconsider their commitment to the
exemption before the rise of the modem feminist movement in the 1970s. See Rebecca M. Ryan, The
Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 941,942-43 (1995);
see also id. ("[A]lthough the professional culture formally rejected the principle of marital unity during
the early 20th century, the male sex right remained fundamental to postwar legal scholars' conception
of marriage.... [T]he postwar legal elite [accordingly] created hypocritical arguments that left the
exemption open for attack.").
1482
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1482 2000
2000] CONTESTAND CONSENT 1483
Divorce is now widely available. Indeed, every state has enacted
some form of no-fault divorce in recent years,399 so that the law of cruelty
and desertion has become far less important and developed. But the possi-
bility of divorce, now as in the nineteenth century, does nothing to alter
the law governing intact marriages.' Moreover, many of the practical ob-
stacles to divorce that women confronted in the nineteenth century remain
in place to a significant extent today. Most notably, divorce is still eco-
nomically disastrous for the average woman, especially if she is raising
children.4°t
As for the law of fault-based divorce, the one site of legal reform in
the nineteenth-century treatment of marital rape, it is difficult to draw
generalizations from the handful of cases published in the last quarter
century in which a wife sought a divorce for cruelty based on her hus-
band's unwanted sexual demands. The few cases that do exist, however,
do not stray far from the nineteenth-century regime, with courts taking
care in the successful suits to note a husband's "excessive"4 or
"persistent" 3  sexual demands and/or the injury that the husband's
399. In 1969, California became the first state to eliminate fault-based divorce entirely. In 1985,
South Dakota became the last state to incorporate some no-fault provision into its divorce laws. See
Henna Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 6, 6 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990); see also Henna Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1,
5-6 (1987) [hereinafter Kay, Equality and Difference] (classifying and reviewing no-fault divorce
laws).
400. See supra Part IV.A.
401. Lenore Weitzman has published the best-known work on this subject. SeeLENORE J.
VEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985). Her study, based on evidence from California, found
that divorced women and their children experienced an average 73% drop in their standard of living in
the first year after the divorce, while divorced men saw their standard of living rise by 42%. See id. at
323. Several scholars have challenged Weitzman's methodology and the extremity of her results. See,
e.g., Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988); Richard R. Peterson, A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of
Divorce, 61 Am. Soc. REv. 528 (1996). But a number of studies confirm the fundamental proposition
that divorce leaves the average woman and her children substantially worse off economically than they
were before. See, e.g., Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery
County, Maryland, 22 FAte. L.Q. 225, 284 chart 6 (1988) (reporting that mean per capita income of
women awarded alimony in contested adjudications declined by 37% after divorce and income of their
children declined by 61%, while their former husbands' income rose by 55%); Greg J. Duncan & Saul
D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22
DEMOGRAPHY 485, 488 (1985) (finding that in the first year following divorce or separation "the family
income of women who do not remarry is 70 percent of its previous figure; five years after a divorce or
separation, the ratio for those still unmarried is 71 percent"); Barbara R. Rowe & Jean M. Lown, The
Economics of Divorce and Remarriage for Rural Utah Families, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 301,324-25 (1990)
(reporting that the divorced women in the study experienced a 32% decrease in their standard of living,
while the men experienced a 73% rise); Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory
Study, 20 FA~t. L.Q. 79, 97 tbl.14 (1986) (calculating per capita income after divorce on the assumption
that all support ordered was paid, and reporting that women's income still declined by 33%, children's
declined by 25%, and men's rose by 120%).
402. Pochop v. Pochop, 233 N.W.2d 806, 808 (S.D. 1975).
403. Lemiey v. Lemley, 649 A.2d 1119, 1128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
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conduct has caused to his wife's health.4" There has been more change in
the sparse modem jurisprudence on whether a husband is entitled to a
fault-based divorce when his wife denies him sexual intercourse, but that
movement has been in favor of accepting the husband's claim. Although
most courts rejected such petitions at the end of the nineteenth century, 05a
majority of the courts that have addressed the question since 1975 have
granted fault-based divorces for refusal to have sex.4
Reform of the criminal exemption has also been fragmentary. A ma-
jority of states still retain some form of the rule exempting a husband from
prosecution for raping his wife.4" Some states require a couple to be sepa-
rated at the time of the injury (and sometimes extend the exemption to
cover unmarried cohabitants).0 8 Some only recognize marital rape if it in-
volves physical force and/or serious physical harm.4" Some provide for
404. See id. (holding that a "coercedsexual performance" is "indeed inconsistent with the health,
self-respect and comfort of the other spouse" and affirming judgment "that it was necessary for [Mrs.
Lemley] to leave the home to protect her physical and emotional health") (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); Richardson v. Richardson, 589 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (App. Div. 1992) (noting
that wife had been subject, inter alia, to "the physical and emotional strain caused by [her husband's]
insistence that [she] conform to his sexual wishes" and citing wife's testimony that her husband
"pressured her to perform sexual acts which were physically painful or humiliating to her and caused
her to vomit").
405. See supra Part IV.B.
406. For cases granting a husband a divorce for cruelty or desertion based on his wife's refusal to
have sexual intercourse, see Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 557 So. 2d 1046, 1050-52 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(cruelty); Coleman v. Coleman, 541 So. 2d 1003, 1006 & n.5 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (cruelty); Broussard
v. Broussard, 462 So. 2d 1386, 1389 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (cruelty); Taddonio v. Kinney-Taddonio, 428
So. 2d 486,487-88 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (cruelty); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 399 So. 2d 651, 652 (La. Ct.
App. 1981) (cruelty); Culver v. Culver, 383 So. 2d 817, 817-18 (Miss. 1980) (cruelty); Silver v. Silver,
677 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594-95 (App. Div. 1998) (desertion); Donohue v. Donohue, 636 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105
(App. Div. 1995) (desertion); Chase v. Chase, 618 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (App. Div. 1994) (desertion); Caso
v. Caso, 555 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (App. Div. 1990) (desertion).
For the same holding where the wife was the plaintiff, see Barr v. Barr, 473 A.2d 1300, 1307 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (desertion); Haymes v. Haymes, 675 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 1998)
(desertion); Tissot v. Tissot, 662 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600-01 (App. Div. 1997) (desertion); Pascarella v.
Pascarella, 621 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (App. Div. 1994) (desertion); Ostriker v. Ostriker, 609 N.Y.S.2d
922, 923 (App. Div. 1994) (desertion); Benarroch v. Benarroch, 391 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139 (App. Div.
1977) (desertion); Riechers v. Riechers, 679 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (desertion).
For a case holding that a wife's refusal of sexual intercourse does not constitute desertion entitling
the husband to divorce, see Preston v. Preston, Nos. 0071-97-4, 0175-97-4, 1998 WL 15137, at *1-2
(Va. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998).
407. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
408. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (1987) ("A person does not commit criminal sexual
conduct ... if the actor and complainant were adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary sexual
relationship at the time of the alleged offense, or if the complainant is the actor's legal spouse, unless
the couple is living apart and one of them has filed for legal separation or dissolution of the
marriage."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) ("A person cannot be guilty of
criminal sexual conduct . . . if the victim is the legal spouse unless the couple is living apart
and the offending spouse's conduct constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first degree or second
degree ....").
409. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.373 (1997) ("It is no defense to a charge of sexual assault
that the perpetrator was, at the time of the assault, married to the victim, if the assault was committed
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vastly reduced penalties if a rape occurs in marriage,410 or create special
procedural requirements for marital rape prosecutions.4" Almost all of this
law, moreover, is the product of political advocacy and legislative action,
rather than constitutional adjudication,412 so that the nature and continued
path of change is insecure. Enforcement of the existing statutes recogniz-
ing some forms of marital rape has certainly been very infrequent.4 3
This criminal arena is where modem Americans defending or con-
testing the legal status of marital rape have focused their attention.4 4 The
history of the nineteenth-century campaign against marital rape casts new
light on this modem debate over a husband's conjugal prerogatives and
helps explain its course.
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the modem defense of
the marital rape exemption-apparent when considered in light of the
historical contest over a husband's conjugal prerogatives but generally
unnoticed in contemporary commentary-is that it presupposes the
aligned interests of husband and wife. The two arguments that modem de-
fenders of the exemption have chosen to stress most prominently are that
the law protects marital privacy and promotes marital harmony and recon-
ciliation. These claims are slightly different, but they have a common
project, which is to explain how the exemption advances the shared con-
cers of men and women, benefitting both. Indeed, contemporary sup-
porters of the exemption go beyond that contention. Their assumption of
conjoined interests in marriage is so absolute that proponents do not con-
cede that a marital rape exemption might inflict harm on wives. Their ar-
gument assumes that a wife's interests, like her husband's, are always and
wholly served in a marital relationship where her husband cannot be
prosecuted for raping her. In the exemption's modem defense, the poten-
tial harm of marital rape is rendered invisible.
by force or by the threat of force."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(b)(1) (Supp. 1999) ("'Spousal
rape' means the unlawful sexual penetration of one spouse by the other where: (A) The defendant is
armed with a weapon... ; (B) The defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim; or (C) The
spouses are living apart and one (1) of them has filed for separate maintenance or divorce.").
410. See statutes cited supra note 2.
411. See statutes cited supra note 3.
412. See infra notes 470-471 and accompanying text.
413. See infra note 423.
414. The recent abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in most states, see Carl Tobias,
Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. Rnv. 359, 359 (1989), suggests that wives might be
able to sue their husbands civilly for damages arising out of a marital rape. Thus far, however, few
cases have been brought presenting the issue. For two rare examples, see Henriksen v. Cameron, 622
A.2d 1135, 1137, 1143 (Me. 1993) (permitting suit against former husband for intentional infliction of
emotional distress during marriage, where underlying conduct included marital rape); Lusby v. Lusby,
390 A.2d 77, 77-78 (Md. 1978) (holding that wife could bring damage claim against husband, where
husband threatened her with a rifle, struck her, raped her, and helped his two companions attempt to
rape her).
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This strategy has been very successful, modern feminist efforts
against the exemption notwithstanding. To some extent, the consensual
vision that dominates the contemporary understanding of the history of
marital rape helps account for the influence that the exemption's modem
champions have enjoyed. If one starts with the premise that women have
long accepted husbands' conjugal prerogatives without protest, the notion
that the exemption continues to operate to the shared benefit of a married
couple is likely to seem much more tenable. At the same time, it would be
unrealistic to suppose that the modem commitment to the exemption
would somehow vanish, if the actual record of contest over a husband's
conjugal prerogatives became well-known. As that history makes clear,
the cultural aversion to envisioning marriage (and marital intercourse in
particular) as a potential site of disharmony, antagonism, and danger is
long-lived, widespread, and exceedingly difficult to uproot.
Yet the fact that the exemption's contemporary defenders go so far as
to deny that a marital rape exemption inflicts harm on women provides a
clue as to how modem feminists might proceed. In the nineteenth century,
popular prescriptive writers and authoritative legal sources opposed to
granting married women legal control over their persons felt free, none-
theless, to acknowledge that marital rape caused women serious harm;
they were living in an age that still accepted and endorsed a wide variety
of laws explicitly subordinating women to men. As the exemption's con-
temporary champions have apparently realized, it is much harder to ra-
tionalize the injury that marital rape inflicts, and to then justify the denial
of legal remedies, in a nation that has become formally committed to
women's legal equality. The record of the historical struggle over marital
rape helps reveal this harm, bringing to light what the exemption's mod-
em defenders have tried to obscure. On this base, the modem feminist
campaign against marital rape can build.
A. The Modem Defense of the Marital Rape Exemption
The first prominent modem argument for the marital rape exemption,
the claim from privacy, posits that there is something inherent in the na-
ture of the relationship between husband and wife that makes legal inter-
vention inappropriate, misguided, and ultimately self-defeating. It
contends that the marital relation depends on intimacy protected from out-
side scrutiny, intimacy that could not survive if the law intervened to in-
vestigate and prosecute marital rape charges.
Contemporary defenders of the marital rape exemption do not ar-
ticulate this privacy claim in sex-specific terms, or as a balancing test in
which gains must be set against losses. They do not seek to explain why it
is important to protect men's privacy in marriage through a marital rape
exemption, even if women's interests may suffer. They make no mention
[Vol. 88:13731486
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of the possibility that marital rape or the absence of criminal remediation
might inflict injury on wives. To the contrary, the exemption's modem de-
fenders speak about protecting the privacy of the marital relationship that
husband and wife share, of benefitting both. Consider, for instance, how a
Florida state representative explained his support for a marital rape ex-
emption: "'The State of Florida has absolutely no business intervening
into the sexual relationship between a husband and a wife.... We don't
need Florida invading the sanctity and the intimacy of a relationship.""'4 5
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, who recommend an absolute
marital rape exemption, similarly note that the exemption "avoids [an]
unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into the life of the family."4"' Along
the same lines, the Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted a recent leg-
islative modification of the exemption narrowly in order to stop the state
from invading "the privacy of the marital bedroom for the purpose of
supervising the manner in which marital relationships are
consummated."4 7 The crucial claim of this privacy defense for the marital
rape exemption is that keeping the judicial system away from disputes
over marital rape serves the interests that a husband and wife both have in
maintaining their joint privacy, that the exemption protects the intimacy
that they have established with each other and from which each benefit
unambiguously. Marriage here is envisioned as a necessarily harmonious
relation, and legal intervention as the first, unwelcome introduction of
antagonism and injury.
The other prominent modem claim articulated in favor of the marital
rape exemption, that it facilitates marital reconciliation, similarly explains
the exemption as promoting the shared interests of wives and husbands.
Building on the proposition that marital intimacy is destroyed by outside
observation, this argument contends that the legal system should not be
able to investigate or prosecute marital rape because such intervention
will make reconciliation between husband and wife significantly less
likely. Once the state appears on the scene, the exemption's supporters
suggest, the delicate shoots of love, trust, and closeness in a marriage will
be trampled in a way unlikely ever to be undone. In contrast, if the ex-
emption remains in place, this argument asserts that many married couples
415. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 18 (rev. ed. 1990) (quoting State Rep. Tom Bush)
(emphasis added); see also id. ("'[T]he Bible doesn't give the state permission... to be in your
bedroom, and that is just exactly what this bill has gone to. It's meddling in your bedroom; the State of
Florida, as an entity, deciding what you can do and what you can't do."' (quoting State Rep. John
Mica)).
416. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, at § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 345
(emphasis added).
417. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (emphasis added); see
also Michael Gary Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 31, 34 (1980) ("[it
is questionable whether the complaining spouse alone has the right to waive the marital privacy right of
the couple by presenting the matter before the courts and the public.") (emphasis added).
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will be able to reconcile after what would otherwise be considered a
marital rape.48
Here again, the central premise of the argument is that private recon-
ciliation and the return to regular married life leave both wife and husband
better off than they would have been if the state had been empowered to
prosecute a marital rape. Supporters do not justify the exemption by ex-
plaining why the advantages to husbands of reconciliation without prose-
cution outweigh the potential costs to wives. They do not suggest that the
interests of husband and wife might diverge like that. Modem defenders
of the marital rape exemption do not even phrase their claim as a conten-
tion that a wife should sacrifice her own interests for the sake of her chil-
dren, who may benefit from their parents' reconciliation, or for the sake of
the broader societal benefits associated with marital stability. Their argu-
ment never acknowledges that the exemption inflicts an injury on wives
that might (potentially) be justified by the benefits conferred on those
around them.
Indeed, supporters go further than that and state that married couples
are able to reconcile so completely after a rape that their relationship be-
comes essentially indistinguishable from other marriages, affirmatively
denying the proposition that marital rape causes any lasting injury at all.
In the view of the Colorado Supreme Court, "the marital exception may
remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of normal marital
relations. 4 9 The Model Penal Code similarly emphasizes the normality of
the reconciliation process possible after a marital rape. As the Code's
drafters note, "[t]he problem with abandoning the [marital] immunity in
many such situations ['of rape by force or threat'] is that the law of rape,
if applied to spouses, would thrust the prospect of criminal sanctions into
the ongoing process of adjustment in the marital relationship."420
A less prominent contemporary defense of the marital rape exemp-
tion might be called the "vindictive wife" argument. This claim contends
that the exemption should be preserved in order to prevent wives from
pursuing false charges of marital rape, especially to gain leverage in a
418. See Hilf, supra note 417, at 34 ("Allowing access to the criminal justice system for every
type of marital dispute will discourage resolution by the spouses and will make their ultimate
reconciliation more difficult."); id. at 34 n.15 ("There are two possible problems that can arise when
marital disputes become involved with the legal system. First, knowledge by the spouses that the law
can step in may pose impediments to direct resolution of disagreements .... [Second,] interspousal
efforts at reconciliation may well be frustrated by a rape prosecution."); Comment, Rape and Battery
Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REv. 719, 725 (1954) ("If reconciliation between married
persons is to be encouraged, it would appear best to allow a husband to be prosecuted for rape only
after absolute and final divorce.... [R]ape is a category ill-suited to marriage.").
419. People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (emphasis added).
420. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, at § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 345
(emphasis added).
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divorce suit 42 The line of reasoning openly recognizes the possibility of
marital antagonism (at least at the end of a relationship), placing it in
some tension with the more prominent claims for the exemption from pri-
vacy and reconciliation. But there is a long, distinct tradition in Anglo-
American law, traceable once again to Hale's seminal treatise, advocating
the particular disbelief of rape victims. Hale famously warned that rape
was "an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to
be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent."4"22 The vindictive
wife argument for preserving the marital rape exemption accords well
with this tradition. There is, after all, no empirical evidence to support the
proposition that wives are prone to make false charges of marital rape. To
the contrary, the evidence available from states that allow marital rape
prosecutions suggests that the incidents that women report to law en-
forcement officials tend to be very brutal, and relatively easy to prove.'
421. See Iowa 'Marital Rape' Measure Is Moving, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 24, 1989, at 16,
16 (quoting State Senator Joe Coleman, arguing that bill to reduce scope of marital rape exemption
"'could cause a person to go to jail for 10 years just because of an argument at breakfast, maybe ....
There are certain people who are always wanting to get even.... I think there are other remedies,
rather than going after something that is natural and making that a criminal offense"'); David
Margolick, Rape in a Marriage Is No Longer Within Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1984, at 6E, 6E ("'In a
nasty custody fight, where a husband and wife are really playing hardball, a woman could threaten that
unless her husband became more reasonable, she would charge him with a rape she says he committed
six months earlier,' [Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan Law School] said [arguing
in favor of a limited marital rape exemption]."); George F. Will, When Custom Doesn't Work Anymore,
WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1978, at A23, A23 ("[T]he potential for abuse of the charge in divorce
proceedings [is 'obvious']. It is less obvious that there are fully compensating social benefits from a
law distinguishing from others this particular category of assault.").
422. HALE, supra note 64, at 635. For a discussion of the history of this argument in American
courts, see supra note 69.
423. For example, the National Clearinghouse on Marital Rape (NCMR) identified 42 instances of
marital rape that came to the attention of California law enforcement officials between January 1980
and December 1981. See DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF
WIVES 222-23 (1985). Sociologists David Finkelhor and Kersti Yllo describe the cases this way:
The first thing to note about the cases compiled by the NCMR is that they were, on the
whole, extremely brutal. The cases include one in which a woman was raped with a crowbar
and a sixteen-inch tire iron and then had her breasts slashed with the same
instruments.... The use of knives and guns was a common feature among these cases, and
several included very severe beatings.
Id. at 223-24. The NCMR study found that the husband was convicted in 64% of the cases in which a
charge was lodged, and 89% of the cases that reached prosecution. See id. at 230. These figures
compare favorably with the statistics for nonmarital rape-hardly evidence of a spate of vindictive
wives pursuing false charges. The California State Department of Justice reports that in 1980, for
instance, only 44% of all arrests for forcible rape resulted in conviction, and only 67% of the cases
reaching prosecution resulted in conviction. See id. The high conviction rate in the NCMR study
appears to be a function of the fact that the marital rape cases were disproportionately severe and easily
proved.
The NCMR study constitutes probably the best available empirical evidence on what happens
when a state repeals or limits its marital rape exemption. Social scientists have not focused on the issue,
which is obviously complicated and made especially difficult to study by the fact that states often do
not keep adequate statistics on marital rape. In California, for instance, the NCMR had to identify many
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More fundamentally, the vindictive wife defense of the marital rape
exemption recognizes marital discord in a very particular, and limited,
way. In this vision, the antagonistic and harmful act to be feared in mar-
riage is not the possibility of an actual marital rape. The argument never
suggests that the marital rape exemption may be shielding and facilitating
injurious conduct inflicted by husbands on wives. To the contrary, it envi-
sions the exemption as a check on self-interestedness within marriage, a
legal rule that keeps one spouse from unjustifiably betraying the other (or,
described more precisely, that keeps wives from betraying their hus-
bands). As one state legislator explains the theory, "since society is
already burdened with these kinds of women [vengeful wives] .... the last
thing we need is a law making it illegal for a husband to sexually assault
his wife."424
This mode of argument in defense of the marital rape exemption has
been very successful. Granted, the law of marital rape has changed more
notably in the late twentieth century than in the nineteenth. At the end of a
half-century's effort by the first organized woman's rights movement, the
only alteration apparent in the legal treatment of marital rape consisted of
a marginal liberalization in the divorce law. In contrast, over the past
quarter century, a minority of states have eliminated the exemption and
many more have modified its reach. Yet the marital rape exemption sur-
vives in some substantial form in a majority of states,4" in an era in which
almost every other aspect of women's legal subordination at common law
(including a husband's right to assault his wife nonsexually) has been
formally repudiated.4"6 The modem feminist campaign against marital
rape, like its nineteenth-century predecessor, has encountered tremendous
resistence and had much less of an impact on the law than it aimed for or
achieved in other arenas.
of the marital rape cases on its own and then confirm their character with law enforcement officials.
See id at 222-23.
424. Dick Polman, Sexual Assault in the Home: Is Marriage a License to Rape?, HARTFORD
Anvoc., Feb. 18, 1981, at 2, 2 (reporting comments of Alfred Onorato of the Connecticut General
Assembly).
425. See statutes cited supra notes 1-3, 408-409 and accompanying text.
426. The modem Supreme Court, for instance, has specifically renounced coverture principles on
occasion, noting that a married woman is no longer "regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a
separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being." Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (abrogating the common law rule that prevented a wife from
voluntarily testifying against her husband); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking
down gender-based alimony laws); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-71 (1976)
(striking down spousal consent provisions in abortion statutes); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) ("[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.").
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B. The Modem Feminist Campaign Against the Marital Rape Exemption
Although not explicitly phrased this way, the contemporary feminist
argument against the marital rape exemption, like that of the nineteenth-
century woman's rights movement, is an effort to establish that marriage
is a potentially antagonistic and dangerous relation, in which women need
and deserve legal rights to protect themselves from the serious harms
caused by unwanted sex in marriage. Modem feminists, for instance, have
a radically different understanding of what privacy arguments for the
marital rape exemption are safeguarding. In this view, the use of privacy
rationales to justify nonintervention in cases of marital rape protects and
exacerbates the current distribution of power within a marriage.427 Femi-
nists take this distribution to be markedly imbalanced, noting that men are
disproportionately richer, stronger, and bigger than their wives.4  They
contend that privacy arguments for the marital rape exemption keep the
state from acting to equalize relations in the wife's interest and add state
sanction to the power that husbands exercise.429 On this account, the inter-
ests of husband and wife are very much unaligned on the question of legal
remediation for marital rape, and the overriding function of the privacy
defense of the exemption is not to shelter shared intimacy. Instead, the
privacy claim gives husbands safety in committing highly injurious
conduct that the law would otherwise consider felonious, while simulta-
neously disabling wives from summoning state resources for their own
protection.430
427. See MAcKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 8, at 193 ("When the law of privacy restricts
intrusions into intimacy, it bars changes in control over that intimacy through law. The existing
distribution of power and resources within the private sphere are precisely what the law of privacy
exists to protect.... [T]he legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of... marital
rape .... ); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1510 (1983) ("The argument that nonintervention serves to empower husbands to
dominate their wives and children has been particularly useful in the attack upon the claimed neutrality
of the state with respect to the family."); Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the
State: Responses to and Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. Rv.
79, 113-14 (1994) ("A refusal to intervene in marital relationships that involve assault, battery and/or
rape preserves the relationship of domination and subordination.... [T]he doctrine of family privacy in
the face of domestic abuse .... is an effective mechanism by which institutional and individual male
power and privilege are maintained and fortified."); West, supra note 9, at 67 ("[T]he... reality
experienced by the raped wife as a daily ritual of violence, abuse, and horror strikes the feminist as
unconscionable state passivity in the face of private subordination . .
428. See, e.g., West, supra note 9, at 68.
429. See sources cited supra note 427.
430. See Thomas K. Clancy, Equal Protection Considerations of the Spousal Sexual Assault
Exclusion, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 23 (1980) (arguing that the privacy claim for the marital rape
exemption uses privacy "as a shield to allow one marital partner to force the other into nonconsensual
acts"); Schelong, supra note 427, at 113-14 ("In applying the right of privacy to cases involving marital
rape and domestic violence, the right to privacy is claimed by one spouse over the objection of the
other. In other words, the abuser's right to privacy is more highly valued than the victim's right to
protection, autonomy, and bodily integrity.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The feminist response to the marital reconciliation argument simi-
larly stresses the divergent interests of husbands and wives, and the last-
ing harm that marital rape inflicts on married women. Feminists
acknowledge that men who rape their wives will systematically favor a
legal regime that permits them to avoid prosecution so that they can at-
tempt to reconcile with their wives on private terms. But they contend that
the exemption does not serve women's interests equally well. In this vi-
sion, what irreparably destroys marital harmony-from the wife's per-
spective-is not state prosecution, but the marital rape itself. Even with
the exemption from prosecution firmly in place, a wife may have little in-
terest in marital reconciliation after her husband has raped her.43 Marital
rape causes women severe and abiding injury, feminists explain, and there
is good reason for a wife to conclude that she will be better off if she does
not reconcile with a husband who has raped her.432 Feminists argue that if
a wife would be willing to cooperate in her husband's prosecution, the law
should not second-guess her assessment of her own interests, even if that
assessment diverges from her husband's preferred resolution.43 a
431. See MAcKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 8, at 177 ("Disallowing charges of rape in marriage
may, depending upon one's view of normalcy, 'remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of
normal marital relationships.' Note that the obstacle is not the rape but the law against it." (quoting
People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en banc))); Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The
Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 570-71 (1990-91) ("[TMo the extent that a man has forcibly
raped his wife, an act of ultimate disrepect and violation, it is unlikely that any marital harmony exists
which needs to be preserved."); Clancy, supra note 430, at 23 ("' [R]econciliation hardly seems an
expected or likely consequence of a relationship that has deteriorated to the point of forcible sexual
advances."' (quoting State v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386, 389 (Essex County Ct. 1977))); Schelong, supra
note 427, at 114 ("One of the most often cited justifications for the marital rape exemption.., is that
the state is fostering marital harmony and intimacy by protecting the privacy of the marital relationship.
However, there is no harmonious relationship when the woman is being beaten and raped by her
husband."); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendnent,
99 HARv. L. REV. 1255, 1268 (1986) ("As one court noted, 'it is the violent act of rape and not the
subsequent attempt of the wife to seek protection through the criminal justice system which 'disrupts' a
marriage."' (quoting People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984))).
432. See Augustine, supra note 431, at 571 ("[G]iven that the psychological and physical
repercussions of forcible rape are incalculable, the ideal goal should not be toward the reconciliation of
the rapist/husband and the victim/wife."); Schelong, supra note 427, at 115 ("[The reconciliation]
theory posits that even in the face of rape and assault and battery, state intervention into the marital
relationship is inappropriate because it will impede a couple's reconciliation. This necessarily leads to
the conclusion that the family should be kept intact at all costs."); Note, supra note 431, at 1268-69
("The state has no interest in preserving a deteriorated marriage, and marital rape is one of the strongest
signs of such deterioration. Rape itself disintegrates the marriage .... In reality, reconciliation in the
context of marital rape is often a stage in the cycle of psychological dependence upon a violent, abusive
husband.").
433. See Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 315 (1977) ("[The
reconciliation defense] assumes that in a situation in which a wife is prompted to bring a rape charge
against her husband there is a state of marital harmony left to be disturbed. The assumption that the
wife will be soothed by denying her the protection of the criminal laws is ludicrous on its face."); Note,
supra note 431, at 1268 ("[A] wife's criminal complaint testifies to the absence of marital harmony and
intimacy.").
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In these feminist arguments, the injury ignored or denied by the ex-
emption's modem defenders is presented in stark relief. The modem
feminist rendering of the wound that marital rape inflicts upon women is
somewhat different from the account that the nineteenth-century woman's
rights movement provided, reflecting an evolving set of commitments.
But contemporary feminists, like their nineteenth-century predecessors,
emphasize that marital rape causes women serious harm.
First, modem feminists oppose marital rape on the ground that it de-
prives women of control over their reproductive capacity.4" This argument
is the closest present-day equivalent to the nineteenth-century focus on
control over the work of motherhood. 435 Reproductive concerns, however,
are far less prominent in modem feminist advocacy against marital rape,
perhaps because contemporary feminism accepts contraception and abor-
tion as alternate means of limiting fertility.436 Modem feminists also con-
centrate more on the physiological aspects of motherhood (like conception
and gestation),437 than on the child rearing that occupied the nineteenth-
century movement, a possible manifestation of the contemporary feminist
decision to contest women's disproportionate responsibility for raising
children.
More frequently, modem feminists argue that marital rape denies
women the right to control their sexuality and their chances for sexual
pleasure.438 This claim from sexual self-sovereignty resembles those ar-
ticulated by the free lovers in the nineteenth century,439 although it would
find no equivalent in the organized feminist movement of that period. The
first woman's rights movement, operating in an era that understood
female sexuality to be weaker than its male counterpart, was more occu-
pied by its effort to limit the downside risks of marital intercourse for
women.44 Modern feminists, in contrast, tend (like contemporary
Americans generally) to be more optimistic about and interested in the
possibilities of sexual intercourse, which has implications for their under-
standing of the injury that marital rape inflicts. Their account of harm of-
ten notes that a marital rape victim loses the ability to determine her
434. See sources cited infra note 437.
435. See supra Part II.A.
436. For a discussion of the nineteenth-century feminist movement's opposition to contraceptive
devices and abortion, see supra text accompanying notes 222-225.
437. See Thomas R. Bearrows, Note, Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory
Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 201, 218 ("The right to be free from government interference in the
decision to use contraceptives includes the right to decide which contraceptive to use.... Rape statutes
which include the marital exemption impermissibly burden a woman's decision to use sexual
abstinence as a method of contraception."); Note, supra note 431, at 1263 ("[The marital rape
exemption] allows him to impregnate her against her will in denial of her reproductive freedom.").
438. See sources cited infra notes 441-442.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 253-260.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 212-221.
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sexual "actions, pleasures, and desires free from external influence."',
From this perspective, "[tihe damage occasioned by [marital rape
exemptions] is the subordination, and in many cases the annihilation, of
the psychic, physical, emotional, and erotic female self."" 2 On a related
note, modem feminists also attack marital rape as a violation of women's
bodily integrity, never a focus of nineteenth-century feminism. The mari-
tal rape exemption, in these terms, "manifest[s] disregard for women's
bodily integrity and autonomy and, instead, sanction[s] their vulnerability
in marriage. '
The difficulties that the contemporary feminist campaign against
marital rape has encountered are particularly remarkable because the
modem empirical evidence on marital rape supports the feminists' sex-
specific analysis in many ways, delineating how the interests of men and
women differ and revealing the trauma that marital rape inflicts upon
women. All available evidence, for instance, indicates that marital rape is
virtually always committed by husbands on wives.44 Indeed, I have been
441. West, supra note 9, at 69.
442. Id.; see also Note, supra note 433, at 316 ("[Rjape laws protect a woman's sexual integrity
and freedom of choice in an area of utmost intimacy.... The fact that the rape occurs in a marital
context does not affect the interests which are violated."); Note, supra note 431, at 1263 ("And perhaps
most important, the exemption extinguishes a married woman's autonomy in one of the most personal
and intimate of all human interactions.").
443. Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 213 (1995); see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN AND RAPE 381 (1975) ("A sexual assault is an invasion of bodily integrity and a violation of
freedom and self-determination wherever it happens to take place, in or out of the marriage bed.");
Augustine, supra note 431, at 560 ("A New York court recently explained that '[r]ape is not simply a
sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the
bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychological
harm."' (quoting People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984))); Michael D.A. Freeman, "But If
You Can't Rape Your Wife, Wholmi Can You Rape?": The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15
FAm. L.Q. 1, 9 (1981) ("Rape is the denial of self-determination, the rejection of the victim's physical
autonomy: it symbolizes ultimate disrespect... the exercise of the power of consent over another
person.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Schelong, supra note 427, at 115 ("The
attitude that marital or date rape is a victimless crime, or a lesser crime, is to deny the woman who has
been raped bodily integrity, autonomy, and equal protection before the law."); Bearrows, supra note
437, at 219 ("When a husband forces his wife to engage in sexual relations, he invades her physical
integrity .... "); Note, supra note 431, at 1263 ("The marital rape exemption allows a husband to
violate his wife's bodily integrity.").
444. Contrary to popular assumption, female-on-male rape is physiologically possible. See Philip
M. Sarrel & William H. Masters, Sexual Molestation of Men by Women, 11 ARcHivas SEXUAL BEHAV.
117, 118 (1982) ("It is evident from this report that men or boys have responded sexually to female
assault or abuse even though the males' emotional states during the molestations have been
overwhelmingly negative-embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, fear, anger, or even terror."); Robert
L. Johnson & Diane Shrier, Past Sexual Victimization by Females of Male Patients in an Adolescent
Medicine Clinic Population, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 650, 651 (1987) ("Three-quarters of the female
molesters attempted to get their victims to ejaculate, and nearly half succeeded."); see also A.
NICHOLAS GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER 123-24 (1979) (study of
male-on-male rape reporting that "there appeared to be a substantial effort made by those offenders
1494
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able to locate just a handful of cases in which women may have come to
the attention of American law enforcement authorities for raping adult
men." 5 Only a few more examples of female-on-male rape have been re-
ported in the psychiatric literature."6 It is possible to predict with almost
who assaulted their victims in the community to get these victims to ejaculate. This occurred in nine
(41%) of the community offenses.").
445. The Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) may have uncovered evidence of
a very small number of female-on-male rapes. The BJS has begun to implement "a more
comprehensive and detailed" methodology for compiling data on crime, known as the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). BRIAN A. REAvEs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING NIBRS
DATA To ANALYZE VIOLENT CRIMa 1 (1993). This system was tested in Alabama, North Dakota, and
South Carolina, using their crime data from 1991. These three states reported a total of 3801 incidents
of forcible rape or forcible sodomy, which included 3172 incidents in which the sex of both the victim
and offender was recorded. Out of these 3172 cases, the states reported that just 6 (or 0.2%) involved a
male victim and a female offender. See id. at 8. That is a very low number to begin with, and the
NIBRS study employed definitions of forcible rape and forcible sodomy that included acts so classified
only because of the youth of the victim. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 31 (1997) ("Forcible rape is [defined by NIBRS to mean] the carnal
knowledge of a person forcibly and/or against that person's will; or not forcibly or against the person's
will where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of his/her youth or because of his/her
temporary or permanent mental or physical incapacity."); id. ("Forcible sodomy is [defined by NIBRS
to mean] oral or anal sexual intercourse with another person, forcibly and/or against that person's will;
or not forcibly or against that person's will where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of
his/her youth or because of his/her temporary or permanent mental or physical incapacity."). To my
knowledge, there is no way to discern from any BJS publications whether the reported rapes involved
adult men or male children as victims. The Bureau decided not to analyze the reported female-on-male
rapes because of their small number. See REAVES, supra, at 8 ("Because of the relatively small number
of rape incidents that did not involve a male offender and a female victim, such cases are excluded
from the analyses presented in this report.").
Further evidence of female-on-male rapes coming to the attention of American law enforcement
authorities is elusive. I was able to locate a stray announcement in a law enforcement newsletter
indicating that Dallas police were looking for two women wanted for raping a man at gunpoint. See
Female Rapists Sought in Dallas, CluRm CONTROL DIG., Mar. 28, 1977, at 10, 10. But the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports; one of the best sources for statistics on crime, does
not even attempt to present data about female-on-male rape. It defines rape as "the carnal knowledge of
a female forcibly and against her will." FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998 UNIFORM CRIM REPORTS 23 (1999) (emphasis added).
446. Philip M. Sarrel and William H. Masters have reported the case histories of seven adult men
(age 17 or older) who were subjected to forced and unwanted intercourse, or lesser sexual assaults, by
adult women. See Sarrel & Masters, supra note 444, at 120-22, 125-26. One of these cases concerned a
husband who had been raped by his wife. See id. at 125; see also William H. Masters, Sexual
Dysfunction as an Aftermath of Sexual Assault of Men by Women, 12 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 35,
37-39 (1986) (describing three of these same cases in greater detail).
In addition, a team of British psychiatrists recently conducted what appears to be the largest
epidemiological study of men's non-consensual sexual experiences to date. The study surveyed 2474
men (age 18 or older) located through 18 general practitioner offices in England. See Adrian Coxell et
al., Lifetime Prevalence, Characteristics, and Associated Problems of Non-Consensual Sex in
Men: Cross Sectional Survey, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 846, 846 (1999). "Almost 3% of [the] men reported
having non-consensual sex as an adult [age 16 or older]," with non-consensual sex defined broadly to
mean sex "'where a person(s) uses force or other means so that they can do sexual things to you that
you did not want them to do' or 'where a person(s) uses force or other means to make you do sexual
things that you did not want to do."' I. at 847 & tbl.2. Of these men, "32 (46%) reported having had
non-consensual sex with women (a man and a woman in two cases)." Id. at 847. Out of these 32, 14
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perfect accuracy that marital rape cases will involve the husband as rapist
and the wife as victim. The more lopsided the factual circumstances, the
easier it is to differentiate the consequences that a marital rape exemption
has for men as opposed to women. Within approximately the past twenty-
five years, almost all state exemptions have been revised in a gender-
neutral idiom, so that they now regulate the rape of one "spouse" by the
other."7 But it is not the case that wives routinely, or even occasionally,
benefit from their immunity from prosecution. Just as a factual matter,
husbands experience the marital rape exemption by enjoying immunity
from prosecution. Wives experience the marital rape exemption as the
person who does not receive the protection of the criminal law for acts
that would otherwise be considered serious crimes.
Contemporary empirical research also casts valuable light on the ex-
tent and nature of the injury that marital rape causes wives, adding support
to the feminist argument that marital rape and the exemption inflict seri-
ous harm on women. The best available evidence suggests that approxi-
mately one out of every seven or eight married women has been subject to
what in the absence of the exemption would be considered to be rape or
attempted rape by their husbands. 8 Sociological studies of marital rape
victims have concluded, moreover, that rape can be more traumatic within
marriage than outside of it. As one research team explained,, these
"victims suffer from many of the same traumas as victims of other rape-
the humiliation, the physical injuries, the guilt and self-reproach. But they
men reported that they had been made to have intercourse with a female perpetrator. See id. at 848
tbl.3.
The sociological literature also estimates that women are responsible for approximately 20% of the
sexual abuse of boys and 5% of the sexual abuse of girls. See David Finkelhor & Diana Russell,
Women as Perpetrators: Review of the Evidence, in DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW
THEORY AND RESEARCH 171, 177 (1984) (reviewing studies); see also Johnson & Shrier, supra note
444, at 650 ("In an adolescent medicine clinic with more than 1,000 patients during 1982-1984, 11
male adolescents reported a history of sexual molestation by females. This molestation had commonly
involved acquaintances and was unlikely to have been accompanied by threats of violence or physical
coercion.").
447. See infra note 465 and accompanying text.
448. Diana Russell has conducted the largest and most thorough empirical study of marital rape.
See RUSSELL, supra note 415, at 1-2. She interviewed a random sample of 930 women and reports that
84 (13%) of the 644 women who had ever been married revealed that their husbands had raped them or
attempted to rape them. See id. at 57. Russell's definition of rape included "rape by force, rape by
threat of force, and rape when the wife is in no position to consent because she is unconscious,
drugged, asleep, or in some other way helpless." I at 43.
David Finkelhor and Kersti Yllo have conducted a smaller and less precise study based on a
random sample of 323 women living with a child between the ages of six and fourteen. See FINKELHOR
& YLLO,supra note 423, at 204. Rather than interview these women about marital rape, Finkelhor and
Yllo gave them a written questionnaire asking them: "'Has your spouse ever used physical force or
threat to try to have sex with you?' Id. at 203-04. Ten percent of the married or previously married
women answered "yes." See id. at 6-7, 205 tbl.A-1.
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suffer some special traumas, too-betrayal, entrapment, and isolation." 49
"The kind of violation they have experienced is much harder to guard
against [than rape by a stranger], short of a refusal to trust any man. It
touches a woman's basic confidence in forming relationships and trusting
intimates." '450
There is an even more striking set of materials available that supports
the feminist effort to elucidate and condemn the harm of marital rape.
Women's contemporary accounts of their own lived experiences of forced
sex in marriage render the problem of marital rape vivid in ways that
numbers and scholarly findings may not convey. Like perhaps nothing
else, the dramatic effect of the anecdotal makes clear the unreality and the
ritualistic character of the notion that the marital rape exemption serves a
wife's interests as much as her husband's because marital rape causes
women no perceptible injury. The modem defenders of the exemption, for
instance, portray a husband's prosecution (rather than the marital rape) as
the source of conflict and harm in a marriage.45 ' Women who have been
subjected to marital rape tend to understand their situation quite differ-
ently. One woman describes her experience of rape in marriage this way:
"It hurt. It wasn't fun at all and I was very mad .... I really hated
that man-I could have shot him. He didn't care. I've never hated
anybody like that. I hope no one else ever has to go through it. It's
like a pit inside, it hurts so bad. You don't know how to crawl out
of it. You don't know where to turn. 452
"Sybil," also raped in marriage, would agree. For her as well, the
marital rape "'was horrible,"' leaving her angry, disgusted, and nauseous.
Her husband, though, "'felt like he'd won something.... He feels,"' she
explains, "'like I control when we have sex, and this was showing me that
even if I didn't want to, it could happen anyway."'' "Mrs. James," now
divorced, became pregnant with five of her six children through marital
rape.454 Her assessment of married women's status at the end of the
twentieth century echoes Elizabeth Cady Stanton's most radical
449. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 423, at 137-38. In addition to their written questionnaire,
discussed supra note 448, Finkelhor and Yllo also conducted intensive personal interviews with 50
additional marital rape victims, see id. at 9-12. Their conclusions about the trauma that marital rape can
inflict are based on those interviews.
450. David Finkelhor & Kersti Yllo, Rape in Marriage: A Sociological View, in THE DARK SIDE
OF FAMILIEs: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 119, 126 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983); see
also RUSSELL, supra note 415, at 198 ("[W]ife rape is potentially more traumatic than stranger rape,
usually perceived as the most dreadful form of rape.... [W]ife rape can be as terrifying and life-
threatening to the victim as stranger rape. In addition, it often evokes a powerful sense of betrayal, deep
disillusionment, and total isolation.").
451. See supra text accompanying notes 415-424.
452. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 423, at 117.
453. Id. at 49.
454. See RUSSELL, supra note 415, at 196.
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declarations. "'I vowed I'd never ever marry again,"' she observes. "'I'd
never be in a position where men have authority over me. Marriage is
license to do anything you want. You're not a whole person because no
one respects your rights as a human being."""
Many women's experiences combine marital rape and wife beating,
doubly undercutting the proposition that the exemption is protecting mar-
riages that are otherwise peaceful, harmonious, and mutually supportive.
"Sophia's" husband, for example, beat her while he raped her. In her
words, her "'whole body was being abused.""'4 6 She found the rapes even
more traumatic than the beatings. "'I feel if I'd been raped by a stranger, I
could have dealt with it a whole lot better,"' she says.
"When a stranger does it, he doesn't know me, I don't know him.
He's not doing it to me as a person, personally. With your husband,
it becomes personal. You say, This man knows me. He knows my
feelings. He knows me intimately, and then to do this to me-it's
such a personal abuse. 4
57
"Jean Michel," just twenty-four-years-old when interviewed, would sec-
ond that conclusion.458 "'There's something worse about being raped than
just being beaten,"' she explains. "'It's the final humiliation, the final
showing you that you're worthless.' 459 After her husband raped her, she
"'felt very dirty', .humiliat[ed],"' "'filthy, used."' 4 As she reports: "'I
haven't begun to deal with it, and I'm not sure that I ever will be able to. I
keep wishing there was some way I could work through this rage that I
have about it, but I don't see any way to do it."' 46
C. The Lessons, and the Promise, of History
Despite the availability of this dramatic record of injury, the modern
feminist attempt to explain the marital rape exemption in terms of the di-
vergent, even antagonistic, interests of husbands and wives has not been
particularly effective. In part, the consensual account of the history of
marital rape, now accepted by supporters and opponents of the exemption
alike, helps explain the success of the exemption's modem defenders. The
proposition that the marital rape exemption serves the shared interests of
husbands and wives is likely to appear more reasonable, even common-
sensical, if one approaches the exemption with the assumption that it has
long been the subject of consensual agreement between men and women.
That proposition would be more difficult to maintain if the historical
455. Id.
456. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 423, at 118.
457. Id.
458. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE PoLITIcs OF RAPE: THE VICrIM'S PERSPECTIVE 71 (1975).
459. Id. at 77.
460. Id. at 79.
461. Id. at 79-80.
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contest over marital rape, in which feminists vociferously opposed a hus-
band's conjugal prerogatives as the ultimate foundation of women's sub-
ordination in marriage, were widely known. As this Article has revealed,
the marital rape exemption did not survive into the twentieth century be-
cause it lacked opposition or because no organized cohort of women
thought that the exemption operated to the benefit of husbands but the
great detriment of their wives.
Still, it would be implausible to suggest that the present legislative
commitment to preserving some substantial form of the marital rape ex-
emption, and the judicial decision to not intercede under the Equal
Protection Clause, would instantly collapse, if the historical struggle over
marital rape became common knowledge. If the fate of the nineteenth-
century campaign against a husband's conjugal prerogatives illuminates
anything, it is that society's reluctance to acknowledge that marriage is a
potentially antagonistic and dangerous relation by giving women legal
rights against their husbands is long-standing, well-entrenched, and ex-
tremely resistant to feminist opposition, especially where marital sex and
reproduction are directly implicated. Even the nineteenth-century pre-
scriptive authors who expounded at length on the harm that marital rape
was inflicting on wives were unwilling to translate that social recognition
into support for granting women legal entitlements. Where feminists made
a rights claim advancing women's interests as they were distinct from and
defined in opposition to those of men, the prescriptive literature put forth
a series of suggested strategies for marital harmony and happiness.
Authoritative legal sources, in turn, absolutely refused to alter a husband's
exemption from prosecution for raping his wife. After a half-century of
writing and advocacy (feminist and otherwise) exploring sexual abuse in
marriage, the only change in the legal status of marital rape consisted of a
marginal amelioration in the terms on which divorce was available to
(privileged) women.
Phrased another way, then, one reason that people are so attracted to
the consensual account of the history of marital rape in the first place is
that we greatly prefer to envision marital relations as loving, mutually
supportive, and harmonious, rather than loathsome, abusive, and conflict-
ridden--even though, as a practical matter, we encounter evidence all the
time that the latter state of affairs characterizes some relationships. That
cultural denial helps explain, for instance, the studies finding that even
people who know current divorce rates believe that the possibility that
they will divorce is negligible and fail to plan rationally for the contin-
gency.46 The contemporary defense of the marital rape exemption is one
462. In one study, Lynn Baker and Robert Emery surveyed people "who had recently applied for a
marriage license ... and who had not previously been married." Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of
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of the most conspicuous, if bizarre, expressions of this phenomenon.
Modem courts, lawmakers, and commentators are never more anxious to
expound upon the wonders of marital love, trust, intimacy, and respect
than when a husband's freedom from prosecution for raping his wife is at
stake.
The cultural need to understand marital relations as consensual and
harmonious also helps explain another phenomenon of approximately the
last quarter-century.4 63 During this period, dozens of states revisited their
marital rape exemptions, but decided to retain them in substantial form
nonetheless. One result of this review was that states modified the scope
of their exemptions. 6 Another result was that virtually every one of these
states rewrote its marital rape exemption in gender-neutral terms,4 65 in
contrast to the explicit and enthusiastic gender-specificity of the common
Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440 (1993). "[W]hen asked to estimate the percent of couples
in the U.S. who marry today who will get divorced at some time in their lives, the median response
given by the license applicants was 50%, the closest correct approximation." Id. at 442 (citation
omitted). But "the median response of the marriage license applicants was 0% when assessing the
likelihood that they personally would divorce." Id. at 443. The respondents also expressed unrealistic
optimism about the likely consequences if their marriages did end. For instance, "[allthough the median
female respondent estimated (very optimistically) that 40% of divorcing women are awarded alimony,
81% of the female respondents expected that the court would award alimony to them if they requested
it at divorce." Id. "Fully 100% of the respondents who expected to be awarded alimony upon divorce,"
moreover, "predicted that their spouse would completely comply with the court's award." Id.; see also
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 806, 809, 810 tbl.1 (1980) (reporting that college students were nine and one-half times more
likely to estimate their chances of divorcing a few years after marriage as lower than average).
463. See Wallace D. Loh, Q: What Has Reform of Rape Legislation Wrought? A: Truth in
Criminal Labelling, 37 J. Soc. IssuEs 28, 28-29 (1981) ("Since the enactment in 1974 by Michigan of
the first comprehensive reform rape legislation in the nation, some forty states have modified existing
or passed new statutes on rape.") (citations omitted); Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform
Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JuumETlucs J. 119, 120-21
(1999) ("Rape law reform quickly became a key item on the feminist agenda ['in the early
1970s'].... [Feminists] were joined in their efforts by crime control advocates .... These groups
formed a powerful, although perhaps ill-matched, coalition. By the mid-1980s, nearly all states had
enacted some type of rape reform legislation.").
464. See statutes cited supra notes 1-3, 408-409 and accompanying text.
465. For instance, all of the statutes cited supra notes 1-3, 408-409 are written in gender-neutral
terms. As recently as 1980, in contrast, 18 states and the District of Columbia still had gender-specific
rape statutes, and 3 additional states had switched to gender-neutrality in just the 3 prior years. See
HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 207-
458 (1980); see also PANEL ON RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 125 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess
eds., 1996) ("Beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing throughout the 190s .... [m]ost states
moved to a gender-neutral definition of rape that includes vaginal, anal, and oral penetration by body
parts or other objects."); Ronald J. Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. &
Soc'y REv. 329, 332 (1988); Leigh Bienen, Rape Reform Legislation in the United States: A Look at
Some Practical Effects, 8 VICrSMOLOGY 139, 141 (1983); Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent
Developments in the Law of Marital Rape, 1989 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 343, 349; Julie Homey & Cassia
Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv.
117, 118 (1991); Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform
Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 25,26 (1987).
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law formulation.466 This latter, linguistic change has almost no practical
consequences, given the accuracy with which one can predict that marital
rapes will be committed by husbands on wives.467 But as a matter of mod-
em equal protection doctrine, it is very important. Statutes that explicitly
classify by sex are automatically subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, which relatively few statutes have managed to
survive.4 8 Once a statute has been made formally gender-neutral, how-
ever, it is subject to heightened scrutiny only if a plaintiff can establish the
equivalent of legislative malice: that the gender-neutral statute was en-
acted "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse ef-
fects upon" women .4 This is precisely the sort of malignant motivation
that is least likely to be uttered in the constitutionally conscious age in
which we live. So, as a practical matter, modem marital rape exemptions
are subject to rational basis review. Although a small number of state
courts have found exemptions unconstitutional on a rational basis analy-
sis,47° a marital rape exemption is likely to survive this relatively
466. See supra Part I.B.
467. See supra text accompanying notes 444-447.
468. The explicit sex-based classifications that have survived heightened scrutiny in the Supreme
Court tend to fall into a small set of regulatory categories. A number of decisions turned on women's
gestational capacity. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion), a
plurality of the Supreme Court upheld a statutory rape law that punished only male perpetrators, on the
ground that "the risk of pregnancy itself constitute[d] a substantial deterrence to young females.... A
criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serve[d] to roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on the
sexes." Id. at 473. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), involved a New York law that granted all
biological mothers, but only some biological fathers, the right to veto the adoption of an illegitimate
child and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding, see id. at 266. The statute conditioned
fathers' rights on requirements designed to indicate that they had established a relationship with their
child. See id. at 250-51. The Court permitted the distinction. See id. at 265-68.
Two other cases upholding explicit sex-based classifications under heightened scrutiny concern
military policy. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981) (upholding male-only military
registration on ground that "[mien and women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are
simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft"); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 499-500, 508, 510 (1975) (upholding statutes that granted women more time to secure
promotions in the navy before they were subject to mandatory discharge, on ground that combat
restrictions on women made their advancement more difficult).
Additional cases concern federal benefits. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 730-31, 745-51
(1984) (permitting temporary sex-based classification in spousal benefit provisions of Social Security
Act in order to ease transition to judicially mandated gender-neutral regime); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313, 314-16, 318 (1977) (per curiam) (permitting a more favorable rubric for calculating women's
earnings for purposes of social security benefits, on ground that distinction "operated directly to
compensate women for past economic discrimination").
469. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute because "nothing in the record
demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted
because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined
place in the Massachusetts Civil Service").
470. See Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1303, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Williams v. State,
494 So. 2d 819, 826, 830 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 708, 712-13 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 575 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Naylor, 609
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unrigorous level of constitutional scrutiny, which asks only whether the
legislature has articulated one reason for the exemption that the court is
willing to accept as rational.4 71
Modem feminist critics, including most prominently Robin West,
have provided an excellent doctrinal analysis of the status of gender-
neutral laws under contemporary equal protection doctrine, and explained
the difficulties that the modem feminist campaign against the marital rape
exemption has encountered as rooted in the inadequacy of that doctrine.472
But feminists have not devoted nearly as much attention to the question of
why the Supreme Court might have chosen to privilege gender-neutral
laws in the first place, and whether there is something more behind the
states' move to gender-neutral marital rape exemptions than a desire to
survive constitutional scrutiny. The fate of the historical struggle over
marital rape, and the nature of the modem arguments put forth in the ex-
emption's defense, suggest that the focus on gender-neutralization is tap-
ping into a larger cultural story about mutuality in relations between the
sexes, particularly in marriage.
The effect of the current equal protection doctrine on gender-
neutrality is to treat men and women as occupying interchangeable roles,
in all cases except where the text of the statute or explicit legislative
statements of malicious intent force the court to do otherwise. It is a doc-
trinal methodology for disregarding evidence about gender-specific con-
sequences that suggests the possibility that the interests of men and
women may be unaligned, differentially affected, even antagonistically
opposed to one another, and not interchangeable at all. Marital rape
N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (App. Div. 1994); People v. De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 516 (Suffolk County
Ct. 1983); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987).
471. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (upholding marital
rape exemption under rational basis review); People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 917-18 (Colo. 1982) (en
bane) (adhering to earlier decision in Brown); West, supra note 9, at 67-68.
472. See West, supra note 9, at 45-51, 63-71 (describing why it is so difficult to establish the
unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions under current equal protection doctrine, especially when
those exemptions are linguistically gender-neutral). West explains her argument this way:
My argument will be that the endurance of marital rape exemptions, despite their apparent
unconstitutionality, partly results from the dominant understanding of the meaning of
equality and constitutionally guaranteed equal protection. This understanding, particularly as
elaborated by the present Supreme Court, obfuscates the unconstitutionality of marital rape
exemptions.... In other words, the endurance of marital rape exemptions partly is a function
of the inadequacy of the dominant or mainstream political theory of equality, which informs
dominant legal understandings of the constitutional mandate of equal protection.
... [T]he inadequate theories of equality and equal protection that we have
inherited .... also are a product of the adjudicative institutional context in which those
theories have evolved .... This adjudicative context, I believe, has skewed and limited our
understanding of equal protection and our understanding of how we should make the promise
of equal protection a reality.
Id. at 49-50; see also Note, supra note 431, at 1267-72 (arguing that marital rape exemptions, whether
gender-specific or gender-neutral, violate the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on sex
discrimination).
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exemptions are not the only statutes with disproportionate consequences
for women to have undergone recent revision into a gender-neutral idiom.
Child custody473 and alimony laws474 are now almost uniformly gender-
neutral, and wife beating statutes now regulate "spousal abuse."475 Indeed,
this impulse substantially predates modem equal protection law: State
interspousal tort immunity doctrines, first developed when married
women gained the right to sue in their own names in the middle of the
nineteenth century, were phrased in gender-neutral terms from the out-
set.476 Yet the strength of the yearning to insist within the law that the in-
terests of men and women always harmoniously coincide is nowhere more
apparent than with the marital rape exemption, where the sex-specificity
of the underlying conduct and injury is extraordinarily pronounced, but
equal protection doctrine nonetheless treats husbands and wives as though
they occupy unassigned positions.
473. See Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 20-21 (1990-1991)
("In the 1970's and 1980's, on the heels of no-fault divorce legislation, most states rushed to eliminate
the maternal preference presumption. Currently only seven states give mothers an automatic preference
through case law. Many states rewrote their statutes regarding custody to present a gender neutral
standard."); Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, Life with Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 332
(1978) ("ITihe tender years doctrine [preferring maternal custody] has lost ground so that in 1978 it is
either rejected or relegated to the role of 'tie breaker' in most states.... [lun twenty-two states the
tender years doctrine is rejected by statute or court decision. It has a doubtful status in three states.");
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 615, 620
n.10 (1992) ("California led the way in abandoning a maternal preference, moving in 1972 to a
gender-neutral standard.").
474. As late as 1969, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia defined alimony as an award
that could only pass from a man to a woman. See Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 399, at 12
n.33. The balance soon shifted, however. By 1979, "about forty states had already 'de-sexed' alimony
and had authorized its award, under appropriate circumstances, to either spouse." Doris Jonas Freed &
Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q. 417, 474 (1988). That
year, the Supreme Court found gender-specific alimony laws unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). The decision forced the remaining states
to adopt gender-neutral formulations of their alimony statutes. See, e.g., Lee Hargrave, Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 46 LA. L. REv. 535, 542-43 (1986) (on Louisiana); Isabel Marcus, Reflections on
the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv.
55, 71 (1987) (on New York); Ronald J. Resmini, The Law of Domestic Relations in Rhode Island, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 379, 411 (1995) (on Rhode Island); Note, The Significance of Stokes v.
Stokes: An Examination of Property Rights Upon Divorce in Georgia, 16 GA. L. REv. 695, 705 (1982)
(on Georgia).
475. As Reva Siegel has observed:
While general criminal assault statutes were often used to regulate "domestic disturbances,"
it was also commonplace for judicial opinions, statutes, and law enforcement policies to refer
to the conduct as "wife beating" or otherwise to discuss the parties involved in
gender-specific terms. After 1976, when the Court decided in Craig v. Boren that sex-based
state action would be subject to a heightened or intermediate standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, all this began to change. Residual
gender-specific references were deleted from the law and replaced with gender-neutral
language, with the result that the conduct is now generally referred to as "spousal assault" or
"domestic violence."
Siegel, "The Rule of Love, " supra note 11, at 2189-90.
476. See id. at 2161-70, 2192.
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All this indicates that there are deep-seated reasons why the course of
the modem effort against marital rape importantly resembles that of its
nineteenth-century predecessor, where feminists campaigning to unseat a
husband's conjugal prerogatives had much less of an impact on the law
than they sought, or won elsewhere. There is no easy path upon which
contemporary feminists might proceed, given the profound and long-lived
societal reluctance-particularly where marital intercourse and reproduc-
tion are at issue-to formulate women's legal rights around the under-
standing that marital relations are potentially antagonistic and dangerous.
There is, however, a very pertinent difference between the arena in which
the first organized woman's rights movement operated and the contempo-
rary environment, which suggests that the future fate of the modem femi-
nist campaign against marital rape need not track the historical record.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the proposition that mari-
tal rape inflicted severe harm upon married women was widely
acknowledged. The prescriptive literature described this harm in great
detail. Authoritative legal sources, moreover, never denied the proposi-
tion, and courts occasionally remarked upon it themselves while deciding
divorce cases later in the century. Recall, for instance, that when a New
Jersey court wanted to underscore the weakness of Abby English's di-
vorce petition for sexual cruelty, it cited medical testimony that, "although
there would be pain" whenever English was forced to have intercourse, "a
large proportion of married women assent under exactly those
circumstances." '477 In an age that still accepted and endorsed a vast range
of legal structures explicitly subordinating women to men, this recogni-
tion of injury was not enough to persuade either popular experts on
marriage or lawmakers to repudiate a husband's legal right to rape his
wife.
The modem defenders of the marital rape exemption, in contrast,
submerge and deny the harm that the rule causes women. This has been
good strategy for a reason. It is much more difficult to justify the harm that
marital rape inflicts upon wives, and explain the absence of legal remedia-
tion, in a nation now formally committed to women's legal equality and
the undoing of women's subjection at common law.478 The historical record
helps make this harm concrete, revealing the ways in which it is buried by
the contemporary defense of the marital rape exemption. If the injury that
marital rape inflicts were more systematically put at issue, and arguments
presuming that marital relations never cause women harm were more
systematically resisted, it might be harder for the legal system to continue
to shelter a husband's conjugal prerogatives. Certainly, building on this
477. English v. English, 27 N.J. Eq. 579,582 (1876).
478. See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
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excavation of injury would be a useful place for the modern feminist
opposition to marital rape to begin its work anew.
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